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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is an investigation into the relation
between humor and authority based on the distinction first
articulated theoretically by Freud between tendentious and
non-tendentious cases of humor.

The first chapter is a

fairly detailed introduction to the historical and
theoretical issues that have preoccupied studies of humor.
Though my study makes occasional use of linguistic insights
on humor, my critical thrust is not on a linguistic analysis
of humor, but to demonstrate how humor may be used
successfully or unsuccessfully as an alternate idiom to
aggression.

The second chapter discusses the relationship

of aggression to authority fundamental to the conflictual
model of humor in the works of the seventeenth century
writer Sir Thomas Browne.

Browne's texts demonstrate in an

incipient form the ground-zero of disarming tendentious
humor.

The third chapter discusses the two different modes

in which humor may act as a corrective to authority from the
inside in two colonial texts: Sir william Jones's
translation of the Sanskrit drama Sakuntala and Rudyard
Kipling's Kim.

The fourth chapter attempts to demonstrate

that Dorothy Parker uses self-deprecating and melancholic
humor in her short stories as a device to create self vi

awareness in her characters which leads them to experience
liberating laughter. The fifth chapter discusses the almost
total appropriation of the language of aggression by
subversive humor in the radio-plays of The Firesign Theatre
which insinuates itself inside the structures of authority
and attempts to destroy it from the inside.

The radioplays

of The Firesign Theatre represent a highly evolved and
sophisticated structure of humor that does not leave safety
valves of any manner to save the institutions that they
challenge.

The overall impulse governing my study is to

discover as many models to combat aggression successfully
with as little harm done to one's self and others.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction: Some Serious Thoughts on Humor

As with many other good things in Western thought, music and
poetry for instance, humor was also first discussed by the
Greek philosophers-

Though we do not find generic

classifications of the laughable into humor, joke, wit,
comedy, parody, and satire in Philebus. Plato isolated for
us for the first time a theoretical perspective on the
mental state that we might call amusement, the common
denominator to all categories of the laughable.

Plato in

his dialogue with Protarchus in Philebus censures humor on
the ground that there is no such category as "innocent"
laughter.

Plato defines the category of the "ridiculous,"

the traditionally designated object of humor as a perception
tho.t produces a mixture of pain and pleasure in the eyes of
the beholder, regardless of the object’s relation to the
beholder:
Then our argument shows that when we laugh at what is
ridiculous in our friends, our pleasure, in mixing with
malice, mixes with pain, for we have agreed that malice
is a pain of the soul, and that laughter is pleasant.
1

2
and on these occasions we both feel malice and laugh.
(The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor 13)
Plato's student, Aristotle, revised Plato's definition of
the ridiculous and dislodged laughter from its metaphysical
relations with the soul that had interested Plato.

We have

to wait for Soren Kierkegaard, George Santayana and Sigmund
Freud to revisit Plato's original theory of laughter as
partly painful.

Aristotle's emphasis was on mimesis and

genre; in his extant definition of comedy (Umberto Eco based
The Name of the Rose on the missing original fragment) he
theorized that the "ridiculous" (qelos) is a painless mask:
Comedy, as we have said, is an imitation of people
who are worse than the average. Their badness,
however, is not of every kind. The ridiculous,
rather, is a species of the ugly; it may be
defined as a mistake or unseemliness that is not
painful or destructive. The comic mask, for
example, is unseemly and distorted but does not
cause pain.

(The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor

14}
Cicero following Aristotle maintained that "the seat and
province of the laughable, so to speak, lies in the kind of
offensiveness as deformity, for the sayings that are laughed
at the most are those which refer to something offensive in
an inoffensive manner"

(The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor

3
17).

Cicero's observation that proper laughable sayings

refer to "something offensive in an inoffensive manner"
marks the rhetorical mode in the study of humor.
Longinus, in an improvement of or an alteration of
Aristotle’s generic classification drew examples from drama,
epic, lyric, history, rhetoric and theology to theorize
about the sublime, an aesthetic category purged of all
aggressive emotions:
For as I keep on saying, actions and feelings which
come close to sweeping us off our feet serve as an
excuse and a lenitive for any kind of daring
phraseology. This is why, even when they reach the
point of being actually incredible, the shafts of
comedy also seem plausible from their very
laughability, as in "The field he had was smaller than
a letter." For laughter, too, is an emotion related as
it is to pleasure.

(Classical literary Criticism 149-

50)
Longinus's is a lone voice among the ancient philosophers
writing about humor as a potentially transcendent and
aesthetically pleasing emotion.

Subsequent studies of

.iumor, with the above-noted exceptions of Kierkegaard,
Santayana and Freud, have all followed the Aristotelian
paradigm which maintains that the object of laughter, the
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ridiculous, produces no pain in the eyes of the beholder.
For instance, Thomas Hobbes wrote in Leviathan:
Sudden glory,

[sic] is the passion that makes those

grimaces called laughter; and is caused either by some
sudden acts of their own, that pleases them; or by the
apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by
comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves.

(The.Philosophy of fravghter an£JHufflQ£ 19)
Hobbes articulates explicitly for us the power distribution
in a context of laughter; the one who laughs is more
powerful than the one who is being laughed at, and feels
morally superior in doing so, since the object of laughter,
the ridiculous, evokes no sympathy in them.

The philosopher

Descartes, Hobbes's contemporary, similarly claimed as the
source of humor the state of superior feeling that another’s
disaster brings to our ego.

He included joy and wonder as

sources of humor as well, but what he ei. ~d treating
extensively in The Passion of the Soul is laughter
occasioned by scorn and ridicule, reducing the scope of
laughter in wonder and joy, tilting the balance in favor of
aggression.

Descartes, moreover, gave a new definition to

the Aristotelian notion of the ridiculous; Aristotle told us
that we laugh at what is ridiculous, ugly, or otherwise
aberrant.

According to Descartes, such objects of
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imperfections are in themselves carriers of malicious
mockery:
And vie notice that people with very obvious defects
such as those who are lame, blind of an eye, hunchedbacked, or who have received some public insult, are
especially given to mockery; for, desiring to see all
others held in as low estimation as themselves, they
are truly rejoiced at the evils which befall them, and
they hold them deserving of these.

(The Philosophy of

24}
Descartes’ definition of the ridiculous as laughing at what
laughs at it might seem like a perspective! shift tor the
better, with the underdog getting the upper-hand, but it is
not; it only enhances the notion of aggression aimed at
producing an imbalance of power between the participants in
the humorous situation.
The relation between the one who laughs and the one
being laughed at, in other words, the deployment of the
concept of the ridiculous, may be likened to the social
relation between the one who commands and the one who obeys
-the master and the slave.

The ridiculous as a laughable

category is dependent on the masters suppressing the
subjectivity of the slaves, which is the only way in which
such laughter can possess an appeal.

The lowest kind of

laughter is one where the self-consciousness of the slaves
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is not visible at all, they offer no resistance to being
laughed at, and no attempt is made from their side to
transform, their relation to their oppressors.

For this

transformation to take place, acknowledging the ground of
pain in laughter is essential which Plato recognized and
Aristotle dismissed.

Hegel in the Phenomeno1oav of the

Spirit explained the role and. the responsibility of the
slave to change the social conditions of his existence:
Generally speaking, it is the Slave, and only he, who
can realize a progress, who can go beyond the given
and--in particular--the given that he himself is. On
the one hand, as I. just said, possessing the idea of
Freedom and not being free, he is led to tranform the
given (social) conditions of his existence--that is, to
realize a historical progress. Furthermore--and this is
the important point--this progress has a meaning for
him which it does not and cannot have for the Master.
(Kojeve

50)

My attempt in. this dissertation is to revive Plato's
original theory that laughter is a partly painful index of
social relations, since laughter is a human, social
phenomenon, and as such, manifests the Hegelian dialectic in
its operation.
Among eighteenth.-century philosophers writing about
humor, Kant focuses on the mode of perception rather than

the object.

Humor as the sudden perception of an

incongruity has found favor with many succeeding
philosophers, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard to some extent, and
as one category of humor, for Freud.

Kant refers to the

humorous joke in the second book of the Critique of
Judgement:
In the case of jokes (the art of which, just like
music, should rather be reckoned as pleasant than
beautiful), the play begins with the thoughts which
together occupy the body, so far as they admit of
sensible expression; and as the understanding stops
/suddenly short at this presentiment, in which it does
not find what it expected, we feel the effect of this
slackening in the body by the oscillation of the
organs, which promotes the restoration of equilibrium
and has a favorable influence upon health.

Maeisni

(Critique of

177)

Laughter is the sudden transformation of a strained
expectation into nothing, and to illustrate this point, Kant
tells the following joke of an Indian at the table of an
Englishman in Surat who when he saw a bottle of ale opened
and all the beer turned into froth and overflowing,
testified to his great astonishment with many exclamations.
When the Englishman asked him, "what is there in this to
astonish you so much?"

the Indian answered, "I am not at
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all astonished that it should flow out, but I do wonder how
you ever got it in" (Critique 178) .

Hobbes might theorize

that we laugh at the stupidity of the Indian, whereas Kant
would conclude that we laugh at this joke because our
expectation was strained for a time and then was suddenly
dissipated into nothing.

This free play of thought,

however, should harmonize with bodily movement and it is
this harmony that will produce the feeling of well-being
that laughter effects.

Humorous exposition, Kant writes, is

"the talent of being able voluntarily to put oneself into a
certain mental disposition, in which everything is judged
quite differently from the ordinary method (reversed, in
fact), and yet in accordance with certain rational
principles in such a frame of mind" (Critique 181).
Kierkegaard portrayed incongruity as the necessary
foundation upon which life is sustained; to Kierkegaard,
this definition of incongruity stems from his preoccupation
with the religious individual (the only category of human
beings that interests him) who cannot be known for what he
is by anyone else.

This gap or contradiction is comical,

since it conceals rather than reveals, or reveals only
obliquely.

"The comical is present in every stage in life

(only that the relative positions are different), for
wherever there is life, there is contradiction, and wherever
there is coiitradiction, the comical is present . . . .

and
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wherever one is justified in ignoring the pain, because it
is non-essential"

(Concluding Unscientific Postscript 459).

Kierkegaard refutes Aristotle's theory that the ridiculous
is a painless mask on the grounds that "even if the
distorted countenance does not cause pain, it is
nevertheless painful to be destined thus to arouse laughter
as soon as one shows one's face"

(Concluding 459).

Kierkegaard postulates that the comical is always a
relation, not merely the perception of the ridiculous in
something or someone, but the perception of a contradiction
which involves the acknowledgement of a relation between the
subject and the object, and that as a relation, it adheres
closely to ethical expectations as in any other forms of
human interaction.

Kierkegaard formulates his corrective to

Aristotle on such ethical grounds:
Of the comical there is certainly enough everywhere,
and at every time, if a man only has an eye for it; one
could continue indefinitely, unless through being clear
about where to laugh, one also understood where not to
laugh.

. . . Recklessness and frivolity as productive

energies produce the loud laughter of indeterminacy and
sensuous irritability, which is extremely different
from the laughter that accompanies the great
translucency of the comical.

If one desires to learn

in a good school, one should for a time renounce
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laughing at what arouses antipathetic passion, where
turgid forces may easily carry a man away; exercising
oneself rather in perceiving the comical in this or
that for which one has partiality, where the sympathy
and the interest, aye the partiality create the
disciplinary opposition against inconsiderateness.
(Concluding 462)
In theoretically positing an opposite category to "loud
laughter" Kierkegaard stakes out the territory that I wish
to explore in this dissertation.

My task is to listen for

this "quiet laughter" born out of a "disciplinary opposition
against inconsiderateness."

The set of power relations

produced by "quiet laughter" is necessarily different from
that produced by that of loud laughter.

Kierkegaard used

the comical as a spiritual device to express his hidden
relation to God (he called humor his "incognito"), but he
demonstrates how humor might be used as a strategy to
preserve and exalt one's sense of self, instead of allowing
external authority to destroy it.

Kierkegaard articulates

for us most clearly, along with Longinus, Santayana, and
Freud, the potential for humor to create a point of view
from scratch that is ethical, secure, grounded in mental
sanity and avoiding the neuroses of repression and
aggression.
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The "comical" covered the whole parameter of humor for
Kierkegaard, but George Santayana's

theoretical approach to

laughter distinguished between laughter occasioned by the
comic, wit, humor, and the grotesque and in each case staked
out, more thoroughly and in greater detail,

a different set

of relations between the participants in the particular
context of laughter.

Incongruity, which had explained the

humorous experience for Kant and Kierkegaard, does not
constitute the whole explanation of humor for Santayana.

In

The Sense of Beauty, Santayana unequivocally revives the
paradoxical relationship between pain and laughter which we
saw was first noted by Plato.

For Santayana, it is not

possible to ignore pain in any context of laughter.
pain is essential to it.

Indeed

Comic laughter, the least aware,

does not connect us with suffering nor does it make us
credit our awareness of evil in a sympathetic manner:
Fun is a good thing, but only when it spoils nothing
better. The best place for absurdity is in the midst of
what is already absurd--then we have the play of fancy
without the sense of ineptitude.

Things amuse us in

the mouth of a fool that would not amuse us in that of
a gentleman; a fact which shows how little incongruity
and degradation have to do with our pleasure in the
comic.

In fact, there is a kind of congruity and

method even in fooling. The incongruous and the
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degraded displease us even there, as by their nature
they must at all times.

The shock which they bring may

sometimes be the occasion of a subsequent pleasure, by
attracting our attention, or by stimulating passions,
such as scorn, or cruelty, or self-satisfaction (for
there is a good deal of malice in our love of fun); but
the incongruity and degradation, as such always remain
unpleasant.

(The Sense of Beauty 249)

Santayana isolates the most liberating form of laughter
possible for human beings, laughter that does not leave any
residue of aggression, scorn, or brutalization of our own
sense of self which tends to accept the transference of such
emotions from the spectacle of laughter produced before it.
The delight produced by wit offers a valid form of pleasure,
in which incongruity is yoked quickly and effortlessly with
the perception of similarities between ostensibly different
forms.

But wit in thus scrambling the different

compartments of life to make amusing comparisons often
"belittles one thing and dignifies another; and its
comparisons are as often as flattering as ironical"
Sense of Beauty 251).

(The

Santayana always brings us back to

the ground-zero of framing aesthetic perceptions against the
human value system, and wit, though more complicated than
the comic, has something reductive about it:
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Hence the understanding, when not suffused with some
glow of sympathetic emotion or some touch of mysticism,
gives but a dry, crude image of the world. The quality
of wit inspires more admiration than confidence. It is
a merit we should miss little in any one we love.
(The_ Sense of Beauty

252)

Santayana regarded the malicious or destructive character of
intelligence as not fundamental, since "all that can be
changed by the exercise of intelligence is our sense of the
unity and homogeneity of the world"
251].

(The Sense of Beauty

When intelligence and reason are mixed with generous

emotion, even that of sentiment, Santayana argues that wit
leaves the dry bed of repartees and satire: "the mood is
transmuted; the mind takes an upward flight, with a sense of
liberation from the convention it dissolves, and of freer
motion in the vagueness beyond.

The disintegration of our

ideal here leads to mysticism, and because of this effort
towards transcendence, the brilliancy becomes sublime"
(Sense 253).

Santayana refreshes in our memory the

Longinian category of laughter as a sublime emotion.
The sense of liberation that kind perception of
incongruities brings with them results in a paradox because
its effect on us is exalting rather than belittling or
aggressive.

Humor, according to Santayana, provides the
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clearest example of this degree of paradoxical liberation
through laughter:
The essence of what we call humor is that amusing
weaknesses should be combined with an amicable
humanity. Whether it be in the way of ingenuity, or
oddity, or drollery, the humorous person must have an
absurd side, or be placed in an absurd situation.

. .

And the explanation of the paradox is the same . . .

in

humor, the painful suggestions are felt as such, and
need to be overbalanced by agreeable elements. These
come from both directions, from the aesthetic and the
sympathetic reaction . . . The juxtaposition of these
two pleasures produces just that tension and
complication in wuich the humorous consists. We are
satirical, and we are friendly at the same time.

The

consciousness of the friendship gives a regretful and
tender touch to the satire, and the sting of satire
makes the friendship a trifle humble and sad.

(Sense

254-55)
Santayana, like Kierkegaard, regrounds our understanding of
humor as a relation between two or more entities.

We might

summarize their conclusions thus:
1.

Loud laughter will result in a set of relations with a

different dynamics than quiet laughter.
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2.

Laughter leaves a psychological effect on th

speaker as

well as the listener(s).
3.

Laughter seldom is without purpose.
In the twentieth century, Sigmund Freud .s the only

theoretician who extracted the submerged and often ignored
dialectical model of power-relations inherent in the
production and reception of laughter.

Freud analysed and

contrasted all manifestations of the mental state of
amusement, such as humor, jokes, wit, the comic, smut, and
is the only theorist who postulated unequivocally a
qualitative value to humor as an exalted, defense mechanism
of the human mind.

Freud propose

his original theory of

humor in Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905)
in which he considered humor posited on the "hydraulic"
theory of psychic energy popular in the nineteenth century.
Freud, like Santayana, distinguished between jokes and wit,
the comic and humor, and in each case, he identified a
different deployment of our psychic energy.

He found that

in each case, we summon up psychic energy for a specific
task, which is then discovered not to be needed, and thus
"saved" or "economised" and released in the form of muscular
movement known as laughter.

Comic saves us energy of

thought; jokes and wit, the energy used to repress hostile,
sexual, aggressive feelings; and humor, the energy of
wasting and negative emotions like fear and pity.
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Freud thus foregrounded, once again, the unpleasant
fact of hostile and negative emotions as a permanent fixture
in any context of laughter.
kinds of jokes:

Freud distinguished between two

(1) tendentious jokes, which are told for a

purpose, usually an aggressive one,

(2) non-tendentious

jokes or innocent jokes in which the joke is an end in
itself and serves no particular end,

Freud observed that,

"only jokes that have a purpose run the risk of meeting with
people who do not want to listen to them" (Jokes and Their
Relation to che Unconscious 90).

The German adjective

"tendenzios," from the German substantive "Tendenz," has
become the naturalized English word "tendentious," which
Freud uses to refer to jokes with a purpose and which are
likely to provoke cr elicit conflict.
Freud admitted that from the point of view of throwing
theoretical light on the nature of jokes, "innocent and
trivial jokes are likely to put the problem of jokes before
us in its purest form, since with them we avoid the danger
of being confused by their purpose or having our judgement
misled by their good sense" (Jokes 94).

Regarding our

defense of innocent jokes, Freud observes that, "the joking
activity should not, after all, be described as pointless or
aimless, since it has the unmistakable aim of evoking
pleasure in its hearers.

I doubt if we are in a position to

undertake anything without having an intention in view"
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(Jokes 95).

Freud’s methodology, ”joke-work," with its keen

analysis of devices to repress or distort meaning in. a joke,
methods such as displacement, substitution, allusion,
combination, is similar to his "dream-work" developed in The
Interpretation of Dreams,

Dreams were useful to Freud in

his clinical treatment of severely disturbed patients
precisely because of their power to reveal and conceal
simultaneously the sufferings inflicted from unconscious
motives within the self.

Like Hegel's definition of the

philosopher as the man who seeks to gain full selfconsciousness which will result in a coherent explanation of
all things in nature ana history, Freud's primary concern
was not the knowledge of anything external to the self, but
an understanding and awareness of our own doings; hence; his
keen theoretical interest on why we laugh.

Freud's

characteristic statement *'I doubt if we are in a position to
undertake anything without having an intention in view" is
reminiscent of his theoretical postulate in The
interpretation of.Dreams;
Dreams are not to be likened to the unregulated sounds
that rise from a musical instrument struck by the blow
of some external force instead of a player's hand . . .
they are not meaningless, they are not absurd; they do
not imply that one portion of our store of ideas is
asleep while another portion is beginning to wake. On
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the contrary, they are psychical phenomena of complete
validity--fulfillments of wishes; they can be inserted
into the chain of intelligible waking mental acts; they
are constructed by a highly complicated activity of the
mind,

(The Interpretation of Dreams 122)

Freud observes that tendentious jokes serve two purposes:
one, a hostile joke, serving the purpose of aggressiveness,
satire or defense; two, an obscene joke serving the purpose
of exposure.

Freud describes the dynamics of "smut" (zote)

or a sexual joke thus:
It is a further relevant fact that smut is directed to
a particular person, by whom one is sexually excited
and who, on hearing it, is expected to become aware of
the speaker’s excitement and as a result to become
sexually excited in turn. Instead of this excitement
the other person may be led to feel shame or
embarrassment, which is only a reaction against the
excitement and, in a roundabout way, is an admission of
if. Smut is thus originally directed towards women and
may be equated with attempts at seduction. If a man in
a company of men enjoys telling or listening to smut,
the original situation, which owing to social
inhibitions cannot be realized, is at the same time
imagined.

A person who laughs at smut that he hears is
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laughing as though he were the spectator of an act of
sexual aggression.

(Jokes 97)

Jane Gallop in "Why Does Freud Giggle When the Women Leave
the Room?" attempts to probe Freud's disguised, contemptuous
view of male homosexuality through a reductive reading

of

the above smut scenario in which she claims that the smut
allows man to enter a man's homosocial realm through the
absence of the woman:
Men exchange women for heterosexual purposes, but the
real intercourse is that exchange between men.

The

heterosexual object is irretrievably lost in the
circuits, and the man is consoled by the homology.

But

the pleasure in the joke, in the homology, the
temptation of the analogy points to the homosexual, the
anal , . .

(Thinking Through the Body 37)

Gallop's specific disagreement with Freud is essential to
our inquiry, since it foregrounds, once again, the patina of
aggression involved in the relation produced by a joke.
Gallop finds Freud's observation about the loss of tne woman
in a smut scenario to be an instance of Freud's patriarchal
ideology in which "identification with the father equals
patriarchal power; desire for the father equals castration,
humiliation"

(Thinking 38).

But it is possible to argue

that in Jokes. the anal stage fascinates Freud as a sexual
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phase, as the source of 11shame" that is a necessary part of
smut's plan of aggression:
The sexual material which forms the content of smut
includes more than what is peculiar to each sex; it
also includes what is common to both sexes and to which
the feeling of shame extends--that is to say, what is
excremental in the most comprehensive sense. This is,
however, the sense covered by sexuality in childhood,
an age at which there is, as it were, a cloaca within
which what is sexual and what is excremental are barely
or not at all distinguished. Throughout the whole range
of the psychology of neuroses, what is sexual inlcudes
what is excremental, and is understood in the old,
infantile sense.

(Jokes 98)

Gallop attempts to make Freud's theory of aggressive
laughter reductive, less universal, by compartmentalising
its victims --women, homosexuals, lower-class etc.

Gallop

does not radically challenge Freud's theory of aggression by
defending homosexuality in an "egalitarian" manner.

Freud's

exposition of smut’s power to humiliate its object may be
seen to hold true regardless of gender or sexual behavior.
Freud's comments on regressing to the anal stage qualifies
it as a pathological regression when done intentionally for
the purpose of reducing the adult ego to its infantile
stage, in which case the dislocation produces humiliation,
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aggression, and pain to the ego.

Freud uses the smutty

jokes as expressions of pathological relations where one
character is definitely demoted in power in relation to the
other.
We might summarize Freud's findings about laughter
thus:
1.

Laughter is seldom without a purpose.

2.

The purposes of laughter are usually for two modes of

aggression--hostile or obscene.
Freud in a later essay entitled "Humor" (1928) revised
some of his earlier findings about humor, not in a
theoretical leap, but in an expansion of the central idea.
The relation produced by tendentious laughter is essentially
aggressive and leads to neuroses and repression and eventual
destruction of the ego.

Humor, on the other hand, Freud

observes, is tendentious laughter that does not leave the
ground of mental sanity and counters aggression without
destruction done to the ego of the subject.

Not everyone

possesses the humorous point of view, Freud notes; it is the
triumph of the pleasure-principle, "the ego’s victorious
assertion of its own invulnerability.

It refuses to be hurt

by the arrows of reality or to be compelled to suffer"
(Collected Papers 217):
These last two characteristics, the denial of the claim
of reality and the triumph of the pleasure principle.

cause humor to approximate to the regressive or
reactionary processes which engage our attention so
largely in psychopathology. By its repudiation of the
possibility of suffering, it takes its place in the
great series of methods devised by the mind of man for
evading the compulsion to suffer -a series which begins
with neurosis and culminates in delusions, and includes
intoxication, self-induced states of abstraction and
ecstasy. Owing to this connection, humor possesses a
dignity which is wholly lacking, for instance, in wit,
for the aim of wit is either simply to afford
gratification, or, in so doing, to provide an outlet
for aggressive tendencies.

(Collected Papers 217)

Humor is rebellious and is the loftiest of mind's defensive
devices, according to Freud.

The humorous point of view, in

Freud's terminology, incorporates a strong super-ego
pacifying the ego intimidated by conflict.

Freud's analogy

is of course that of the parent and the child, but without
distorting the analogy for ideological purposes, we might
conclude that the humorous point of view requires the
creation of a benign authority within ourselves that
protects us or vaccinates us against destructive authority
from the outside.
My use of Freud's model of tendentious laughter, humor
and its relation to destructive authority, is to identify
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models of non-violent attacks on authority.

My primary

objective is to extract ways in which humor may be used in a
pointed but non-destructive manner to challenge, transform
or destroy authority with minimum harm done to others or
one's self.

Though my study makes occasional use of

linguistic insights on humor, for instance, the semantic and
syntactic rules governing certain jokes, my emphasis is not
on a linguistic analysis of humor.

I attempt to demonstrate

how humor may be used successfully or unsuccessfully as an
alternate idiom to aggression.
My reading of Sir Thomas Browne's Pseudodoxia Eoidemica
and Reliaio Medici attempts to show how humor is used in
these texts to diffuse aggression against authority by
absorbing it into the matrix of challenge and transforming
it into a non-violent point of view in the process.
Browne's texts demonstrate in incipient form what I would
term "whackiness" or ground-zero of disarming tendentious
humor.

It is instructive to learn Browne's strategies to

combat false authority,
The first part of the third chapter discusses the
structural transformation that the character of the clown in
Kalidasa's Sanskrit drama Sakuntala undergoes in Sir William
Jones's colonial English translation.

The clown's humor is

a style that is permitted by authority and hence is not
threatening to the

la tv .
* quo of authority.

In the gap
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between the clown's characterization in the original and
Jones's characterization in the translation we may perceive
two different modes in which humor may act as a corrective
to authority from the inside.
The second part of the chapter is a discussion of the
function of the idiom of jest in another colonial text,
Rudyard Kipling's Kim.

Kipling experiments with humor as

the language of a world-view that offers an alternate model
to the master-slave dialectic characteristic of the colonial
enterprise.

Kipling’s answer to the Hegelian dialectic is

the master-disciple or lover-beloved bond.
My fourth chapter attempts to demonstrate that selfdeprecating humor need not always necessarily be taken as a
sign of compromise or defeat.

My primary examples are the

short stories and poetry of Dorothy Parker which have been
traditionally censured as simultaneously self-deprecating
and hostile towards others.

In my examination of these

texts, I contend that Parker positions herself outside the
parameters set for women by patriarchy.

She uses humor as a

distancing tool to subvert men's unfair expectations about
women.

Parker's stories demonstrate the possibilities and

dead-ends governing most cases of subversive humor.
The radio plays of The Firesign Theatre represent a
highly evolved and sophisticated structure of humor that
does not leave open safety valves of any manner to save the
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institutions that they challenge.

In these plays we may

locate an almost total appropriation of the language of
aggression by subversive humor that insinuates itself inside
the structures of authority and attempts to destroy
authority from the inside.

Technology, radio, computers,

etc., are thus artfully appropriate t- pes for this ultimate
subversion from the inside.
I have chosen Sir Thomas Browne as a starting point for
my research for two reasons.

One textual: his use of humor

demonstrates in the quietest manner possible, how to contend
the authority of past masters --here, medieval science-acknowledging the conflict, working to change it without
violence, and establish himself as an authority on an equal
footing with his adversaries.

Two, formal:

Browne's

historical relation to his opponents, that is the relation
of seventeenth-century empirical science to medieval
science, is similar to the relation of ■adio to television
explored in my last chapter ou non-violent humor in the
plays of the Firesign Theatre.

We might call them both

odtires on learning. Of course, Browne takes a look backward
whereas the Firesign Theatre looks forward.
The intermediate chapter on Sir William Jones's
translation of Sakuntala and Rudyard Kipling's Kim adds
another complex layer to the polarisation of and monopoly on
learning. In these colonial texts, monopoly over learning is
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an index of the deeper, more pervasive, oppressive binary of
the colonizer and the colonized.

In Kim we find Kim

subverting his master role among the Indians to substitute
the master-slave dialectic with the mutually giving one of
the master-disciple or lover-beloved bond.
The chapter on Dorothy Parker's humor reverses this
transcendent status of love; in Parker, hetero-sexual
romance is the arena for hostile humor.

The thread that

connects the four chapters is the explicit, self-conscious
and paradoxical intent present in all of them to resist
authority, to change their social situation, and yet to
avoid direct, deliberate attack against their oppressors.
It is this paradoxical search for a mode of rebellion that
will avoid the ultimate brutalization of the self that more
direct forms of violent change might inflict on a society
chat fascinates me and is the subject of this dissertation.
"Towards Non-Tendentious Humor and Non-Violent
Rebellion" appropriates Freud's concept of tendentious humor
in its original sense, that is, humor with a purpose.

In

each of the texts analysed here, however, we find a paradox
governing the production of non-tendentious humor.

Non-

tendentious humor does not mean the absence of conflict.
The humorous point of view is born as the self in conflict
with authority absorbs, transforms, or waits for aggressive
authority to self destruct itself, so that it appears to be
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on a path towards approaching "humor," the exalted,
introspective, defensive device of the human mind that Freud
posited as an alternate to aggressive humor.

CHAPTER TWO
Ancients in the Lab: Curing the Pseudcdoxia Epidemica

Sir Thomas Browne lived and wrote during the turbulent times
of England's Civil War but there is nothing in Browne's
published writings to remind us of these social and
political disturbances. By training and profession a
physician, he lived and practiced in Norwich all his life,
writing over the course of his life a volume on the birds
and fishes of Norfolk.

Keen, scientific observation of

animals, birds, plants, minerals and vegetables abound in
Notes and Letters on the Natural History of Norfolk, More
aggagiali^L.on .the on the Binds and Fishes. (19 02) as well as
his domestic correspondence, but it is in Pseudodoxia
SB-idem icgt: or Enquiries into very many received Tenets,.and
BBffiQinly.PXQS.um.ed.Truths. (1646) that we find Browne the
naturalist and scientist paying his most devoted and copious
attention to all forms of life.
Pseudodoxia Epidemica or Vulgar Errors is an elaborate
enquiry into the many "errors" or "superstitions” regarding
nature, religion, language, and other compartments of
knowledge.

Many of the errors that Browne attempts to
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correct are still active in our times (eg: Is the tenth wave
greater than the other nine?

Browne says no.), but we don’t

read Browne these days to verify these errors; at least,
that is not the entire reason why we read him.

Browne's

prose delightfully demonstrates a method of disputation and
we follow the train of his arguments for the sake of
following his mind as it takes up one dovibtful claim after
another, made by serious-minded ancient and medieval
scholars, then disprove them in a humorous manner. Browne's
relation to the authority of these medieval scholars was one
of genial skepticism. Though Browne himself expressed his
doubts and disagreements with the ancients in a non-hostile
manner, Pseudodoxia was vehemently attacked five years after
its publication by Alexander Ross, defender of Aristotle and
orthodox knowledge, in Arcana Microcosmi: or the hid Secrets
of Man's Body disclosed , ___ With.a refutation., of..Dx__BrQwas
Vulgar Errors: And the Ancient.Opinions vindicated on the
grounds that its empiricism endangered sacred knowledge.
Ross published a second and enlarged edition a year later
where he refuted The Lord Bacon's Natural__Historv as well as
Dr Harvey's Book Pe Generatione, thus making his real target
visible to us--the rise of empirical science in the
seventeenth century.

It is ironic that the defenders of the

ancients regarded Pseudodoxia as a threat to their system of
belief, because Browne's strategy of attack carefully
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disguised the fact that it was an attack. This essay
explores Browne's strategy of contention with the ancients,
a non-aggressive challenge where hostility is kept at bay by
the judicious, use of purposeful humor.
Browne’s humor was not immediately remarked, upon by his
readers (though his good temper was), particularly those
from the eighteenth century which had perfected the art of
aggressive humor.

For instance, compare Pseudodoxia. with

Jonathan Swift's satire on learning,
(1704.) , with, its military metaphor, and. we can hear the
differences in the volume and tone between the two forms of
challenges. Aggressive humor has no better record-keeper
chan Swift; the battle between the Ancients and the Moderns
is fought with "ink, . .the great missive weapon . . . which
conveyed through, a sort of engine called a quill, infinite
numbers of these axe darted at the enemy, by the valiant on
each, side, with equal skill and violence, as if it were an
engagement of porcupines” (Swift GULllilESE-L,s.Haaslfl-janfl
other Writings 361) . Swift makes the Moderns the targets of
his satire for a. certain belligerent approach to
argumentation, a presumptuous contempt evident in them
towards their older counterparts in the field of
intellectual enquiry.

In the fable of the spider and the

bee, the spider who represents the Moderns embodies this
ill-mannered approach well: "At this the spider, having
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swelled himself into the size and posture of a disputant,
began his argument in the true spirit of controversy, with a
resolution to be heartily scurrilous and angry, to urge on
his own reasons, without the least regard to the answers or
objections of his opposite, and fully predetermined in his
mind against all conviction"

(Gullivers Travels 366).

Browne is a defender of the Moderns that Swift ridicules;
but Browne negotiates with the Ancients with humor which
reduces the seriousness of the challenge that he extends
towards them. Swift's text is incomplete: we are not told
who won the war between the Ancients and the Moderns, but in
Pseudodoxia, Browne and seventeenth century empirical
science wins.

Though the resultant relationship between

Browne and the Ancients clearly favors Browne, it achieves
that victory v/ithout ridiculing the Ancients in a violent
manner.
Dr. Johnson was one of many eighteenth century readers
not impressed with Browne's humor.

In his Life of Browne he

uses the testimony of Dr. John Lightfoote who knew Browne
"two-thirds of his life," to project this picture of
Browne’s equanimity:
He was never seen to be transported with mirth, or
dejected with sadness; always cheerful, but rarely
merry, at any sensible rate; seldom heard to break a
jest; and when he did, he would be apt to blush at the
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levity of it: his gravity was natural without
affectation.

(Browne Major Works 503)

Browne's equivocal temperament is further attested by his
biographer Edmund Gosse who said outright "he had no sense
of humour" though he grudgingly admitted his "wit,"

"It is

doubtful whether in the whole body of his writings," wrote
Gosse, "there is a single phrase written for the purpose or
expectation of raising a laugh" (Gosse Sir Thomas Browne
183).

William Hazlitt and Thomas De Quincey were two other

nineteenth-century writers who were of the same persuasion.
Hazlitt did not include Browne in his Lectures on the Comic
Writers Etc of Britain: instead, in his Essays on the
D ramatic Literatyre of the Age,..Q.f,_E1.iz^ b-g-Lh he praised
Browne for his rhetorical excellence, his "passion for the
abstruse and the imaginary," his childhood temper of the
curiosity which "superannuated" all his other faculties, his
"most intense consciousness of contradictions and non
entities"

(The Complete Works 333-35). Hazlitt qualified

Browne's style as the great "sublime of indifference," and
notes how Browne seizes abstractions and "decks them out in
the pride and pedantry of words as if they were the attire
of his proper person: the categories hang about his neck
like the gold chain of knighthood, and he ’walks gowned’ in
the intricate folds and swelling drapery of dark sayings and
impenetrable riddles!" (The Complete Works 335).
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De Quincey too was seduced by the dazzling density of
Browne’s style, and in an essay entitled "Rhetoric" he paid
his tribute to Browne in this verbose eulogy of
Hydriotaphia. imitative of Browne's style, but in which
there is no room for Brownian humor:
What a melodious ascent as of a prelude to some
impassioned requiem breathing from the pomps of earth,
and from the sanctities of the grave!

What a fluctus

decumanus of rhetoric! Time expounded, not by
generations or centuries, but by the vast periods of
conquests and dynasties; by cycles of Pharoahs and
Ptolemis, Antiochi and Arsacides! And these vast
successions of time distinguished and figured by the
uproars which revolve at their inaugurations; by the
drums and tramplings rolling overhead upon the chambers
of forgotten dead--the trepidation of time and
mortality vexing, at secular intervals, the everlasting
sabbaths of the grave!

(De Quincey Collected Writings

104-5)
Browne himself regarded the greatness attributed to the
fluctus decumanus or tenth wave to be scientifically
inaccurate and dismissed it quietly in Pseudodoxia
Eoidemica: "nor can it be made out by observation either
upon the shore or the Ocean, as we have with diligence
observed both"

(Browne The Works of Sir Thomas Browne 535).
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The fluctus decumanus of rhetoric which enchanted De Quincey
seems to be more a reflection of De Quincey's enthusiasm for
an admired writer than any inherent exuberance in Browne
himself, as the sample we just quoted would prove to us.
An alert reader who noticed the light-hearted point of
view in Browne was the ubiquitous Samuel Pepys, who wrote in
his Diarv in 1664:
At the Coffee-house, where I sat with Sir G. Ascue and
Sir Wiliam Petty, who in discourse is, methinks, one of
the most rational men that ever I heard speak with a
tongue, having all his notions the most distinct and
clear, and, among other things (saying, that in all his
life these three books were the most esteemed and
generally cried up for wit in the world--"Religio
Medici," "Osborne's Advice to a Son," and "Hudibras").
. • (The Diarv of Samuel Pepvs 480)
The guarded, understated tone of the qualifier, "one of the
most rational men that ever I heard speak with a tongue,
having all his notions the most distinct and clear," could
very well be Pepys' testimony to Browne's own quiet style of
humor.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge was a more eloquent believer in
Browne's humor.

In 1804 he wrote Sara Hutchinson that Sir

Thomas Browne was "among his first favorites.

. . .he is a

quiet and Sublime Enthusiast with a strong tinge of the
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Fantast, the Humorist constantly mingling with & flashing
across the Philosopher.
Century 448).

. ." (Coleridge on the Seventeenth

Coleridge was particularly charmed by that

farewell passage in The Garden of Cvrus. and he copied it in
its entirety to Sara:
But it is time for me to be in bed; in the words of Sir
Thomas, which will serve you, my darling Sara! as a
fair specimen of his manner. "But the Quincunx of
Heaven (the Hyades or 5 Stars about the Horizon, at
midnight at that time) runs low, and tis time we close
the five Ports of knowledge!

We are unwilling to spin

out our waking Thoughts into the Phantasms of Sleep,
which often continueth praecogitations, making Cables
of Cobwebs, and wilderness of handsome Groves. To keep
our eyes open longer were to act cur Antipodes. The
Huntsmen are up in America, and they have already past
their first Sleep in Persia."

(Seventeenth Century 449)

Coleridge interjects his transcription here to add his own
thoughts, and in the intimacy of this correspondence we hear
why he is so enraptured with Browne:
Think

you,

reason
wit,

of

given

that

our

my

if

dear

Sara!

before

for

we

not,

did

A N T I P O D E S !! A n d

A m e r i c a " - -what

Life,

that
going
we

then,

what

there
to

ever

bed

should

be

at

was

midnight,

acting

"The Huntsmen

Fancy!

Does

such

the

are

up

a
to
part
in

the w h i m s i c a l
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Knight give us thus a dish of strong green Tea, & call
it an Opiate?

(Seventeenth Century 449)

We might call the "Fancy" that caught Coleridge's ear,
Browne's unique line of reasoning which is at once whimsical
but indisputable; a manner of proof that incorporates
science, logic and imagination in equal parts.

As with Da

Quincey, Coleridge's copy of Browne is marked up with
passionate outbursts of approbation; evidently Coleridge
likened himself to Browne--"I have never read a book, in
which I felt greater similarity to my own make of mind-active in enquiry, & yet with an appetite to believe,--in
short, an affectionate & elevated Visionary!"

His final

verdict, however self-serving, expresses his admiration
quite succinctly: "it is a most delicious Book"

(Seventeenth

439) .

If Coleridge was enchanted with Browne's fancy, Sir
Leslie Stephen isolated Browne's humor for us, and in doing
so, staked out the territory that we want to explore: "He is
a humorist to the core. . . The numerous class which insists
upon a joke being as unequivocal as a pistol-shot, and a
serious statement as grave as a Blue-book, should therefore
keep clear of Sir Thomas Browne"

(Hours in a Library 269 -

72). "Humour," Stephen says, is "the faculty which always
keeps us in mind of the absurdity which is the shadow of
sublimity," and Browne’s "most congenial readers are those
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who take a simple delight in following out any quaint train
of reflections, careless whether it may culminate in a smile
or sigh, or in some thoughts in which the two elements of
the sad and the ludicruous are inextricably blended"

(Hours

2 7 2 ).

My use of Browne is to listen to the humorous voice
that Pepys's friend, Coleridge, and Stephen heard, a faint
voice easy to miss, but which nevertheless colors his
thought and style.

In Browne we are at the threshold of a

certain type of humor that we may tentatively characterize
as "degree-zero" of non-aggressive humor.

We are not

listening for jokes as "unequivocal as pistol-shots," but
for that quality of expression that led Coleridge to find in
him "the Humorist mingling with & flashing across the
Philosopher" and in which Leslie Stephen saw the union of
the sublime and the absurd. I don't contend that the
pleasure of reading Browne is similar to that of reading
other (louder) authors like Pope, Swift, Congreve, or even
Addison and Steele.

Browne’s humor highlights a particular

kind of moral vision that offers a philosophical variation
to the traditional structure on which humor, comedy,
laughter, etc. are erected -- namely, the master-slave
dialectic broached in my introduction as implicit in
Aristotle's definition of the "ridiculous" as the engine of
comedy, and elaborated by Freud. The moral vision Browne
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demonstrates for us explicitly rejects the easy road of
direct aggression; nor does he make himself vulnerable or
helpless.

Swift's Ancient authors on top of Parnassus

challenge the Moderns to raise themselves upto the Ancient
heights as an alternative to war. Browne had already
achieved that half a century earlier.

He meets his

adversaries on equal ground; indeed, the first part of the
first book of Pseudodoxia deals exclusively with
intellectual cowardice and supinity evident in the blind
submission to authority:
Sixthly, We urge authorities in points that need not,
and introduce the testimony of ancient writers, to
confirm things evidently believed, and whereto no
reasonable hearer but would assent without them. .
.Antonius Guevara, that elegant Spaniard, in his book
entituled, The Dial of Princes, beginneth his epistle
thus: Apollonius Thyanaeus, disputing with the scholars
of Hiarchus said, that among all the affectations of
nature, nothing was more natural than the desire all
have to preserve life.

Which, being a confessed truth,

and a verity acknowledged by all, it was a superfluous
affectation to derive its authority from Apollonius, or
seek confirmation therof as far as India, and the
learned scholars of Hiarchus.
Thomas Browne 46}.

(Browne The 'Works of Sir
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The phrase "that elegant Spaniard" to describe Antonius
Guevara tells us that it is within Browne's power to
tendentiously ridicule his target.

But he stabilizes

himself on the level of common sense, after having exposed
the unnecesssary practice in an effective understatement.
In the third Book of Pseudodoxia. Browne targets Aristotle
for misleading us about the behavior of the elephant.
Regarding the popular superstition that elephants have no
joints, Browne writes:
The first shall be of the elephant, whereof there
generally passeth an opinion it hath no joints: and
this absurdity is seconded with another, that, being
unable to lie down, it sleepeth against a tree; which
the hunters observing, do saw it almost asunder;
whereon the beast relying, by the fall of the tree
falls also down itself, and is able to rise no more.
(Browne The Works 157)
Browne relates the error as it is reported, with minimum
editorial intrusion.

Even when he traces the error to

Aristotle, he chastises Aristotle in a gentle manner:
Which conceit is not the daughter of later times, but
an old and grey-headed error, even in the days of
Aristotle, as he aelivereth in his book De Incessu
Animalium, and stands successively related by several
other authors; by Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Ambrose,
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Cassiodore, Solinus, and many more.

(Browne The Works

157)
An error made by Aristotle is "an old and grey-headed
error," an accusation that is as respectful as it is
uncompromising.

In this relation, Browne does not belittle

himself, nor does he belittle Aristotle.

Browne allows the

error to expose itself:
For first, they affirm it hath no joints, and yet
concede it walks and moves about; whereby they conceive
there may be a progression or advancement made in
motion, without inflexion of parts.

Now, all

progression or animal locomotion being (as Aristotle
teacheth) performed tractu et pulsu, that is, by
drawing on or impelling forward some part which was
before in station, or at quiet,--where there are no
joints or flexures, neither can there be actions.
(Browne The Works 157)
Aristotle is held responsible to his erring observations,
but obliquely, literally, since Browne positions it as if it
were an afterthought, within parenthesis. Aristotle's error
is exposed as such in Aristotle's own terms, according to
his own definition.

We don't hear any aggression from

Browne, the interlocutor, who acts as a choreographer who
picks and chooses among his actors, his evidence, the
ancient authors, and arranges a scene as demonstrative as a
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tableau.

The scene will convey its meaning, in this case,

the error, without any vehement thrust of energy from
Browne.
We might summarise the first rule for Browne's fair
battle thus: The adversaries are relatively equal in
knowledge.

The strategy of dispute is through demonstrating

complete knowledge of the enemy territory, finding its most
vulnerable points, and arranging them in such a way that the
error undoes itself as if by its own energy.
The ridiculous as a category of the laughable does not
play a significant part in Browne's humorous challenges to
his adversaries. Aristotle's definition of the "ridiculous"
carefully emphasized that it was a painless mask, a blunder
or ugliness that does not cause pain or disaster (see
Introduction). The most significant philosophical challenge
to this definition of humor, we saw, came from Soren
Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard's question was simple, yet very
important: who defined what is ridiculous? Is there a
category called the "ridiculous" in nature? In his
Concluding .Unscientific Postscripts he suggests that the
ridiculous is not a "something" but always a relation that
involves a contradiction, and hence an index of perception,
but one that is free from, pain (Concluding 4595. Kierkegaard
saw humor as legitimately belonging to the province of
religion because of its ubiquity as a human phenomenon. To
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study humor in a good school, he notes, one must turn away
from laughter as an "antipathetic passion," to objects that
arouse our "partiality" and "sympathy," which would create
“the disciplinary opposition against inconsiderateness" so
that the "great translucency of the comical” would become
visible to us {Concluding 462) . In Kierkegaard as well as in
Browne, we find the option for a system of humor that is
non-aggressive, which demands from the comical a necessary
correspondence with an ethical framework.
The ethical is a religious category in Browne, so that
any charitable acts in the human society are monitored by
God and any trangression in the human society is a
trangression against God.

It is this ethical/religious

monitoring of laughter that makes the ridiculous a suspect
source of humor for Browne.

Not only does Browne reject the

concept of the ridiculous, but also he tracks the division
of power in the human world to its first schism--God versus
Devil. Browne’s good school of humor opens with Reliaio

Medici,

or ihe

Religion of.a.EfaY&isian

(1642) which

established Browne's reputation in England and overseas as a
great scholar and wit. Browne's quiet voice that eventually
became the signature style of his humor in Pseudodoxia first
makes its appearance in this work.
Reliaio Medici pursues the Manichean division between
God and Devil and arranges a disputation in which this
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hostility is shown to be fundamentally contrary to the
teachings of Christ.

Browne's self-conscious intent to

dissolve this conflict is integral to his design to
establish an alternate paradigm to the master-slave
conflict. Browne's Devil, consequently, does not challenge
God's authority, and Browne's God does not exact oppressive
submission from Devil, Dr, Johnson observed that Reliaio
Medici was much read and much criticized because of "the
novelty of paradoxes, the dignity of sentiment, the quick
succession of images, the multitude of abstruse allusions,
the subtlety of disquisitions, and the strength of language"
(Browne Major Works 486). In spite of such general praise
and Browne's solemn affirmation that his was "the honorable
stile of a Christian" he was accused of being an atheist,
probably because of the novel manner in which he chose to
affirm his Christian faith. He refused to take sides in
religious disputes; in Reliaio Medici he admits that he is
"naturally inclined to that, which misguided zeales termes
superstition" (63), that he cannot hear an Ave Maria without
lifting his heart in prayer, that he is guilty of the error
of praying for the dead and of thinking that even the most
damned might be saved, like the Devil, for instance, that
the "Hieroglyphicks and allegories of Egyptians" please him
more than the metaphysical definitions of Divines, and that
he "cannot dreame that there should be at the last day any

44
uch Judiciall proceeding, or calling to the Earre, as
ndeed the Scripture seemes to imply"

(Browne Manor Works

17). it is understandable that he did not endear himself to
he Anglican church.
Browne reforms the traditional antagonism by treating
he devil and hell as aspects of the human mind, much like
hat William Blake would do a century and a half later in
he Songs of Innocence and Experience or more in The
arriacre of Heaven and Hell.

Though Browne says that he

ates nobody as intensely as he hates the devil, he quickly
eminds us that the "heart of man is the place the devill
wels in, " pointing to himself as a perfect example of
tatement.

Browne’s intent is to direct us towa- -is constant

ntrospection, to identify the internal climate that fosters
ppression:
Surely though wee place Hell under earth, the Devils
walke and purlue is about it; men speake too popularly
who place it in those flaming mountaines, which to
grosser apprehensions represent Hell.

The heart of man

is the place the devill dwels in; I feele sometimes a
hell within my selfe, Lucifer keeps his court in my
brest, Leoion is revived in me.

There are as many hels

as Anaxagoras conceited worlds: there was more than one
hell in Magdalen. when there were seven devils; for
every devil is a hell unto himselfe: he holds enough of
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torture in his owne ubi. and needs not the misery of
circumference to afflict him, and thus a distracted
conscience here is a shadow or introduction unto hell
hereafter; Who can but pity the merciful intention of
those hands that doe destroy themselves? the devill
were it in his power would do the like. . . .

(Browne

Major Works 125)
The Devil, in other words, is but a distracted conscience.
Although the conclusion that the devil is to be pitied and
not hated or feared (and does he also condone suicide
here?), might sound heretical to an absolute doctrine of
Christianity, it is characteristic of Browne's ameliorating
vision, "a soft and flexible sense" that makes a convincing
argument to dismantle an ancient and cherished opposition,
that of the arch-enemies, God and Devil.
The importance of dismantling the Manichean opposition
to Christianity cannot be emphasized enough, and it has a
direct bearing on our subject of humor and laughter.

The

Venerable Jorge in Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose calls
laughter the "Devil's plot" and commits several murders to
hide Aristotle's lost treatise on comedy from ever falling
into the hands of the public, because it sanctions laughter.
He announces his reasons:
Laughter frees the villein from fear of the Devil,
because in the feast of fools the Devil also appears
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poor and foolish, and therefore controllable.

But this

book could teach that freeing oneself of the fear of
the Devil is wisdom. When he laughs, as the wine
gurgles in his throat, the villein feels he is master,
because he has overturned his position with respect to
his lord. . . .

The prudence of our fathers made its

choice: if laughter is the delight of the plebians, the
license of the plebians must be restrained and
humiliated, and intimidated by sternness.

(Eco The Name

of the Rose 476)
3co is a medievalist and * novelist, and the political
reasons for suppressing laughter to maintain the status-quo
of the social structure are upfront in Jorge's speech.
Laughter is a form of power that can be liberating, hence it
is to be suppressed.

Manichean oppositions, between God and

Devil, Good and Evil, are designed to keep those ignorant
and less powerful inside the dialectic under check and
constant terror. Browne's strategy to dismantle this
opposition adopts Kierkegaard's "disciplinary opposition
against inconsiderateness" rather than Aristotle's painless
lauahter at the ridiculous. But is it possible to correct an
error without subverting the base or undermining the dignity
of the adversary, a humiliation which might lead to the
hydra-like regeneration of the oppressive dialectic;
seems to be the task of the humorist in Browne.

That
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Browne's first step is to upgrade his devil as a "poor
fool," to make him not an adversary of equal strength to
God, but an upstart rebel who, if he could, would prefer to
end the tortures of rebelling against God.

In a disarming

confession in the Reliaio Medici Browne admits to the sin of
believing that "God would not persist in his Vengeance for
ever, but after a definite time of his wrath, he would
release the Damned souls from torture: Which error I fell
into upon a serious contemplation of the great Attribute of
God, his Mercie"

(Browne Mai or Works 67).

The seventeenth-

century cleric Jeremy Taylor called it "at worst a wrong
error upon the right side of charity"

(Browne Major Works

67), while Coleridge in his characteristic enthusiasm
exclaimed, "To call this opinion an error! Merciful God!
how thy creatures blaspheme thee!" (Seventeenth Century
440).

That even the devil would be pardoned--this is a row

and fine thought, which combines an imaginative sympathy
with the ineluctability of the devil’s fate to be always the
rival of God and goodness, with the thought that the devil,
were it in his power, would put an end to this nonsense.
Browne holds the Church responsible for the defamation of
the devil in such unredeemable terms: "The Foundations of
Religion are already established, and the principles of
Salvation subscribed unto by all, there remaines not many
controversies wortxi a passion.

. . (Browne Ms.ior Works 138) .

48
But whether worth it or not, Browne's treatment of the
devil, that other cornerstone of Christian faith, is a
passionate rethinking of the traditional devil-story. In
Reliqio Medici, Browne's unstated purpose is to bring us
back to the ground of self-observation and study; the fire
and brimstone images of medieval devils are superstitions
that are to be tamed by rational thought.
Browne regarded good and evil in dialectical terms is
evident from his observation that both Democritus who
thought "to laugh the times into goodnesse," and Heraclitus
who bewailed them offend Charity, since both seek to abolish
vice not knowing that "they that endeavour to abolish vice
destroy also vertue, for contraries, though they destroy one
another, are yet the life of one another" (Browne Manor
Works 140). What bridges the dialectical opposites for
Browne are on the one hand, his unequivocal belief in the
goodness of God, and, two, human love that follows in the
footsteps of God's love, and three, his skeptical mind to
which all acts of human enquiry whether social, political,
scientific, or philosophical are necessarily open-ended,
indeterminate and vulnerable to continuous emendation. The
indeterminacy of human knowledge creates a point of view
which views errors with a dispassionate eye.

Material

errors, which Browne exposes as such, however, are symptoms
of a more deep-rooted misunderstanding of Nature, both its
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physical as well as philosophical underpinnings. Thus a
discussion of errors always brings us back to the system of
thought that generated that error.

Browne goes to the root

of the problem; in Pseudcdoxia Epidemica, they are antiquity
and medieval science.
Browne's
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Devill":

’Tis not onely the mischiefe of diseases, and the
villanie of poysons that make an end of us, we vainly
accuse the fury of Gunnes, and the new inventions of
death;

'tis in the power of every hand to destroy us,

and we are beholding unto every one wee meete hee doth
not kill us.

There is therefore but one comfort left,

that though it be in the power of the weekest arme to
take away life, it is not in the strongest to deprive
us of death: God would not exempt himselfe from that,
the misery of immortality in the flesh, he undertooke
not that was in it immortall.

(Browne Major Works 115)

The profound felicity of Browne's thought and expression is
striking; so is the strange logic in the appeal "wee are
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beholding unto every one wee meete hee doth not kill us"-the dry understatement that we would prefer not to be
killed. But on second reading, is it understatement or an
existential caution?

Is Browne making the master-slave

relationship so ubiquitous here that it no longer matters?
In this dialectic, we are responsible

for the master or

slave relations that we create with each other.

But its

pervasiveness in the human realm is precisely what Browne is
centering on: it is the human condition that even God, once
he was born human, could not transcend, at least not all the
time.

Browne reminds us once again of our respo’
.isibility of

our destiny when he states with profound simplicity, an
existential caution, "'tis in the power of every hand to
destroy us, and we are beholding unto every one wee meete
hee doth not kill us."
This dissolution of antagonism (and Browne attempts to
dissolve the paradigmatic antagonism of western Christian
theology, through a repenting Devil and a forgiving God) is
important to our pursuit of non-aggressive humor because of
two reasons. One: Browne creates a system -where the
different generating tensions of the phenomenal world are
levelled to a harmonious realm answerable to each other and
to God so that any transgression amongst creatures is a
transgression against God in which case we are confronted
with a definitional challenge for the term, "ridiculous."
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Two, humor seems to be the inevitable emotional and
intellectual point of view that would serve the double
purpose of avoiding violence to self as well as ics
adversaries.
The errors disproved in Pseudodoxia demonstrate
explicitly this point of view with its "disciplinary
opposition to inconsiderateness." Browne breaks us into the
enquiry, phrasing it in the form of a dispute, with the
introduction of the error and its disproof usually carried
out within the space of a paragraph.

The disputes

themselves are unique; they are very often about opinions
that are so taken for granted (thus once again making erring
ubiquitous) that we rarely think of them as "erring" against
us in any deliberate manner.

The following is a typical

error:
That Lapis Lazuli hath in it a purgative faculty
we know; that Bezoar is antidotal, Lapis Judaicus
diuretical, Coral Antepileptical, we will not
deny.

That Cornelius, Jaspis, Heliotropes, and

Blood-stones, may be of vertue to those intentions
they are implied, experience and visible effects
may make us grant.

But that an Amethyst prevents

inebriation, that an Emerald will break if worn in
copulation.

That a Diamond laid under the pillow,

will betray the incontinency of a wife. That a
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Saphire is preservative against inchantments; that
the fume of an Agath will avert a tempest, or a
wearing of a Cryoprase make one out of love with
Gold; as some have delivered, we are yet, I
confess, to believe, and in that infidelity are
likely to end our days.

(Browne The Works 139}

The two remarkable features in this passage are the
fluctuations in the pacing and the inversion of the
predicates ("we know," and "we will grant”} from their
normal syntactic positions.

The variation in pacing is

integral to Browne's style of kind dismissal and merits
close textual attention.

The claim of each stone is

predicated upon the clause "we know," "we will not deny,"
and "will make us grant" but in each case these predications
are inverted, so that they seems to throw into relief what is
essentially subordinate to them.
voice.

The inversions quieten the

Syntactically and semantical1y they are rhetorical

mirrors to each other and as such function to emphasize the
quality of understatement in the enumerator's voice.

It is

a voice that is obviously not excited by the rare potencies
in these stones.

But it says so in a civilized manner.

In

fact in the second sentence he does not even list their
amazing virtues by name; he hurries to concede to their
claims on the basis of experience and visible effects and
dismisses them easily enough by saying that they "may be of
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vertue to those intentions they are implied, experience and
visible effects will make us grant."
We may tentatively call the rhythm of the passage
dramatic.

Browne reverses the order of the sentence so that

the dependent clauses with the stones as subjects are put in
the emphatic position. This makes perfect sense since he is
engaged in enumerating the truth claims of each stone.

But

already in the first sentence we detect a sudden quickening
of the rhythm when he substitutes the leisurely pace of the
first period with the thrifty swiftness of. predicating all
three clauses in the second period {“that Bezoar is
Antidotal, Lapis.Judalcus diuretical, Coral Antepiieptical")
to "we will not deny.*

in the second sentence, the pace

quickens even more: he strings four stones one after the
other without even bothering to enumerate their claims: they
are collectively dismissed under the general attribute that
they "may be of vertue to those intentions they are
implied.”

Suddenly in the rn.idd.le then, from that rapid

skimming over of truth-claims, he leaves the fast-track and
begins anew, as if in fits and starts. The sentence about
the amethyst is strictly speaking not a. complete sentence
although he ends it with a. period.

“But that an Amethyst

prevents inebriation, that an Emerald will break if worn in
copulation.*

And "That a. Diamond, hid under the pillow, will

betray the ir.continency of a wife."

The claims hang as if
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suspended in air, without anything to anchor themselves
onto.

And we are soon told why that is so.

But the sudden

s3owing of pace is quite dramatic: we are invited to feast
ourselves on an error of great promise. The periodic syntax
of the last sentence mirrors that of the first, with the
string of phrases delaying its main predication, but that
external form is all that it shares with the first sentence.
For these claims about the diamond, the saphire, and the
amethyst, Browne asserts, with parenthetical protest, "we
are yet, I confess, to believe," and then adds his own
editorial "and in that infidelity are likely to end our
days."

It is noteworthy that Browne dismisses these errors

with absolute confidence, though he does not submit us with
any proofs.
adversary.

The confident ego does not belittle the
It merely announces that it is unwilling to

believe what has been presented before it.

It is a

demonstrative statement with no attempt made at explanation.
There is doubtless an element of tendentiousness in
Browne's discourse here, especially in the attributed power
of diamonds to test the incontinency of a wife: a certain
teasing of our logic, like the rabbit who cried to the fox
who was threatening to eat him, "Oh do whatever you want to
do with me! But please don't throw me in the briar-patch!"
Browne is offering us a similar scicky situation here; does
anyone really want to test his wife's fidelity?
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The structure of the disputation itself can be
separated neatly into two halves: one consistently positive,
and tne other consistently negative in presenting the point
of view of the narrator. But beyond that the voice yields no
information about itself; we are not told why or why not
these claims are either true or false; we are faced with a
scene projected by an invisible eye: items unaccompanied by
backdrop or footnotes are left to explain their fantastic
claims, and they are unable to.

Browne uses a minimal point

of view in this case: I saw; I believe; I do not believe.
This is a point of view that is attempting to be truthful
and absurd at the same time; truthful because it mirrors the
arbitrariness of all subjective truths, and absurd because
Browne does not really care to discuss "truth."
There are other instances in Pseudodoxia Eoidemica
where Browne becomes a more overt participant in the scene.
Reporting on the recent taste for magnets and magnetic
experiments he discloses this attractive lore:
The conceit is excellent, and if the effect would
follow, somewhat divine; whereby we might communicate
like spirits and confer on earth with Menippus in the
moon.

And this is pretended from the sympathy of two

Needles touched with the same Loadstone, and placed in
the center of two Abecedery circles or rings, with
letters described roundabout them, one friend keeping
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one, and another the other, and agreeing upon an hour
wherein they will communicate.

For then, saith

tradition, at what distance of place soever, when one
needle shall be removed unto any letter; the other by a
wonderful sympathy will move unto the same.

But herein

I confess my experience can find no truth; for having
expressly framed two circles of Wood, and according to
the number of Latine letters divided each into twenty
three parts, placing therein two stiles or Needles
composed of the same steel, touched with the same
Loadstone, and at the same point: of these two,
whenever I removed the one, although but at the
distance of half a span, the other would stand like
Hercules' pillar, and if the Earth stand still, have
surely no motion at all.

(Browne The works 114)

"The conceit is excellent, and if the effect would follow,
somewhat divine" is a good example of a delayed, tendentious
opening; it sets the skeptical note of the passage, with the
disarming request that he is quite willing to believe in
this claim if only it were true.

Browne's choice of diction

is more overtly resonant of humor: the word "pretended" is
particularly appropriate as it bolsters the air of disbelief
suggested in the first sentence; it guides our focus to the
fake scene itself, which he then describes immediately.
Browne's voice recedes here to re-emerge as the voice of
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tradition: he almost wants the story of the sympathetic
magnetic needles and the seventeenth-century fax machine to
be true; he calls the participants "friends," as if such
emotional affinity would effect the miracle, even if the
experiment fails.
Browne's argument follows a strictly subordinating
structure here, emphasizing procedure and cause and effect,
linking the clauses and sentences through such subordinating
conjunctions as "if," "whereby," "for then," "when,"
"although" etc. His disprcv-ng of the claim follows an
almost mirroring repetition of the procedures quoted by
tradition:
But herein I confess my experience can find no truth;
for having expressly framed two circles of Wood, and
according to the number of Latine letters divided each
into twenty three parts, placing therein two stiles or
Needles composed of the same steel, touched with the
same Loadstone, and at the same point.

. .

(114)

The phrasing of such thorough precision is humorous with its
insistent repetition of the word "same": "same steel," "same
Loadstone," "same point." So is the meticulous display of
the apparatus: there is an exaggerated concern with
following the procedure emphasized in the two circles of
wood "expressly framed," and all twenty-three latin letters
arranged exactly to evoke the magic. The humor lies in the
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disproportion in intensity between the pre- and postexperiment states so artfully delayed in a long sentence:
"of these two, whensoever I removed the one, although but at
the distance of half a span, the other would stand like
Hercules' pillars, and if the Earth stand still, have surely
no motion at all." We have been waiting for this punchline
from the very beginning when we first read that "the conceit
is excellent, if the effect would follow." It is again
disp.roportion that makes the comparison of the two small
needles to Hercules' pillars comical. It is an absurd
comparison in terms of size, but an appropriate one
metonymically: Hercules' pillars represent an immovable,
adamant obstacle, and Browne's comparison precisely
expresses that: that the experiment was perfect but for one
crucial problem--the results did not follow.

In a related

report on magnets, he recounts his disbelief at the popular
belief that if pieces of flesh are interchanged from the
bicipital arms of two men and all the alphabets inscribed
therein, at an appointed time the two men may communicate
for a long time, across whatever distance, by magnetic
needles prepared as above (Browne The works 115).

Browne

tried that as well and it failed to take off.
Browne's strategy in both of the above examples is to
accumulate evidence of the error, making it seem more and
more absurd, and then with a gracious tone of disbelief
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dismiss it in one short phrase or sentence.

The delay or

lag i^ integral to the general atmosphere of non-contention
that Browne carefully cultivates; his purpose is to list the
errors without any comments and then let them expose
themselves as errors by their preposterous claims.

We learn

from letters to his son Dr. Edward Browne as well as his own
records of his experiments with the birds and fishes of
Norfolk that Browne was well-versed in the art of scientific
discourse.

But we seldom find evidence of that rigorous

style in Pseudodoxia.

Pseudodoxia Epidemica. instead,

demonstrates a contentious style that succeeds in defeating
its target without any aggression, loudness or malice.
Browne's strategy to contend established authority in
Pseudodoxia marks the ground-zero of a liberating humor;
liberating, because it does not leave any residue of
aggression or victimhood transferred to us, the readers.
Representing liberating humor is the task for a philosopher,
since the philosopher attempts to correct the error at its
foundation, and aggressive laughter without liberation is
the mark of a fake philosophy.

The philosopher's voyage is

always inward; we follow Browne as he travels far in history
and to interpretations of religion to gather evidence for a
rethinking of the master-slave dialectic in the God-Devil
relationship.

The significance of Pseudodoxia for a thesis

on humor springs from Browne's confident evocation of a
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moral vision, which is paradoxically not slippery about what
is and is not ethical.

Particular errors that he discusses

are treated as subservient to or representative of deeper
misunderstandings about the nature of Nature and human life.
Browne's persona in this contention is that of a preceptor;
the errors are precisely that--errors --which may be
corrected if we are so inclined.

Browne's philosophy to

counter false systems of beliefs that foster oppression
places that responsibility firmly in the human world and
upon human interactions.

Browne strives towards a

comprehensive demonstration of the possibility of the ideal
of equality when he argues for equal relations among humans
as the mark of our equal relation to God.

To possess this

ideal is to embrace a paradox, since it necessarily demands
the recognition and rectification of an ethically weak or
wrong system of belief.

What Pseudodoxia demonstrates for

us, given this paradox, is a method of challenge that is
undaunted by its task or its target, undertakes to do it
joyfully and confidently, and rectifies the system rather
than destroys it.

CHAPTER THREE
Colonials in the Arena: Jones and Kipling in India

Sir Thomas Browne won a non-violent victory over the
ancients in the dispute over learning, but Sir William
Jones's translation of the Sanskrit epic Sakuntala (1789)
into English demonstrates a simple-minded victory, an
incomplete, unbalanced, and dialectically regressive and
decaying relationship between Sanskrit and English, and by
extension, Indian and British cultures.

Defining the

relation of the translation to the original, Walter Benjamin
wrote that the task of the translator, "consists in finding
that intended effect (Intention) upon the language into
which he is translating which produces in it the echo of the
original"

(Benjamin Illuminations 76).

Intention in a work

of art or a language, Benjamin theorized, was not what the
author wanted to communicate, but was the mode in which we
perceived the life of the language or art as determined by
its historical relations.

Benjamin had an exalted, ultimate

and ideationally directed understanding of the mode of
translation. Translation ultimately serves the purpose of
expressing the reciprocal relationship between two languages
61
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which, inspite of differences in words, sentences and
structure, supplement each other in their underlying
intentions, which makes translation possible in the first
place.

Jones' translation serves the purpose of

communicating the meaning of the play more than it does the
intended effect of the p3ay upon the history of the language
itself.

In his letter to Sir Joseph Banks Jones asserted

that "the translation is as literal as possible; but I am
not sure, that my own errors or inattention may not have
occasioned mistakes"

(Pachori Sir William Jones 89).

Benjamin might not censor Jones fox* failing in a literal
translation of the original if he had succeeded in
reproducing the intention of the original.

The

disappearance of "the echo of the original" in Jones's
translation may be credited partly to Jones's attempt to
capture the meaning of the original, which he sought to
reproduce first by an interlinear Latin translation and then
by its literal rendering into English.

Benjamin theorized

that the literal reproduction of meaning will never uncover
the intention of the original; the translator*'s real task is
an objective recognition of its form:
Fragments of a vessel which are to be glued together
must match one another in the smallest details,
although they need not be like one another.

In the

same way a translation, instead of resembling the
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meaning of the original, must lovingly and in detail
incorporate the original's mode of signification, thus
making both the original and the translation
recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just
as fragments of a vessel.

(Illuminations 78)

Benjamin's "greater language" is a philosopher's category of
a "tensionless" ultimate language of truth, which is guided
by the "great motif of integrating many tongues into one
true language at work"

(Illumine ions 77).

Jones's

translation is tensionless, but not as the ultimate product
of strife that Benjamin interprets it to be; rather, it
seeks to be tensionless by concealing conflict, and does not
attend to the nature of relations between characters, its
mode of signification, in the original.

This inattention to

the nature of power relations in the play distorts the
play's point of view on the king's authority and its gradual
domestication through introspection.
In the colonizer's favorite fiction, the master is
never challenged or pushed towards introspection, and there
is no attempt made on the part of the master to reform
himself; correspondingly, the slave suffers, serves and
nurtures, but does not transform the master or himself in
any way.

Jones's translation follows this fiction as if the

binary of the colonizer and the colonized transferred its
own adamant stance of authority and submission onto the
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play's framework so that the master, here the king, remains
essentially unchanged in character.

The role of the clown

which in the original embodied the humorous approach of a
kind but exacting preceptor is transformed in Jones’s
translation into that of a humorless nurse-maid to .he king.
We may attribute Jones's distrust of laughter to
Jorge’s reasoning in The Name of the Rose--that laughter is
a form of power and hence not to be in the possession of
slaves.

The presence of humor in colonial narratives

frequently challenges the binary of force and submission
that characterizes the enterprise of colonialism.

Ethnic

slurs and racist jokes, similar in purpose to that of the
colonizer's fiction, succeed in arousing laughter, because
they rigidly preserve this binary by sharply suppressing the
experiential component in the lives of the masters and the
slaves.

Humor in such slurs and insults moreover create

stereotypes of the colonizing as well as the colonized
cultures.

But evidence from colonial narratives such as

Rudyard Kipling's Kim, or E. M. Forster’s A Passage to India
shows that one way in which colonial writers attempt to
merge the separate trajectories of the political interests
of the colonized versus the colonizer is to choose a
narrative style that highlights the subjectivity of
individual experience. This exercise does not necessarily
downplay the ideological conflict between masters and slaves
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but makes characters active partners in undoing the
apparently predestined violence of the master -slave
conflict.

We see a qualitative change for the better in the

dynamics of the master-slave interactioii, from both the
master's and the slave's points of view.

It is this

mutually transforming dialecuical strife that is absent in
Jones's translation.
Humor seems to be the inevitable idiomatic device for
the reduction of conflict in such paradoxically transcendent
narratives as Kim, the paradox being contained in the
aforementioned antithetical stand to the master-slave
dialectic.

Frequently in these stcries the oppressor

resists meeting an .intellectual or ideological challenge cn
an intellectual or ideological ground.

Consequently. in

narratives such as Kim, there is an inevitable falling-short
or rising-above of the occasion, which could be seen as a
generic quality of romance; in any case, an incongruous
reaction resembling the mechanism of humor, as opposed to
the expression of direct hostility among the ideologically
divided characters.

In the first part of this chapter, I

examine the incommensurable gap between Kalidasa's Sakuntala
and Jones’s translation in their representation of the
relations between characters.

The former attempts to

transcend the effect of the role of authority in the
character of the king through his growing introspection; the
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latter, demonstrates a blindness towards this element of
introspection leaving the king essentially unchanged in his
relation with himself.

In the second part of this chapter,

I contrast Jones's translation with another early twentiethcentury colonial text wrj tten at the beginning of the end of
British power in India, Rudyard Kipling's Kim (1901).

In

Kim , Kipling attempts to develop an alternative relationship
between masters and slaves, one that eschews striving for
authority in favor of the strife to be free of authority.
The two texts demonstrate two different ways to tame
authority through humor.

In the former, humor permitted by

authority acts as a corrective to authority; in the latter,
humor runs counter to authority, but transcends its power to
brutalize the slaves into replicating the paradigm set by
the masters.

Both texts are indices of the historical

relation between India and Britain at two different moments
during the colonial period.
In 1789, the year of the French Revolution, Sir William
Jones, newly arrived in Calcutta to take his post as a Judge
of the Supreme Court, translated Sakuntala into English for
the first time.

In the preface to his translation, Jones

informs us that he undertook the study and translation of
Sanskrit drama with the desire to know "the real state of
this empire before the conquest of it by the Savages of the
North"

(William Jones Reader 90).

Jones's descriptive
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pithet "Savages of the North" refers of course to the
uslim invasion of India in 1000 A.D, the second of the
hree major invasions that rippled across the Indian
ubcontinent, the first being that of the Aryans who brought
he Vedas and Sanskrit sometime between 3000 and 2000 BCE;
nd the most recent being Jones's own people, the British,
ho introduced English and Protestant Christianity in the
eventeenth century.

Jcnes writes:

I was very solicituous, on my arrival in Bengal, to
procure access to those books, either by the help of
translations, if they had been translated, or by
learning the language in which they were originally
composed, and which I had yet a stronger inducement to
learn from its connection with the administration of
justice to the Hindus.

(Pachori William Jones Reader

90)
i his 1993 edition of Jones's selected writings, Satya S.
ichori notes

that "by this translation, Jones ushered in

i Age of Indian Renaissance and added Indian drama to world
Lterature"

(William Jones Reader 89).

Goethe acknowledged

le influence cf Sakuntala in designing the prologue to
iust.

In a letter to Jacobi he praised the play thus:

Wouldst thou the blossoms of spring, as well as the
fruits of the autumn,
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Wouldst thou what charms and delights, wouldst
thou what plenteously feeds,
Wouldst thou include both Heaven and earth in one
designation,
All that is needed is done, when I Sakontala name.
(Goethe Collected Works 270)
Goethe's poem elevates Sakontala into a landscape of sublime
beauty consistent with the Romanticist apotheosis of Nature,
but Jones himself tended to regard most of the details of
the forest setting as extraneous to the drama proper: the
machinery of the drama is clearly allegorical, Jones argues,
and the verdurous plenitude it evokes must have pleased the
Indian courts when it was first represented only because
“the Indian empire was then in full vigour, and the national
vanity must have been highly flattered by the magnificent
introduction of those kings and heroes in whom the Hindus
gloried; the scenery must have been splendid and beautiful.
. ." (William Jones Reader 91).

In other words, to Jones

nature mirrored the power of king and court, a power, he
reminds us, that no longer exists.

The intent of Jones'

translation is to fossilize the original language, deny it a
life of its own, rather than rejuvenate it.
The plot of Sakuntala is similar to Shakespeare's
mature comedies.

King Dushyanta chances to meet the

beautiful Sakuntala, surrogate daughter of the sage Kanva
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while hunting in the forest.
married secretly.

He pursues her and they get

Dushyanta promises to send for Sakuntala

as soon as he returns to the palace and leaves his royal
ring with her as the sign of his promise to her.

While

waiting for Dushyanta, Sakuntala, however, neglects to
attend to the sage Durvasavu who puts the curse on her that
he who she was thinking about would forget her just as she
forgot to attend to him.

So when the pregnant Sakuntala,

after a long and futile wait comes to Dushyanta's court, she
is rejected by the king who fails to recognise her as a
result of the curse.

The humiliated Sakuntala is rescued by

her mother, a celestial nymph, who takes her away.
Dushyanta grows melancholy as time passes due to an
inexplainable sorrow.

Dushyanta and Sakuntala eventually

find each other and the story ends with their happy reunion.
The solar dynasty that ruled India in the ancient times
commences with their son, Bharath, after whom India is
called Bharath in vernacular languages.
In Jones's interpretation of the story the king is an
adamant monarch who exacts his subjects's submission through
ineluctable acts of force.

in the Sanskrit text, however,

the king is adamant and powerful, but his authority is
portrayed as vulnerable, and his vulnerability surfaces
primarily in his relationship to his jester, Madhavya.
Humor is a narrative device here that makes the reader watch
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the unraveling of the play's commentary on power from an
ironic distance. This level of ironic subversion of
authority is absent in Jones's translation.

Consequently,

Sakuntala becomes a serious play, in Jones's translation, to
the almost total exclusion of the non-serious.

Example:

the English title, Sakontala: Or the Fatal Rina.

The word

"fatal" in Jones's time signified, then as now, something
that was fraught with destiny, often ominous, and producing
irreversible ruin.

Further, Jones suggested editing the

original text considerably, with emendations which would
directly affect the humorous content of the play: "the piece
might easily be reduced to five acts of moderate length, by
throwing the third act into the second, and the sixth into
the fifth; for it must be confessed that the whole of
Dushmanta's conversation with his buffoon, and [sic] great
part of his courtship in the hermitage, might be omitted
without any injury to the drama"

(William Jones Reader 91).

Jones's hypothetical scheme of elimination aimed at
reducing the role of humor and resulted in transforming the
role of the jester in the play.

The jester's humor is

admittedly at the expense of the conflict in the king's
life, but it is also a laughter permitted by authority.
There is a paradox implicit in this laughter; the nature of
the relationship between the king and the jester is that of
a master and his slave.

In this framework, to laugh at the
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folly or misfortune of the king is an act of aggression on
the jester's part.

On the other hand, the officially

foolish character in a play, the Fool, is the least slave
like of all characters --his aggression is unreprimanded by
authority.

There is a paradox of power surrounding the

Fool, a paradox in which to act against authority results in
endearment rather than censure, which leads the melancholy
and always-in- trouble Jaques in As You Like It to exclaim,
"0 that I were a fool"
II.VII.41).

(Shakespeare As You Like It

Madhavya uses this freedom to be ruthlessly

straightforward to dispense with deccrum and expose the
vulnerabilities of the king, a method at once subtle and
tendentious, and which lays the groundwork for the
increasing conflict and introspection in the king.
The conflict in the plot is built around the confusion
of identity that surrounds the king--the king as role versus
king as person.

For instance, in act one, Dushyanta seeks

Madhavya’s assistance to work his way surreptitiously into
Kanva's hermitage in order to meet Sakuntala.

Madhavya's

advice verbalizes the conflict: "Hola! bid the hermits bring
my sixth part of their grain.
without scruple"

Say this, and enter the grove

(william Jones Reader. 101) .

The

implication here is that Dushyanta should use his authority
as king to enter the hermitage because the hermits are his
subjects like everyone else.

Madhavya's advice, however

72
well-disposed towards the king, has nevertheless a vanity
about it that is particularly suited for comedy and which
reduces the effect of verbal aggression.

He mimics the

king's voice instead of merely advising him, the mimicry
adding a tendentious levity to his message.

At the same

time, it draws our attention to the fact that even though he
is king, Dushyanta is for once undecided about using his
authority because he feels a moral hesitation in doing so.
Kalidasa builds this vain streak in the jester's character
as a check against charges of tendentiousness so that the
fool's ethical counsel is always left a little suspect.

The

fool is a gluttonous, comfort -loving Brahmin, a
characterization that already casts him in a comic light,
since Brahmins are traditionally the most austere caste
among Hindus.

But Madhavya is necessary to bring out the

human hesitations in the king at this point in the play.
Madhavya’s levity, however, embodies an ironic
seriousness that acts as a contrast to the self-indulgent
seriousness of the king, which borders on melancholy.

Jones

himself was aware of this ambiguous aesthetic of Sakuntala.
In a letter to George John Spencer, he described Sakuntala
as being "neither tragedy nor comedy," but like "one of
Shakespeare's fairy plays"

(Sir William Jones 115).

It is

unclear which specific plays of Shakespeare provoked this
comparison, but it seems fair to assume that in all
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probability it rested on the increasingly light and tenuous
world of Shakespeare's post-A Midsummer Night's Dream
comedies and perhaps his later tragi-comedies.

Sakuntala

shares with these texts a thematic emphasis on the
vulnerability of melancholy to parody.

Dushyanta combines

in him both the romant/c self-absorption of Duke Orsino in
Twelfth Night, as well as Jaques in As You Like It. "who can
suck melancholy out of a song, like a weasel sucks eggs" (As
You Like It ii. V. 11-13)
For instance, consider nature and love seen through
Dushyanta's eyes.

Reassuring Sakuntala's friends, Dushyanta

makes the following proclamation: pariaraha bahutve api dve
pratishte kulasya me/ samudrarasana cha urvi sakhi cha
vuvavorivum (Kalidasa Collected Works 571).

My translation

reads, "I might consort with many women, but there shall be
only two worthy of my name--this sea-girt earth, and your
sweet friend."

Jones translates the speech thus, "What need

is there of many words?

Let there be ever so many women in

my palace, I will have only two objects of perfect regard;
the seagirt earth, which I govern, and your sweet friend,
whom I love" (William Jones Reader 105) .

Sakuntala and the

earth have equal value and are equally exalted because he
rules one and loves the other.

The Sanskrit phrase

"pratishte kulasya me" ("[I] will consecrate in my lineage")
carries all the arrogance of the king's point of view, which
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is flattened in Jones's freely glossed translation.

It is

this point of view that demonstrates the unchecked authority
that is parodied and tampered with by the jester.

Another

example of the kingly point of view occurs in act two, where
Dushyanta describes Sakuntala as unparallelled in beauty.
Madhavya retorts, "Oh! certainly, whatever a king admires
must be superlatively charming"

(William Jones Reader 101),

implying that, as king, he can be completely wrong in his
perceptions and yet be acknowledged right, if he plays the
role of the king.
What reduces the king's tension in his role-playing is
that his kingliness is seemingly honored by Madhavya.
Example: in the interlude between acts one and two, he
complains to the audience that the king has gone native in
the forest, wearing "a garland of flowers" for his diadem.
The second act opens with Dushyanta walking into Madhavya's
vicinity soliloquizing aloud about the beautiful Sakuntala,
only to see Madhavya leaning motionless against a staff
pretending to be worn out by the physical exertion involved
in making a living in the forest.

The exchange that follows

between the king and the jester illustrates the limits of
power that the jester attempts to transgress. Jones
translates:
Madh.

[Bending downward, as before.] Great Prince! my

hands are unable to move; and it is with my lips only
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that I can mutter a blessing on you.
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the king, just as a tree is powerless against the stream.
Madhavya departs from the norm--submission to the king--but
by a witty analogy that bypasses direct aggression.

His

reasoning is comparable to that of Feste's in Twelfth Night
or the fool in Othello in its tendentious co-opting of the
outer shell of systems of thought.

When Olivia calls Feste

a "dry Fool" in act one of Twelfth Night, Feste answers with
an analogy run wild:
Two faults, madonna, that drink and good counsel will
amend.
not dry.

For give the dry fool drink, then is the fool
Bid the dishonest man mend himself: if he

mend, he is no longer dishonest; if he cannot, let the
botcher mend him.

Anything that's mended is but

patch'd; virtue that's mended is but patch'd with sin,
and sin that amends is but patch'd with virtue.

If

that this simple syllogism will serve, so; if it will
not, what remedy?

As there is no true cuckold but

calamity, so beauty's a flower.

The lady bade take

away the fool; therefore, I say again, take her away.
(Shakespeare Twelfth Night I.V.37-47)
Olivia is amply rewarded in this catechism for calling Feste
a "dry fool," a stupid fool.

Both Madhavya and Feste are

fools playing at fools, and part of their act is to co-opt
idealized systems, Nature for Madhavya, logic for Feste, and
turn them inside out for tendentious purposes.

Madhavya's
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intent is to push the king towards recognising the kingly
role he plays as a role; so that he may begin to remedy its
overreaching hold on himself as an individual.
Feste describes the quintessential comic sentence when
he says, ,!A sentence is but a chev'ril glove to a good wit.
How quickly the wrong side may be turn'd outward"
Night III.1 .11-13).
certain.

(Twelfth

Viola's rejoinder, "Nay, that's

They that dally nicely with words may quickly make

them wanton"

(Twelfth Niaht III.I.14-15) is in effect

describing the office of the "vidushaka" or the Fool,
etymologically, "visheshana dushayanti iti vidushaka," that
is, "one who tampers [with words, thoughts, deeds] in a
particular way."

Jones does not preserve this deliberately

banal pose of the jester with any accuracy in his
translation.

Not only that, but at times, he attempts to

improve the jester's point of view.

In this passage in act

two, Madhavya tells Bhadrasena, the king's commander -in chief to terminate his eulogy on hunting.

The original

Sanskrit speech Apehi re utsahahetuka! Atra bhavan prakritim
aoanna. Tvam tavat atavitoatavim ahindamano
naranasikaloluoasva iirnarikshasva kasvapi mukhe patish_v_at.i
(Kalidasa Collected Works 553) might be translated as "Hold
your excitement fellow!
senses.

The king has just returned to his

You may wander from forest to forest and get eaten
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by some old bear, if you want (but we are going back to the
city)."

Jones translates the exchange thus:

Away, thou false flatterer!

The king, indeed, follows

his natural bent, and is excusable; but thou, son of a
slave girl, hast no e x c u s e - A w a y to the wood!--How I
wish thou hadst been seized by a tiger or an old bear,
who was prowling for a skakal, like thyself!

(William

Jones Reader 100)
Jones makes Madhavya rather belligerent with the gratuitous
curses "son of a slave girl" and "skakal," neither of which
are present in the original prose Sanskrit text.

Nor is the

sudden, violent eruption of anger in the jester consistent
with his character elsewhere in the play.

For what

motivates Madhavya to reproach hunting is a selfish love of
comfort, and instead of tuning himself to this perverse
dandyism which we already discussed as integral to the
jester's character, Jones transforms him into a ill-tempered
nursemaid unduly worried about the welfare of the king.

But

Jones's translation does have an internal consistency;
earlier he makes Dushyanta refer to the jester as the
"moralizing" Madhavya, a spurious adjective not present in
the original.

Dushyanta's Mandotsaha kritoasmi

mriaavapavadina madhawena (Kalidasa Collected Works 552)
might read "Madhavya's disparagement of hunting has taken
all the fun out of it for me.

This is an ironic moment in
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the play when both the king and the jester get what they
want, each by pretending to concede to the other's wish-Dushyanta gains access to the hermitage, and Madhavya
returns to the palace.

As with translating the king's vow

in act three, Jones flattens the subtle irony here as well
when he translates the speech as "This moralizing Madhavya
has put a stop to our recreation by forbidding the pleasures
of the chase"

(William Jones Reader 100).

Madhavya is

successful in manipulating the king precisely because he
does not forbid he works through insinuation instead of
direct censure.
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The metaphor "gale of affection" is rather untypical of
Madhavya, whose speech shows a remarkable propensity towards
gustatorial imagery.

The translation is inaccurate in yet

another respect: the clause "and I hardly know a remedy for
his illness" gives Madhavya an inferiority and a sense of
responsibility totally lacking in irony, which is an
uncharacteristic pose for the jester.

Because a few lines

later we hear what is really on Madhavya's mind: "So; I must
wait here during his meditations, and perish with hunger"
(William Jones Reader 121).
It then follows that the greatest source of inaccuracy
in Jones's translation, which has direct bearing on the
relationship of the jester to the king, is its rather
uniformly stylized diction which does not record subtle
nuances of levels of diction in his speeches.

Kalidasa's

jester does not persuade the king by direct arguments; he
describes himself to Dushyanta as "crooked"

(William Jones

Reader 121) and his verbal ploys follow a similar bend.

He

confronts the king's exaggerated passion, sorrow, and selfimportance as roles and responds in kind.

The jester mocks

the kingly emotions, while genuine melancholy is undisturbed
by jest, as in act five when Dushyanta makes the famous
speech about Knowledge and Remembrance.

Plunged into sorrow

by the sound of a song, Dushyanta connects the experience of
pleasure and pain to our remembrance of ideal essences.
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Jones's translation here for once captures the poignancy of
the original:
Ah I what makes me so melancholy on hearing a mere song
of absence, when I am not in fact separated from any
real object of my affection?--Perhaps the sadness of
men, otherwise happy, on seeing beautiful forms and
listening to sweet melody, arises from some faint
remembrance of past joys and the traces of connections
in a former state of existence.

(William Jones Reader

114)
The king is genuinely, ironically powerless against the
assault on his senses, and the irony deepens as he fails to
recognize Sakuntala when she comes to his court.

The jester

who is absent in this scene (act five, scene one) is present
in a parallel scene when Dushyanta laments over the absence
of details in Sakuntala's portrait.

Madhavya's jesting

retort, "Why, my friend, it is only a painted bee"

(William

Jones Reader 122) once again positions him as a censor of
external vanities, as opposed to internal knowledge.
The jester's role, in other words, straddles the
paradoxical position of being a preceptor as well as an
entertainer.

But a definite pattern is visible under his

random jest in which excesses of emotion and power are
reprimanded, however obliquely.

This obliquity of the

jester is felicituous since it does not intrude upon the
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growing introspection and eventual self-realization of
Dushyanta in a happy reconciliation of his roles both as a
king and as an individual.

The designated Fool in a

Shakespearean play is always playing at being a Fool; Feste
tells Olivia in Twelfth Niaht, " Lady, cucullus non facit
monachum

[The cowl does not make the monk].

to say as, I wear not motley in my brain"

That's as much

(I.V.49-51).

Madhavya resembles Shakespeare's clowns in his selfconscious dismissal of authority and oblique dispensing of
truth, but his tendentiousness is never cruel. By reducing
the humor, the seriousness of the jester becomes a
gratuitious tone in an already serious play about the
confict of role and identity.

He is, then, both humorous

and tendentious and essential to the gradual humanizing of
the king. Eliminating him from the text does considerable
injury to its moral vision.

In Kalidasa's Sakuntala

authority is perceived as a role that alienates the one who
possesses it from himself as well as his environment; the
purpose of the jester's humor is to remind the king that he
is playing a role.

In Jones's translation, the jester’s

humor does not have this pointed purpose to it.

The absence

of tendentiousness in the jester's humor reduces the play's
serious reflection on devices that oppress the mind;
Madhavya instead of being a censor of the king's vanity
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becomes a stock, foolish character who draws attention to
himself rather than his relation to the king.
Kipling's Kim (1901) provides another model of colonial
humor in which humor is employed as an exalted point of view
that sees through such devices of oppression as blind
obedience to authority.

The critical reception of Kipling's

humor has not failed to remark on its political framework.
Sara Suleri expands Oscar Wilde’s remark on Kipling's
journalistic style, "From the point of view of life, he is a
reporter who knows vulgarity better than any one has ever
known it" (Suleri The Rhetoric of English India 7), into an
example of historical escapism that frames Kipling's complex
imperialist ideology.

Unlike Jones who did not learn the

vernacular, Kipling's English is well-mixed with Hindi and
Hindustani or Urdu.

He is equally sensitive to official

speech as well as street-talk.

In "The Adolescence of Kim,"

Suleri equates Kipling's sensitivity to his historical
moment (she attributes a negative value to this awareness of
the present in Kipling) represented through the pidgin to a
deliberate evasion of history:
. . . imperial narratives consistently demonstrate
their discomfort with the temporal negotiation that
allows stories to represent their situatedness within a
chronology that roughly approximates history.

, . .

implying that the precarious condition of the present
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tense is the only safe construction in which to
articulate its tale.

. . .To name the present tense of

history is of course to turn to journalism, to its
absorption in the moment and the concomitant
youthfulness suggested by such exuberance of attention.
(Suleri Rhetoric 111)
Suleri's journalistic reading of KtjQ directly impacts on its
"idiom of jest." "Like journalism," she writes, "a jest as a
genre accrues a certain colloquial power of contemporaneity;
it is not required to resolve the conflictual surprise with
which it claims closure.

. . .the jest. . .confirms

Kipling's journalistic ability to incorporate colonial
dischronology into his tales" (Suleri Rhetoric 126).

The

relationship of colonial dischronology to imperialism, in
other words, is similar to the relationship of humor to a
tendentious joke.

Both function to bypass or disguise an

underlying conflict, according to Suleri.

But it is

possible to demonstrate that Kipling's immersion in the
present and the youthful exuberance of his characters are
deliberate devices to break the "seriousness" with which the
masters regard the colonial enterprise.

Kipling wrote an

imperialist novel which deliberately sets out to devalue the
ponderous flashback into the history of colonialism,
deliberately downplaying the seriousness of the conquest,
"the Great Game," in favor of exploring alternate methods to
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free the self from oppression brought on by such
seriousness.
Kipling's story "The Conversion of Aurelian McGoggin,"
which Suleri distinguishes as an exemplary example of what
she calls "colonial aphasia," shares with Kim a pointed
critique of authority telescoped through a point of view
that is more ironic, it seems to me, than, as Suleri argues,
disempowering.

The young British administrator McGoggin,

known to his colleagues as "Blastoderm" for his empirical
positivist views, is punished by God (lightning strikes him
dumb) for doubting his existence.

Kipling

relation to the infinitely regressing

sketches

God's

oionial bureaucracy

thus:
in India, is not long enough to waste in proving
that there is no one in particular at the head of
affairs.

For this reason.

The Deputy is above the

Assistant, the Commissioner above the Deputy, the
Lieutenant-Governor above the Commissioner, and the
Viceroy above all four, under the orders of the
Secretary of State who is responsible to the Empress.
If the Empress be not responsible to her Maker--if
there is no Maker for her to be responsible to--the
entire system of Our administration must be wrong.
Which is manifestly impossible.
From the Hills 105).

(Kipling Plain Tales

86
He experiences two sources of authority in the story-McGoggin's senior officers and God.

Kipling's vertiginous

listing of one bureaucrat on top of the other is in itself a
humorous parody of a system of hierarchy like medieval
cosmology with its parallel apotheosis of God at the apex
which is emulated in other systems like those of the Church
or the State.

The sudden introduction of God to a purely

human list is a deliberate incongruity that brings the
enumeration of such efficient, bureaucratic streamlining to
a comical end.

The result of this reasoning is McGoggin's

disregard of authority.
Colonial administration might have believed seriously
in God's benediction for their enterprise, but Kipling makes
it sound as if divine blessing and leadership were a selfserving construct, rather than any such metaphysical given.
It becomes an ironic critique of imperialism itself when
Kipling’s narrator exposes the provisional nature of
colonialism's power: "If the Empress be not responsible to
her Maker--if there is no Maker for her to be responsible
to--the entire system of Our administration must be wrong."
The use of the conditional "if" leads to the creation of an
argument in which the usual cause-effect relation is
reversed; if there is no God one will have to be invented to
justify human actions, here colonialism.

This inverse

relation of an effect creating a cause becomes clear in the
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following tag, "Which is manifestly imposssible," in which
"manifest" once again points its finger to the achieved
fact, colonialism, which is alluded to almost as an
afterthought.

McGoggin who was engaged in disproving the

necessity of God when he was struck by lightning naturally
is "converted"; hence the title "The Conversion of Aurelian
McGoggin."

God has been effectively manipulated to serve

oppressive ends.
The story concludes with the image of McGoggin holding
forth on "things Human--he doesn't seem to know as much as
he used to about things Divine--"

(Kipling Plain Tales 110),

and we are left with an ambiguous moral in which McGoggin is
not so much an example of "the dispossessed panic of
youthfulness,"

(Plain Tales 117) as Suleri asserts; on the

contrary, he is a convert to the new religion of imperialism
and the story itself an allegory of colonialism.

Kipling's

irony is particularly sharp in this story: his narrator
opens by remarking, "This . . .
immensely proud of it.
Tales 104).

is a Tract; and I am

Making a Tract is a Feat" (Plain

The emphasis on "making the tract" never flags;

in other words, this is a story with a moral. The narrator
introduces McGoggin's aphasia with complete control: "One
day, the collapse came--as dramatically as if it had been
meant to embellish a Tract"

(Plain Tales 107).

The

"aphasia," in other words, is not an end in itself as
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Suleri's reading of the story implies; it is a means towards
conformity.

Only a reading that downplays Kipling's

profound use of irony would mistake "The Conversion of
Aurelian McGoggin" for a traumatic document about the
suffering of British soldiers in India.

Loss of memory and

disturbed speech are repeated motifs in Kipling's other
stories as well.

In both "The Finest Story in the World"

and "Wireless," memory and its loss are metaphors for the
gift and loss of creative imagination, a mysterious power of
the mind whose true nature baffled Kipling by its
elusiveness.

McGoggin1s doctor tells him as much: "I can't

help it," said the Doctor; "there are a good many things you
can't understand; and, by the time you have put in my length
of service, you'll know how much a man dare call his own in
this world"

(Plain Tales 110) .

For Suleri, McGoggin's aphasia is a radical instrument
to prove the victim status of the colonizers.

Such a

reading seems to rewrite the binary of the master-slave
relationship with the victimization dispersed among both
categories, but once this grid of oppressor-victim is locked
into place, it does not seem to allow the possibility of
other models of human relationships in colonial narratives.
Suleri's characterisation of "colonial aphasia" owes
itself

the concept of the collective historic guilt of the

colonizers famously expounded by Edmund Burke in his "Indian
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sublime."

The Indian sublime was Burke's term for the

futility of the colonizers to categorize India correctly;
India cannot be reduced to a list, something will elude the
masters always.

Burke used the term to denote the

paradoxical fearfulness and horror that the colonized
culture evoked in the colonizers, a feeling of
incomprehensibility that promoted irrational objectification
of the colonized.

Suleri reads Burke's sublime as an

"aestheticizing of political discourse, or as idiosyncratic
retreats from the parameters of rationalism into the
categorization of irrationality that the sublime signifies"
(Rhetoric 28).

Though Suleri charges Kim with "ethical and

aesthetic ambivalence"

(Rhetoric 34), she admits that Kim

"points toward an alternative reading of what colonization
signifies to the subcontinent., one less convinced of the
efficacy of a Western need to chart, to map, and to evaluate
its psychic and political geography'- (Rhetoric 35) .
Suleri's astute critique of Burke does not, however, detain
her from imposing on Kim Burke's paradigm of the sublime
that obscures the nature of colonial possession and
dispossession in that novel.

The greatest disadvantage

struck by the reading of the sublime as a category of the
irrational impacts upon Kim's relationship with the Lama,
which Kipling develops as an alternative to his relationship
with Colonel Creighton and colonial bureacracy.

As in her
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reading of McGoggin, so in Kim's character, Suleri perceives
random stabs of submerged melancholy that reiterate the
victim status of the colonizer.

Both the victimizations of

self and others are recurring patterns in the literature of
colonialism, but it is a profound misreading to accelerate
its frequency in Kim at the expense of reducing the role of
alternate relationships evident in the text.

This reduction

is most pronounced in the manner in which Suleri deemphasizes the significance of the relationship between Kim
and the lama.
Edward Said relegated the relationship between Kim and
the lama to the peripheries of the main action, which for
him, is Kim's involvement with Colonel Creighton's Great
Game.

He calls the lama's final panoramic vision of India

"mumbo-jumbo" with some meaning in it: "The lama's
encyclopedic vision of freedom strikingly resembles Colonol
Creighton's Indian Survey, in which every camp and village
is duly noted" (Kipling Kim 19).
the lama is no "confidence man"

Though Said admits that
(Kim 16) he is quick to

remind us that tne lama's presence in the novel provokes an
ahistorical reading of Kim that we should be aware of.
The most serious charge against the lama is what Suleri
calls his "ostensible otherwordliness" and what Said
referred to above as the lama's tendency to provoke an
"ahistorical" reading of Kim.

Said's reading of the lama's
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function in the novel is less harsh than Suleri’s, but the
tension surrounding the subplot with the lama receives its
extreme censure from Suleri who sharply observes that "the
infantilism of the lama exceeds that of his boy guide: his
ostensible otherworldliness sheathes him from the routine
cartography that constitutes colonial life. . .in which the
'Middle Way' most typically represents the petty ineptitudes
of colonial adm:nistration"

(Suleri Rhetoric 120).

It is a

deliberate move on Kipling's part to depict colonial
administration as inept; part of Aurelian McGoggin’s "fault"
according to the narrator is that he took administering
India too seriously.

The ideological clash in Kipling's

stories is not between those who promote colonialism and
those who are against it.

It is more accurately to be

located between those who take colonialism seriously as
opposed to those who regard it non-seriously.

Kim's

attitude to the demands of the ethnographic survey is almost
as amusingly dismissive as Browne's dismissal of Aristotle.
An ironic example of one who takes his job in India very
seriously is the story "Thrown Away," in which a young
British officer, very much like McGoggin, ends up killing
himself in India because he takes his job "too seriously"
(Kipling Plain Tales 16).

In Kim the colonial systems's

ineptitude is matched by the lightness of its hero in whom
the "idiom of jest" contains a critique of its ideology.
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Ineptitude of the administration is the primary center
of Kipling's jest in Kim.

A clear example of the way in

which "ineptitude" becomes an occasion for humor may be
located in chapter 5 where Kim is captured by the Anglican
priest Mr. Bennett and his future is discussed by the three
religious figures, Mr. Bennett, the Catholic priest Father
Victor, and the lama.

We hear Mr.Bennett musing on the

first conflict that delays any immediate decisions about
Kim's future: "Between himself and the Roman Catholic
Chaplain of the Irish contingent lay, as Bennett believed,
an unbridgeable gulf, but it was noticeable that whenever
the Church of England dealt with a human problem she was
very likely to call in the church of Rome"
133).

(Kipling Kim

The Catholic priests's kindness and the Anglican's

stern meanness contrast and imply thereby a breakdown of the
monolithic concept of colonialism.

Their disagreement over

what needs to be done with Kim results in a slow diffusion
of the seriousness of his capture.

When Bennett remarks

that there is no need to consult the lama before dispatching
Kim to the Masonic Orphanage, Father Victor replies: "Ah!
That's your opinion as Secretary to the Regimental Lodge . .
. but we might as well tell the old man what we are going to
do.

He doesn't look like a villain"

(Kim 13S) .

Kim takes

advantage of this competition for authority between the
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Catholic and Anglican priests to weave his summary of their
quest:
"There is a River in this country which he [lama]
wishes to find so verree much.

It was put out by an

Arrow which-" Kim tapped his foot impatiently as he
translated in his own mind from the vernacular to his
clumsy English.

"Oah, it was made by our Lord God

Buddha, you know, and if you wash there you are washed
away from all your sins and made as white as cotton
wool."

(Kim had heard mission-talk in his time.)

his disciple, and we must find that River.
verree valuable to us."

"I am

It is so

(Kim 137)

In Kim's literal translation from Urdu to Eurasian
(Kipling's term for Indian English), faith is transformed
into a naive superstition, the transformation made to sound
ridiculous by an absence of commentary.

The phrase "you

know" in "Oah, it was made by our Lord God Budha, you know"
is a feeble attempt to

create a common pool of reference

amongst all four of them.

Kim tries hard to make the

concept familiar to the priests and proceeds to do so by
speaking what he believes to be "mission-talk"--the analogy
"made as white as cotton-wool."

Kim's reply shocks and

infuriates the color-conscious Christians who regard it
impudent on his part to suggest that his sins (blackness)

94
could be washed away in a river and he be turned white
(saved):
"But this is gross blasphemy!" cried the Church of
England. "Tck! Tck!" said Father Victor
sympathetically.

"I'd give a good deal to be able to

talk the vernacular.

A river that washes away sin!"

(Kim 137)
Father Victor's desire to learn the vernacular groups him
with those British characters in Kipling who s;eek to build a
bridge between the Indian and British people.

Suleri

remarks on the victimization of Indians achieved through the
"anglicization" of India; she find

Kim to belong to the

class of "native" interpreters described by Macaulay in his
"Minutes on Indian Education."

Macaulay in his notorious

Minutes had dismissed Indian language and culture in one
aggressive sweep; "I have no knowledge of either Sanscrit of
Arabic.--But I have done what I could to form a correct
estimate of their value. . . . I am quite ready to take the
Oriental learning at the valuation of the Orientalists
themselves.

I have never found one of them who could deny

that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the
whole native literature of India and Arabia"

(Rhetoric 33).

Kipling sets Macaulay's serious dismissal of Indian
languages in reverse in Kim when he makes misunderstanding
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of the vernacular tongues into an occasion for purposeful
humor.
Kipling wrote of a time in India when the British had
been in control for so long that some even had graves going
back three or four generations.

What we find in his stories

are people communicating in spite of their linguistic short
comings.

In the story "The Three Musketeers" three

subalterns, Learoyd, Mulvaney, and Ortheris of the
Helanthami Cantonment decide to avenge their mistreatment by
a Lord Benira Trig.

The list that the subalterns use to

describe him runs thus: "He is a Duke, or an Earl, or
something unofficial; also a Peer; also a Globe-trotter"
(Plain Tales 70).

On all three counts, Ortheris says, "'e

didn’t deserve no consideration."

Trig is further described

as a collector, an Orientalist collecting material for his
book Our Eastern Impediments, a potential successor to, say
Sir William Jones.

The three men plan to abduct the Lord,

have him thrown into a lake, then rescue him all in the
manner of a "Vic'orai Melodrama."

To execute their plan of

revenge, Mulvaney solicits the services of a "native" hekkadriver (a hekka is a two-wheeled carriage drawn by a pony).
The English-Hindi pidgin used by the three subalterns mark
them as low-class and daringly inventive in a foreign
tongue:

96

I purshued a hekka, an' I sez to the dhriver-divil, I
sez, "Ye black limb, there's a Sahib coming for this
hekka. He wants to go iildi to the Padsahi Jhil" -1twas about tu moiles away--"to shoot--chirria. You
dhrive Jahannum ke marfik. mallum--like Hell? 'Tis no
manner av use bukkin1 to the Sahib, bekaze he doesn't
samiao your talk. Av he bolos anything, just you choop
and chel. Dekker? Go arstv for the first arder-mile
from cantonmints. Thin chel. shaitan ke marfik, an' the
chopper you choops an' the iildier you chgls the better
kooshv will that Sahib be; an' here's a ruppee for ye?"
(Kim 72-73)
The vocabulary of Eurasian pidgin had functioned as a
legitimate language of contact between the Indians and the
British during the colonial period.

Where Jones's

translation of Sakuntala maintains the decorum of Latin
translated into English, Kipling's ears pick up the full
range of dialects, which is perhaps the reason why Wilde
called him a vulgar journalist.

A gloss on the above speech

would demonstrate the extent to which English and Hindi had
undone each other's self-sufficiency as independent
languages and become a syncretic language with a uniquely
flourishing communication.

A translation of the Hindi words

in the above speech shows us the extent to which the two
languages had altered the look and sound of each other.
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For example, Sahib=master; jildi=corruption of "jaldi"
meaning "quick"; chirria=corruption of "chidiya" meaning
"birds"; Jahannum ke marfik=like hell; bukking="buk" means
"to chatter pointlessly," here pidginized by adding the
English suffix "-ing"; samjao=to understand; bolos="bol"
means "to talk," here pidginized by adding the English
present tense suffix "-s"; choop=corruption of "chup"
meaning "to shut up"; chal=to walk; Dekker=corruption of
"Dheek Hai?" meaning "all right?"; arsty=corruption of
"ahista" meaning "slowly"; arder=corruption of "adha"
meaning "half"; shaitan=devil; kooshy with a soft
"k"=corruption of "khushi" meaning "to be happy."
The locus of humor here is in the layers of linguistic
errors-- (chirriva. arder), the seamless affixing of English
phonological and morphological features on to Hindi words
(bolos for "says," chopper for "silently," bukkinn for
"arguing"), the phrase-book application of Hindi idioms
(shaitan ke marfik, iahaimum ke marfik).

The root-joke of

the entire anecdote, however, is the ineffective authority
of Lord Benira Trig in a situation where he is
linguistically out of control.

("Tis no manner av use

bukkin1 to the sahib, bekaze he doesn't sarniao your talk,"
Ortheris tells the hekka-walla.)
Two important points emerge from this story: one, by
the late 1890s there was a growing discontent among the
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British troops stationed in India, the subalterns; and two,
by the same time there existed a shared pool of experience
between the Indians and the British.

The pidgin is a figure

for this common pool of experience, which from Kipling's
evidence favors the complicity between the British and the
Indians in an enterprise that seems to be deliberately
indifferent to the upkeep of imperialism in India.

Though

Suleri asserts to the contrary, it is impossible to find
textual evidence in Kim to suggest that "the pragmatics of
his [Kim's] education as a sahib severely unhinge the
confidence of his cultural transactions"

(Rhetoric 122) .

On

the contrary, we find Kipling stretching the bounds of
possible cultural interactions between two linguistically
and politically divided people, the elasticity often causing
them to bounce back and hit the colonizer on his face with a
comic boomerang.
That Kipling's characters regarded India as part of
their natural destiny is evident when the narrator in
"Cupid's Arrows" nostalgically admits that the events in the
story took place in the "pre-history" of British India when
the contacts between the British and the Indian people were
minimal or next to nothing.

The story is remarkable for its

complete absence of Indian characters.

History then, for

Kipling, as opposed to pre-history, meant the mixing of the
two peoples in the degree of his later works, especially
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Kim.

Humor in Kim is often the result of one of the

participants in an event or a speech not connecting with
this shared Anglo-Indian experience.

Lord Benira Trig is

made to look ridiculous because of his inability to
understand the plot to sabotage him when it was being
discussed right under his nose.

That Kipling was kind to

those who made the slightest attempt to comprehend the
colonised language is evident by Father Victor's genuinely
bewildered but non-hostile recaption of the lama's letter.
Like the subalterns' daring usage of Hindi the lama's letter
in English is yet another example of the comic verbalization
of this contact:
Sitting on wayside in grave meditation, trusting to be
applause of present step, which recommend your Honour
to execute for almighty God's sake. Education favored
with your Honour's is greatest blessing if of best
sorts. Otherwise no earthly use....... confide in your
Honour's humble servant for adequate remuneration per
hoondi [draft] per annum three hundred rupees a year to
one expensive education St Xavier, Lucknow, and allow
small time to forward same per hoondi sent to any part
of India as your Honour shall address yourself.

So

going to Benares, where will find address and forward
rupees for boy who is apple of eye, and for God
Almighty's sake execute this education, and your
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.

. . Please note boy is apple of eye, and rupees shall
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When we separate the various thematic threads weaving
the story we find that Kipling leaves the effects of
imperialist indoctrination open-ended--will Kim go with the
lama or Colonel Creighton?

This ambiguity once again

directs our attention to the subjectivity of the main
characters --Kim, the lama, and Colonel Creighton --and the
experiential component of the novel--so that rather than a
flat, didactic approbation or censure of imperialism, we get
a more complex resolution of the dialectic of strife.

Kim

at the end of his adventure with the lama is a significantly
altered character --one who begins to question his identity
rather than blindly submit to an external definition of his
selfhood.
The lama's letter, in Suleri's reading, becomes the
greatest piece of evidence incriminating him in Creighton's
Great Game.

"There are no quests that live a charmed life

outside the confines of colonial desire," writes Suleri
connecting the lama's "utilitarianism" to "Kim's . . .
tyrannical status of a Macaulayan interpreter” {Suleri
Rhetoric 122).

Said glosses the phrase "Great Game" as a

term from chess thought to have originated in the writing of
a

Bengal

cavalry officer named Arthur Connolly, who in his

Narrative of $n Overland Journey to the North of.India
(1 8 3 8 ) u s e d

he phrase to signify the diplomatic maneuvers

followed by India and Russia in their struggle for political
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ascendency in western Asia in the first half of the
nineteenth century.

In Kim Kipling uses the trope of Game

generally to describe British activities in India and more
specifically the espionage subplot which takes the lama and
Kim to the Himalayas.

Said describes the relation of the

Game to the deeper, deceitful, aggressive reality of
colonialism:
. . .the confluence between Creighton's Great Game and
Kim's inexhaustibly renewed capacity for disguises and
adventure; Kipling keeps the two things tightly
connected. The first is the device of political
surveillance and control; the second, at a much deeper
and more interesting level, is the wish-fantasy of
someone who would like to think that everything is
possible, that one can go anywhere and be anything.
(Kim 44)
The teleological approach of both Said and Suleri isolate
the Great Game as the logical end of Kipling's jest.

They

bracket Kim's apprenticeship to the lama as a decoy
deliberately thrown in to reduce the seriousness of the
novel's ultimate position on imperialism.

This bracketing

points less to Kipling's ambivalence towards the empire than
to our own contemporary anxiety when confronted with an
apparent dissolution of the master-slave dialectic.

Suleri,
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for instance, finds Kim to be an image of the "absent other"
in the conclusion:
. . . the concluding sentence of the text, which once
again images Kim in a magnificent moment of uncontrol:
" [The lama] crossed his ha^do on his lap and smiled, as
a man may who has won Salvation for himself and his
beloved".

. . Here, Kim is envisioned as the absent

other that indicates the silence of classical Urdu
poetry, in which the beloved has no voice at all.
(Rhetoric 131)
Though Suleri alludes to it as a potential disqualification,
the comparison of Kim to the "beloved" in Urdu poetry is
both felicitous and paradoxical as it brings to light the
nature of authority and submission in the master-disciple
(or lover-beloved relationships) which is an alternative to
the master-slave dialectic that dominates the political
framework in Kim.

Like his elegant counterpart in Urdu

poetry, Kim is an ideal to the lama: according to the lama
he is "Temperate, kindly, wise, of ungrudging disposition, a
merry heart upon the road, never forgetting, learned,
truthful, courteous"

(Kim 332).

Like the "beloved" he is

also a paradoxical authority figure to the lama: despite
Suleri's efforts to establish that "[Kim] either possesses
the lama or is possessed by him"

(Rhetoric 118) , the

ambiguity in the narrative may be located in the lama's
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inability to possess him completely.

The inability to

possess the object of desire completely situates Kim in a
middle category of a text that is a study in such desiring
rather than a "study of cultural possession and
dispossession" as Suleri proposes in her reading of Kim
(Rhetoric 117).
We find an example of Kipling's daring takes on
defining identity within the master-slave framework in Kim's
conversation with the Pathan horse-dealer Mahbub Ali.
Mahbub Ali's response to Kim's question, "What am I?
Mussalman, Hindu, Jain, or Budhist?"

(Kim 191) brings the

metaphysical question to earth:
This matter of creeds is like horseflesh. The wise man
knows horses are good--that there is a profit to be
made from all; and for myself--but that I am a good
Sunni and hate the men of Tirah--I could believe the
same of all the Faiths. Now manifestly a Kathiawar mare
taken from the sands of her birthplace and removed to
the west of Bengal founders --nor is even a Balkh
stallion (and there are no better horses than those of
Balkh, were they not so heavy in the shoulder) of any
account in the great Northern deserts beside the snowcamels I have seen. Therefore I say in my heart the
Faiths are like the horses. Each has merit in its own
country.

(Kim 191-92)
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The point of Mahbub Ali's humorous analogy lies in the fact
that it is evasive: he does not respond to Kim's question
directly.

Kim's question is not answered.

Instead he is

presented with a comparison of faith to horse-flesh, a low,
incongruous analogy which deflates the emotional weight of
Kim's question, "What am I?"

Mahbub Ali seems to say that

in faith as in horse business the crucial factor is profit.
This claim seems to involve an exclusive definition of
profit, but in further comparisons of the relative merits of
a Kathiawar mare, a Balkh stallion and a northern snow-camel
Mahbub Ali proves that profit is always relative to the
place and purpose which they serve.

The snow-camel,

however, seems to be an inappropriate addition to the list
which was originally begun with horses.

The digression on

the Balkh stallion pulls the analogy further away from faith
with the aside "and there are no better horses than those of
Balkh, were they not so heavy in the shoulder" that throws
off the rhythm of the passage in a mildly comic manner. This
digression is intentional and tendentious.

Not having his

question answered, in other words, failure to appropriate a
definite identity for himself, makes Kim a suitable
alternative to the violence of fixed and inflexible creeds;
his vagabondage becomes more than what Said classifies as
"fantasy."

Kim's disguises and wanderings challenge the

notion of fixed definitions of identity and power.

Hence
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Kipling's repeated fascination with make-up, disguises,
masks, ventriloquism, and reincarnation--all of which
challenge the notion of selfhood as a fixed and unchangeable
entity,
Kipling's skepticism of fixed notions of identity is
once again hinted at in Mahbub Ali's ironic parting
conversation with the lama.

To the lama's suggestion, "Why

not follow the Way thyself, and so accompany the boy?"
Mahbub Ali reacts thus: "Mahbub stared stupified at the
magnificent insolence of the demand, which across the Border
he would have paid with more than a blow" (Kim 335).
the lama and for Kim identity is fluid.

For

As in his response

to Kim, here too Mahbub Ali underreacts to the situation,
and his subtle bewilderment mirrors his awareness of his
difference from the lama.

Mahbub Ali is fixed and

unchanging selfhood while the lama is the ever expanding
one.
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Kim's need for the lama, on the other hand, is

self-motivated.

He asks Mahbub Ali, "If I do not see him,

and if he is taken from me, I will go out of that madrissah
in Nucklao and, and--once gone, who is to find me again?"
(Kim 192)

Kipling makes the lama "lose" Kim to the British

officers for the sake of education which immerses Kim in the
dialectic of masters and slaves.

The purposeful

significance of the master-disciple bond becomes apparent
when the lama eventually "finds" Kim by his self-propelled
comeback from the oblivion of Buddhist Nirvana.

The master-

disciple bond, or the lover-beloved bond, in other words,
become a refuge inside the ubiquitous hold of the masterslave relationship of colonialism.
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his own bondage and to protect an orphaned, new-born
elephant calf.

The calf who reaches adulthood under the

protection of the old elephant finally breaks open the
imprisoned elephant's leg-irons and frees him.
In a scene which Suleri shockingly misreads as that of a
crime of passion, Kipling makes the political framework of
the text secondary to the growing bond between the lama and
Kim.

According to Suleri, in the "chilling conclusion" to

the story, "The narrator knows that Kim must be killed.

He

hands the deed over to the otherworldly lama, however, with
whom he remains in perpetual contestation for Kim's love"
(Rhetoric 130).

Kim's love for the lama is the only

uncontested relation in the novel.

Here the narrator's

point of view alluded to by Suleri is quite obviously that
of Kipling the imperialist, but the manner in which the
camera focuses on Kim and the lama at this point in the
story is far from framing a threatening chiaroscuro for a
murder plot.

Kim sees the lama as "the cross-legged figure,

outlined jet-black against the lemon-coloured drift of
light.

So does the stone Eodhisat sit who looks down upon

the patent self -registering turnstiles of the Lahore Museum"
(Kim. 336) .

The "wheel" of time reappears here in the image

of the turnstiles at the Museum where the lama and Kim had
their first encounter; it becomes the index of the mystical
freedom that the lama and Kim find in each other and has
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more to do with Buddhist mysticism and not with surveys and
agriculture, as Suleri dismisses it so patronisingly in her
reading.
Ultimately the challenge for our reading Kim is not
merely to expose the fantastic devices of colonialism which
are fairly obvious.

Rather it is to resensitize the reader

towards an ambiguous definition of possession itself, which
Kipling explores in an idiom that self-consciously
negotiates a middle path between the potentially alienating
extremes of cultural possession and dispossession.

In this

respect one narrative function of the "idiom of jest" in Kim
is not so much to gloss over the issue of victimizing power
as Said suggests, or render the conflict between loyalties
"irresolvable" as David Bromwich's reading of Kim concludes,
but to force the reader to move beyond the details of the
foreground in still another direction and listen to the
manner in which the idiom of jest throws into relief the
growing m.aster-disciple/lover-beloved bond that situates
itself as an alternative to the master-slave relationship.
The lama's naivety and Kim's ebullience never lack selfawareness; they provide deliberate points of view that
Kipling self-consciously experiments with in order to right
the unequal and ultimately unfair historical relation
between the colonizer and the colonized.

The lama's and

Kim's partial involvement in the Great Game with all its
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accompanying dangers is thus a felicitous framework for
Kipling's experiment.

But Kipling attempts to create his

own system rather than follow the favorite fiction of
colonizers.

Like Browne who dismantled the cherished

opposition between God and the Devil, by creating the loverbeloved bond between the lama and Kim, Kipling attempts to
merge love of the spirit with the love of material life, no
small task in itself, since it calls for an exact evaluation
of the importance of material life for the life of the
spirit.

Contrary to Suleri's claim that the sublime flees

into irrationality, the sense of freedom that Kim and the
lama experience is the product of a carefully reasoned
stance.

The lama tells Kim, "Son of my Soul, I have

wrenched my Soul back from the Threshold of Freedom to free
thee from all sin" (Kim 338).

The lama here pronounces

Kim's involvement with the Great Game a "sin" with great
simplicity and no deception.

This is the inevitable ground

of good humor, which acknowledges the conflict and then
seeks to rise above it.

CHAPTER FOUR
I Don't Feel Funny Today: Dorothy Parker and the
Melancholy of Humor

Both Sir Thomas Browne and Rudyard Kipling demonstrated
for us that the best strategy to avoid lacerating the self
from the inside or the outside in a situation of conflict
was to act upon the principle of equal love.

In both of

these writers, humor became the protective persona, or
Kierkegaard's incognito, of a non-aggressive, loving
dialectic.

But in the stories of Dorothy Parker, romantic

love becomes the ground upon which strife develops between
two individuals.

Love as war challenges us with the

necessity to expand our strategies to contend new and
subtler methods of oppression.
Though Parker's stories provide us with the problem of
hostility between men and women in the area of romantic
love, Parker is primarily known for the withering wit
characteristic of her reviews and poems. As a reviewer
Parker was equally aggressive towards men and women and
cauterized the lowest kind of social pretensions with her
tendentious laughter.

In her review of Upton Sinclair's
111
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Money Writes Parker chastised Sinclair for unleashing his
socialist indignation on Joseph Hergesheimer, a petty
bourgeois writer of little distinction.

Parker wrote "There

is a certain lack of proportion in bringing heavy artillery
to bear on Joseph Hergesheimer for so innocuous a work as
From an Qld House "(The Portable Dorothy Parker 470) .

it is

ironic that Parker would blame Sinclair for overreacting to
trifles, because except for an occasional review of a
Hemingway novel, Parker herself reviewed little known,
innocuous, and dull books.

A random list would include the

genres of pulp fiction, etiquette books, anatomy texts,
self-help books and autobiographies of movie stars.
But Parker's stories exemplify the fiction of women
who love too much and men who love too little, women who are
from Venus and men who are from Mars, and other myths of
hetero-sexual romance.

Love is not the answer to the

struggles in her stories; indeed we often sense that her
women use love as a figure of speech to reveal or obliquely
conceal the hostile dynamics of their relations with men.
The aggressive wit in her reviews turns inward in her
fiction taking us into the minds of her characters, allowing
us to eavesdrop while they commit embarrassing revelations
about their insecurities, their need for male company, and
articulate the existence of a poignant state of melancholy
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which is, apparently, the ocher half of romance.

Parker's

stories have been called sentimental and her humor selfdeprecating.

In this chapter I will argue for a more

generous interpretation of both of these traits--sentiment
and self-deprecation.

I shall attempt to demonstrate how

Parker uses both of these characteristics in her characters
as self-conscious and self-aware devices to defend herself
against the hostile dynamics of hetero-sexual romance.
Parker's wit in her stories echoes that of her reviews.
A typical example of the aggressive mode for which she is
well-praised is her review of William Lyon Phelps's
Happiness --"a volume about six inches tall, perhaps four
inches across, and something less than a half inch thick,"
(Portable 461).

What is most obvious about Parker's style

is its tendentious wit:
Anyway, there is this to be said for a volume such as
Professor Phelps’s Happiness.

It is second only to a

rubber duck as an ideal bathtub companion.

It may be

held in the hand without causing muscular fatigue or
nerve strain, it may be neatly balanced back of the
faucets, and it may be read through before the water
has cooled.

And if it slips down the drain pipe, all

right, it slips down the drain pipe.

(Portable 462)

This aggressive tone is maintained throughout the review
with slight internal variations resulting from the relative
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relaxation and intensification of irony.

For instance,

after a relatively innocuous passage where she lists a few
of the Professor's moral adages, she concludes the review
thus:
Happiness concludes with a pretty tribute to what the
Professor calls the American

cow.

The cow, he points

out, does not have to brush her teeth, bob her hair,
select garments, light her fire and cook her food.

She

is not passionate about the income tax or the League of
Nations; she has none of the thoughts that inflict
distress and torture.

"I have observed many cows,"

says the Professor, in an interesting glimpse of
autobiography, "and there is in their beautiful eyes no
perplexity; they are never even bored."

He paints a

picture of so sweet, so placid, so carefree an
existence, that you could curse your parents for not
being Holsteins.

(Portable 463)

Although the particular details of a cow's life that she
chooses to include are in themselves comical already-bobbing hair, selecting garments, brushing teeth etc.,--the
passage gains an additional tendentious twist when she
suddenly forces us to look at the professor instead of the
cows.

That her real target is the author is clear in the

sudden, but calculated switch in perspective located in the
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editorial "in an interesting glimpse of autobiography."

It

is a cruel subtle put-down.
Parker's reputation rests mainly on such witticisms.
An example is Mervyn Border's anthology of "black diamonds
of her wit" in which he picks and chooses among Parker's
destructive, but comic, put-downs of other people.

Joan

Acocella, in a 1993 New Yorker retrospective on Parker
describes her Constant Reader columns as "standup-comedy
routines" primarily on the basis of the witty personae that
she created for her audience in one installment after the
other.

Acocella describes

Parker as dominated by one idea:

"the interlocking of vulnerability and cruelty.

. . .how as

Lillian Heilman described it, Parker "embraced and flattered
a man or woman, only to turn, when they had left the room,
to say in [her] soft, pleasant, clear voice,
meet such a shit?'"

(Acocella 78-79).

'Did you ever

The characteristic

features of Parker's humor, in other words, are concealment,
deception and aggressiveness.
Acocella is correct in identifying aggressiveness as
characterizing Parker's conspicuous persona but as any
cursory reading of Parker's stories would show us this
explanation is not all-inclusive.
observes that

Accocella herself

the most significant difference between

Parker's reviews and her stories (she doesn't discuss
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Parker's poems at any length) is that "basically, she is
held back from wit . . . something curious happens to her
vulnerability-cruelty formula.

Instead of deploying the two

forces sequentially--buildup, chen letdown--she works them
simultaneously.

Her heroiner are all vulnerability.

(Acocella 79).

. ."

Acocella's reading exposes a paradox at the

heart of all gender-linked definitions of humor. Genderbased definitions of humor account largely for two groups of
aggressive humor--against oneself or ones own gender, in
other words, self-deprecating, or directed against the other
gender, hostile.

In Acocella's reading Parker's humor is

made to swing within this restricted circuit--as a reviewer
she is the aggressor and as a story-teller she is the
victim.
To substantiate her reading, Acocella scrutinizes
Parker's relentless fascination with the theme of the
dependency of women on men, *which she asserts is her "only
true subject"

(Acocella 80).

She finds an economic basis

for this emotional dependency:
If

in

the

old

nevertheless
legal

had

claims,

shifted

to

viewed,

and

days

an

so

women

legal
all

still

claims

the

emotional
view,

were

force

enslaved
on
of

them.
their

claim--love,
differently

by

men,

Now

they

they

had

dependency

a matter

that

from women.

no

was
men

Hence

117
Parker's heroines, waiting by the phone, weeping,
begging, hating themselves for begging.

(Acocella 81)

The relationship between the emotional cathexis of the ego
in love to its economic status might involve more complex
variables than this simple scheme of an arbitrary leap in
time against which Acocella pins it.

Furthermore, it is

possible to demonstrate that Acocella's polarization of
aggressor and victim as two clean-cut extremes is at the
expense of down-playing Parker's tendentious use of irony in
most of her stories.

Parker for all her gloomy self-mockery

was never naive, as this poem entitled "Thought for a
Sunshiny Morning" makes clear:
It cost me never a stab or a squirm
To tread by chance upon a worm
"Aha, my little dear," I say,
"Your clan will pay me back one day." (Portable 226)
As an alternative to Acocella's portrait of Parker's
victimized women, Nina Miller in an essay entitled "Making
Love Modern: Dorothy Parker and Her Public"

(1992),

identifies this ironic, uplifting function of Parker's selfdeprecating humor.

She argues that Parker, though "bound up

with her persona as a loser -in-love was an alternative . . .
model of self-other relations" (Miller 763).

Drawing

examples primarily from Parker's poetry, Miller argues that
Parker uses humor to undercut the conventional
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objectification of women in love-poetry. Parker's rhetorical
technique in her poetry is for her new, sophisticated
heroine to establish a better relationship with her audience
than with any of her men or women characters.

She writes:

. . . Parker undercuts her own ascension to "muse" or
loved object through her irony, a stance built into her
Round Table imperative to perform as a humorist.

. . .

sacrificing the high seriousness of romantic love to
humor, she breaks up the loving dyad of male and female
through the implied intervention of her audience, for
whom the joke is staged . . . Thus "triangulated" . .
humor about love . . . has the power to rupture the
magic circle of intersubjectivity by constructing its
audience as a complicituous third party to the ridicule
of one lover (the man) by the other (the woman).
(Miller 769)
Miller's above three-part schema--subject, object, audience-brings us back to Freud's three-part structure of a
tendentious joke developed in Jokes and Their Relation in
the Unconscious.

In his analysis of smut (zote), Freud

discovered that smut or verbal aggression against women by a
group of men acts as a substitute for the sexual act and
that it may take place independently of the presence of
women.

Since the presence of women is not a chief requisite
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for the expression of zote. Freud argues that the
requirements for the genre of zote is a teller (usually
male) and his audience (usually male).

Miller likewise

observes that Parker's literary persona displaced the allconsuming intersubjectivity of traditional heterosexual love
as represented in lyric poetry "and instead [made] the
poem's audience the site of her primary psychological
investment"

(Miller 772),

The public Parker imagined for

herself. Miller observes, "drew variously on family
relations and New York urban culture" and ideally defined "a
culture and in relation to which a woman love poet could
define herself, as against the definition imposed on her in
the private world of love" (Miller 772).

In other words,

Parker's poems force us to view two separate levels of
discourse about love at the same time: one, which speaks in
the conventional language of love as suffering from the
point of view of the woman, and two, a sudden opening
outwards of love's secret tyrannies onto a public mode that
is more akin to dialogue than confession.

In "Theory"

Parker substitutes the intimacy of romantic suffering and
soul-searching in private, with making herself into an
illustration of a general paradigm:
Into love and out again,
Thus I went, and thus I go.
Spare your voice, and hold your pen--

12 0

Well and bitterly I know
All the songs were ever sung,
All the words were ever said;
Could it be, when I was young,
Some one dropped me on my head?

Here, Parker makes romantic love a derivative emotion
constructed out of popular songs and popular poems,
deliberately replacing the subjectivity of suffering with
all that she has read and heard about love.

With

subjectivity cleverly pushed out of the way, Parker's selfdeprecating line "Could it be, when I was young,/ Some one
dropped me on my head?" becomes less self-debasing; it might
even appear to be a somewhat exalted point of view.
Everything popular culture says about love should ideally
have prevented her from falling in love, but she persisted
in believing in love, an act of some daring.

Parker's

persona situates itself in the public sphere than within an
intimate rei.tionshir witr a lev.;:.:.

She expresses her grief

or disappointment not in the privacy of an intimate session
of suffering for one or two; rather she makes herself an
illustration for the popular theory about love.

She is a

loser, but she is not alone.
Miller sees this displacement of affect from the lover
to the community by the woman in essentially the same terms,
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an almost total breakdown of romance.

Parker's characters

in her stories are decidedly single (but not self-sufficient
emotionally), even when they are united,
of a pervasive melancholy.

leaving the effect

Glimpses of this melancholy are

visible even in the witty, self-deprecations in her book
reviews.

An example is a 1928 review of "a book culled The

Technique of the Love Affair, by one who signs herself
Gentlewoman'

(Portable 522).

'A

Parker writes:

You know what you ought to be with men?

You should

always be aloof, you should never let them know that
you like them, you must on no account let them feel
that they are of any importance to you, you must be
wrapped up in your own concerns, you must never let
them lose sight of the fact that you are superior, you
must be, in short, a regular stuffed chemise.
you could see what I've been doing!

And if

(Portable 522)

The passage is simultaneously aggressive against men,
against the social norms of courtship, and against herself.
It is as much a public confession as a private one in that
she is replaying back to her audience what her audience had
told her she should do in matters of romance--she is
remembering the cultural hints women receive on the right
technique of the love affair.

Clearly Parker has not been

following these rules to heart; we hear the note of
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melancholy in the fading wistfulness of the tag "And if you
could see what I've been doing!" Any imaginative reading of
this self-deprecating sigh would show that it is intended to
provoke our moral indignation at precisely what it pretends
to endorse--men's courtship expectations of women.

Though

she mocks herself here, she acknowledges the conflict
between men and women in the arena of romance.

What we

would like to see happening here in addition is for the wit
to prevent her ego from collapsing into the conflict.
The "fade-out" or the incomplete ending, in which we
hear a voice still muttering to itself with no audience but
the reader (incidentally, its ideal audience), is a favorite
device with Parker to suggest the atmosphere of helplessness
and powerlessness that surrounds the women in her stories.
In the story "Too Bad," the anatomy of a marriage on the
brink of break-up is presented in a style of similar
inconclusiveness and repetition.

An example of this

purposeful fade-out is the scene where the Mr. and Mrs.
Weldon are eating dinner at home.

Parker uses a limited

vocabulary with repetition of words to suggest a moment of
conversational bottle-neck:
"Like your pie, Ernie?"

she asked vivaciously

"Why, I don't know," he said, thinking it over,
"I'm not so crazy about rhubarb, I don't think.
you? "

Are
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"Mo, I'm not so awfully crazy about it," she
answered.

"But then, I'm not really crazy about any

kind of pie."
"Aren't you really?"

he said, politely surprised.

"I like pie pretty well some kinds of pie."
"Do you?"

The polite surprise was hers now.

"Why, yes," he said.

"I like a nice huckleberry

pie or a nice lemon meringue pie, or a--"

He lost

interest in the thing himself, and his voice died away.
(Portable 179)
This conversation aoout something that they both are not
sure that they like, "pie," ends characteristically in
another fade-out.

Parker's stories regularly employ the

technique of fading-out to suggest the inadequacy of
language to rescue people from silence.

In Parker's stories

repetition, fade-outs and incomplete endings suggest the
ground of conflict between characters, a melancholic
stagnation which results in a subtle violence that her women
characters direct inwardly into themselves.

The

internalization of this violence results in representations
of painful neurosis as in the short stories "The Lovely
Leave," or "A Telephone Call."

Self-deprecating humor is an

inevitable idiom for the expression of this neurosis:
I think he must still like me a little.

He couldn't

have called me "darling" twice today, if he didn't
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still like me a little.

It isn't all gone, if he still

likes me a little, little bit.

(Portable 121)

What introduces an element of painful laughter in us as we
read this is its ability to convey the neurotic anxiety in
the speaker made concrete in the exact detail "called me
'darling' twice today" in a sentence that is otherwise
rambling and repetitious.

We feel sympathy as we laugh, but

the voice of the character does nothing to empower itself.
It illustrates self-deprecating humor where the self is at
its lowest level of strife with what oppresses it.
The fade-out as a rhetorical strategy can also blur the
roles of aggressor and victim within a potential conflict.
Used ironically it can highlight the conflictual framework
itself, making the particular example subsidiary to the
general pattern.

Dorothy Shay, a prefeminist comedienne and

musician used this strategy to great effect in her 1946 song
"Efficiency."

Shay's persona is a character like "Rosie the

Riveter" in the song of the same name written during World
War II to glamorize, honor and patronize working women.
Shay presents the new pattern of exploitation of women in
the changed social context thus:
You've heard of Rosie the Riveter,
Well, she’s got nothing on me,
’Cause long before her time,
I had a job in Tennessee.
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I turned a knob with just one hand.
And I was satisfied
And then one day I looked up,
And the Foreman was by my side

He said your motor's running
And your rhythm is quite smart.
But there’s one hand you're not using.
Use it here to push this part
The sexual innuendos are unmistakable if unstated.

Other

verses continue to the same effect until the speaker is made
to move all her various limbs, and ends up with a broom tied
to her waist.

Shay ends the song in a fade-out:

So I can turn, and push, and sweep sweep sweep sweep
sweep sweep sweep sweep sweep. . .
The song leaves us with the picture of the woman tied to the
broom sweeping away to eternity.

That the song is meant to

be witty is obvious from the pervasive use of double
entendre surrounding every aspect of the machine's movement.
The real subject, or object, is the woman, rather than the
machine.

Self-deprecating humor here does not resolve the

conflict, except perhaps to transform the humiliation
experienced by the woman being used by her employer into
some form of pleasure.

This transformation, however, is at
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the cost of great humiliation to her personhood; it is the
transference of this sense of humiliation onto the reader
that makes us regard self-deprecating humor as a weak
defense strategy.

But unlike the character in "A Telephone

Call" we hear an ironic revelation of the woman's exploited
relation with the man; though weak and self-deprecating,
here humor does have an edge.
Parker published her last story "The Banquet of Crow"
in the New Yorker in 1957 which antedates her career, like
Shay's, in relation to the Feminist Movement of the 1960s.
Much of the current dissatisfaction with Parker's humor
arises out of the historically altered vision of what
feminist humor ought to be.

For instance, Acocella's cold

patronizing of Parker in her New Yorker retrospective, a sad
irony in itself since Parker was one of the founding voices
of The New Yorker.

Acccella writes, "Female shame is a big

subject, and for its sake Parker should have been bigger,
but she is what we have, and it's not nothing"

(81).

Defining the two types of women's humor, Nancy Walker
distinguishes between subversive and overt feminist humor:
One, operating subversively within the cultural system
of subjugation, acknowledges woi

n ’s subordination

while protesting it in subtle and not -so -subtle ways,
thus performing the necessary step of calling attention
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to "the actual position of women in American culture";
the other explores the fundamental absurdity of that
system and calls for different ways of conceptualizing
gender definition.

(Walker A Very Serious Thing 147)

For Walker the difference between the two groups lay in the
role they played in the political emanicipation of women.
Subversive humor recorded women1s problems with life in a
sexist culture, whereas "overt feminist humor speaks
directly to such issues as economic dependency, lack of
political power, and open discrimination . . . .

this humor

challenges the assumptions that underlie that culture and
reveals their fundamental absurdity.

For this reason, the

humor frequently takes the form of satire or parody, both of
which work to revise social realities rather than simply
establishing their existence"

(A Very Serious Thing 149).

Defined in these terms, Parker is clearly a misfit among
the more overt feminist humorists.

Parker's ironic humor

subverts the oppressive framework of patriarchy from the
inside; it does not topple institutions or offer challenges
in a loud manner. Parker, moreover, endangers her position
among future feminist humorists by her self-deprecating
laughter.

Though Walker's distinction between subversive

and overt humor, or Kaufman's female humor and feminist
humor are useful as thematic categories to a certain extent,
they are ultimately non-divisive in their demonstration of
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the set of relations that women divide with men within the
structure of patriarchy.

Overt feminist laughter in the

above classification is outwardly directed, its target
usually men, whereas the direction of subversive laughter is
not so clearly mapped.
the enemy in Parker.

We detect this hesitation to name
For Parker the solutions to women's

problems in a sexist culture were not so clearly predicated
on the ousting of men from the social and emotional lives of
women.

Her stories, consequently, tend to handle conflict

between men and women in indirect ways.
More than the thematic division that Walker pronounces
as the dividing factors between female and feminist
humorists, we might argue that it is the formal
representation that differentiates the laughter of a
revolutionary from the laughter of a slave.

Quiet

demonstration may be as powerful a weapon as loud laughter
and might turn a slave into possesing the self-control of a
master.

Parker's genius is that of demonstration; we

already discussed Parker's purposeful use of fade-outs,
incomplete endings, and repetitions to suggest the hostile
dynamics between men and women.

These are quiet tactics to

demonstrate resistance to violence.
In Parker's stories the demand for women's speech
primarily to be entertaining when they are in the company of
men is the ground upon which the conflict is predicated that
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undoes the man-woman relationship.

In "Too Bad" for

instance, Parker presents the disintegration of the Weldon
marriage exclusively in terms of disintegrating speech.
M r .and Mrs.Weldon can talk well enough to other people but
their speech with each other is stilted, forced and
artificial.

Parker writes:

Both men and women found her attractive to listen to;
not brilliant, not particularly funny, but still
amusing and agreeable. She was never at a loss for
something to say, never conscious of groping around for
a topic.

She had a good memory for bits of gossip and

a knack of telling them entertainingly. Things people
said to her stimulated her to quick replies, and more
amusing narratives.

(Portable 177)

The narrative of "Too Bad" tracks the breakdown of
Mrs.Weldon's attempts to make "amusing narratives."

The

larger narrative of the story, structured around the
duration of one evening, is punctuated at almost equal
intervals with Mrs.Weldon's failed attempts to make amusing
conversation with her husband.

The narrative is divided

between direct narration and short spurts of dialogue.

The

dialogue which starts off unhinged from the rest of the text
is, however, not dramatic in effect; it merely verbalizes
the tedium that has already been narrated.

Parker's

strategy is to draw out the extent of their suffering by a
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conversational style that is at once repetitious and inane,
like the example of the pie discussed above.

In yet another

example from the same story, we hear the same self-consuming
disintegration of speech whose primary narrative function is
to mark the duration of time rather than prolong the
conversation:
She was waiting, cheerful and bright, courteously
refraining from beginning her soup, when he took his
place at the table.
"Oh, tomato soup, eh?" he said.
"Yes, " she answered, "You like it, don't you?"
"Who--me?" he said.

"Oh, yes.

Yes, indeed."

She smiled at him.
"Yp

s

, I

thought

you

liked

it,"

she

said.

"You like it, too, don't you?" he inquired.
"Oh, yes," she assured him.
so much.

"Yes, I like it ever

I'm awfully fond of tomato soup."

"Yes," he said, "there's nothing much better than
tomato soup on a cold night."
She nodded.
"I think it's nice, too," she confided.

(Portable

176)
Speaking of Ben Jonson's theory of "the humors," Northrop
Frye in his Anatomy of Criticism (1957) observes that "the
principle of the humour is the principle that unincremental
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repetition, the literary imitation of ritual bondage, is
funny.

. . Repetition overdone or not going anywhere belongs

to comedy . .

(168).

Frye's example is the repetition of

deaths in Synge's Riders to t-.he Sea--he observes that
instead of the three deaths, an endless repetition of deaths
would have turned the play from a tragedy into a comedy.
But in "Too Bad" the quality or quantity of speech in the
scenes does not change or increase in any manner, it is
unincremental repetition, but the effect is far from being
funny. It makes us acutely aware of the deeper melancholy of
repetition, as in the plays of Samuel Beckett, putting
Frye's observation on Synge's drama in reverse.
So it is ironic that what Parker's repetitions reveal
is an aspect of a personality, a mannerism, a quirk, the
dominance of a melancholic humor.

Repetition in Parker's

stories does not advance the plot; like a needle stuck in a
groove it reminds us of the lack of continuity in the
narrative, a sudden narrative disjunction that does not
offer options of narrative movement.

This incrementally

undifferentiated repetition of dialogue creates the effect
of static time, ponderous atmosphere, and tired characters.
In the above example, the narrative possibilities suggested
by the introduction of a new topic, "cold night," in the
man's remark, "Yes . . . there’s nothing much better than
tomato soup on a cold night," is not carried over by the
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woman.

The narrative closes when she "confides," "I think

it's nice, too," the word "confide," almost comic in its
incongruous understatement for the context, once again
turning our attention to Parker’s tendentious use of their
conversation.

We are left without an explanation of why

this conversation is going the way it is, or where it is
going, but merely a scene which breaks the conventional
optimism of linear narratives.
The night ends thus: "Mr.Weldon turned a page, and
yawned aloud.
scale.

Wah-huh-huh-huh-huh, he went, on a descending

He yawned again, and this time climbed the scale"

(Portable 180).

Like their conversation, even the

verbalization of his yawn, which is a common comic device
like the verbalization of other aspects of bodily functions,
and perhaps tendentious in this context as it is the only
sound that breaks the silence that surrounds the Weldons,
and thus underscores the whole gamut of their life which
sounds severely tedious and limited and which threatens to
end in a scream.

Parker's women cannot make amusing

conversation and their anxiety over not being amusing masks
a deeper anxiety of not being loved.

Absence of humor, in

these stories, is an index of the total vulnerability of
their inner selves to any form of violence inflicted from
the outside or inside.
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In both "The Lovely Leave" and "Sentiment," the
experience of the duration of time by the women characters
is directly related to their inability to have fun.

In the

ironically titled "The Lovely Leave," a young wife waits for
her soldier husband to come home to her for twenty-four
hours and spends the entire time apologizing to him for not
being gay and charming enough.

In "Sentiment" a young woman

reflects on her lover ditching her for being too
"sentimental."

The young woman's monologue runs thus:

Yes, that's the way it goes.
right.

And it's right, it's so

What is it to me what I wear?

Go and buy

yourself a big red hat with poppies on it--that ought
to cheer you up.

Yes--go buy it and loathe it.

How am

I to go on, sitting and staring and buying big red hats
and hating them, and then sitting and staring again-day upon day upon day upon day? Tomorrow and tomorrow
and tomorrow.

How am I to drag through them like this?

(Portable 357)
Parker uses a drive through the city in a taxi-cab as a
trope for the perambulations of the narrative.

In the

opening sentence the young woman tells the cab-driver, "Oh,
anywhere, driver, anywhere--it doesn't matter.
driving"

(Portable 354).

Just keep

The narrative is punctuated by the

woman remarking on the landmarks--all are places that she
associates with her lover--so that both the movement of the
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narrative as well as the movement of the car converge to
create the effect of stasis--the trip has no specific goal,
and the narrative similarly does not edge towards a
satisfactory closure.

Parker uses the device of fading-out

once again to suggest this lack of narrative closure:
But where's the tree?
-our tree?

Can they have cut down our tree-

And where's

the apartment house?

where's the florist's shop?

And

And where--oh, where's our

house, where's -Driver, what street is this?
Oh.

No, nothing, thank you.

Sixty-Third.

. . .

Sixty-Fifth?

I--I thought it was

(Portable 359)

Parker was an artist who painted the the painfully
incongruous image well; like the young woman in "A Telephone
Call” recalling the precise number of times that her
boyfriend had called her "darling" (twice in one day), the
young woman in "Sentiment" pulls us into all the misery in
her situation by the precise evocation of her attempts to
cheer herself up--buy yourself a big red hat with poppies on
it.

Parker's cheerless women are as much in search of humor

as they are for love.

In the search for humor by these

cheerless women, we recognize Freud's observation that humor
is the loftiest of mind's defensive devices.
There is a curious paradox in Parker's treatment of the
relationship between women and humor in her stories.

On the
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one hand, the Parker personae in her reviews and her poems
use aggressive wit variously as offensive weapons against
men or defensive cocoons to hide their vulnerability in
their relationship with men.

In her stories, however, her

women characters actively resist being funny.

For most of

her women characters humor is a thing of their past; we hear
it referred to only as an image that the men have of them.
In Parker's saddest story, "Big Blonde"

(1929), Hazel Morse

accounts for her immense popularity with men thus; "Men like
you because you were fun, and when they liked you they took
you out, and there you were.

So, and successfully, she was

fun.

Men liked a good sport"

She was

a good sport.

(Portable 187).

Parker's strategy in this story is to strip

humor of its power to amuse. She begins by making it nonperformative.

All allusions to humor, jokes and fun, are

narrated as reports or factual observations as in the above
passage; Parker does not give any of her characters a single
joke or funny line.

What is verbalized is the gradual

erosion of fun from the Morse's lives.

Herbie Morse, for

instance, tells Hazel, "Ah, for God's sake," he would say.
"Crabbing again.

All right, sit here and crab your head

off. I'm going out" (Portable 190).

Art, her lover, tells

her right before her suicide attempt, "See if you can't
sleep yourself out of it.

I'll see you Thursday.

sake, try and cheer up by then, will you?"

For G o d ’s

(Portable 204)
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In a story that is otherwise narrated by a detached
point of view with minimal or no narratorial intrusion, the
one instance where we hear something like verbal irony on
the part of the narrator is when we are introduced to the
character of Mrs, Martin and her "Boys."

Here, Parker

brings to the surface her suppressed disapproval of fun.
She writes:
Mrs. Martin had no visible spouse; you were left to
decide for yourself whether he was or was not dead. She
had an admirer, Joe, who came to see her almost
nightly. Often he brought several friends with him-"The Boys," they were called. The Boys were big, red,
good-humored men, perhaps forty-five, perhaps fifty.
(Portable 193)
The devices used here, the ironic understatement of "visible
spouse," "admirer," and "The Boys," can be potentially
humorous.

Other devices, primarily images that can be

construed as humorous, are scattered throughout the story.
When Hazel cries, "the drops slipped rhythmically over her
plump cheeks," Hazel and Herbie "resume friendly relations"
after they have a fight; drinking alcohol "kept her fat."
Even the title of the story "Big Blonde" with the literal
adjective "big" evoking Hazel's appearance is ultimately an
image that is in the realm of the comic--the big, boisterous
blonde holding court in a bar.

Comedy colors this image of
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the doctor checking Hazel to see if she was dead after her
suicide attempt:
The doctor looked sharply at her, then plunged his
thumbs into the lidded pits above her eyeballs and
threw his weight upon them. . . . Mrs. Morse gave no
sign under the pressure.

Abruptly the doctor abandoned

it, and with one quick movement swept the covers down
to the foot of the bed. With another he flung her
nightgown back and lifted the thick, white legs, crosshatched with blocks of tiny, iris-colored veins. He
pinched them repeatedly, with long, cruel nips, back of
the knees.

She did not awaken.

(Portable 207)

The scene evokes what might have been comic, the pattern
Bergson described as "something mechanical encrusted on the
living"

(Comedy 84)

In his essay on laughter, Bergson

observed that "the attitudes, gestures and movements of the
human body are laughable in exact proportion as that body
reminds us of a mere machine . . . any incident is comic
that calls our attention to the physical in a person, when
it is the moral side that is concerned"

(Comedy 79).

Parker

does make Hazel's cataleptic body the focus of our attention
instead of the more morally demanding fact of her suicide.
The image of Hazel's robotic lifelessness, however, is
prevented from amusing us by Parker' s construction of the
doctor's attitude to Hazel's body.

The doctor's responses

139
are quick, hard, unexplained.

The words used to describe

his movements are "sharply," "plunged," "abruptly,"
"abandoned," and "cruel"--words that stop us from
identifying this scene as a comic scene however familiar the
pattern might seem.
In a way, Hazel's comeback from suicide itself is a
conventional trope of comedy--no one dies in the end.

The

comeback could still be comic if Hazel's thoughts were in
any way inappropriate to the context in the manner of
Kafka's The Metamorphosis in which the horror of the
fantastic premise--human being transformed into a giant
vermin--is described with an eye for precise naturalistic
details.

Gregor’s thoughts on discovering that he had been

turned into an insect are totally contrary to our
expectations.

Kafka writes:

Gregor's eyes turned next to the window, and the
overcast sky--one could hear raindrops beating on the
window gutter--made him quite melancholy.

What about

sleeping a little longer and forgetting all this

nonsense

he thought, but it could not be done. for he

was accustomed to sleep on his right side and in his
present condition he could not turn himself over.
(Metamorphosis and Other stories 9)
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Hazel's last thoughts as she lies in bed after swallowing a
bottle of sleeping pills similarly contradicts our
expectations.

Parker writes:

She stretched her arms high and gave a vast yawn.
"Guess I'll go to bed,” she said, "Gee, I'm nearly
dead."
That struck her as comic, and she turned out the
bathroom light and went in and laid herelf down in her
bed, chuckling softly all the time.
"Gee, I'm nearly dead," she quoted.
one!"

"That's a hot

(Portable 205)

What complicates reading this scene as totally comic is its
tone of detached observation, quite Kafkesque, most
pointedly present in the use of the word "quoted."

It is a

quotation only in so far as it repeats itself, and is used
not to augment the movement of the plot, but to dilate a
stasis that has already set in.

No irony breaks through the

bleak, solipsistic cocoon which Hazel has spun around her in
her alcoholic daze.

Hazel's laughter and use of the term

"comic" to describe her condition of near-death, however,
shows an element of control still existing in her dazed
mind.

At this point, her laughter is not self-deprecating

and neither is it directed against anyone else.

It seems to

belong to the kind of tendentious laughter that Freud
described as "cynical or blasphemous," but here the irony is
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not directed against any religious or moral idea but the
transience of life itself, Hazel's knowledge that she has
the power to put an end to her life.
"Big Blonde" ends with a variation of the fade-out that
Parker uses in stories like "From New York to Detroit" and
"Sentiment"--a closure that comes too close at the heels of
a long delayed conflict.

There is a resultant lag in the

rhythm of the story that not only resists our efforts to
determine a satisfactory closure but also resists
interpretation of meaning at the level of plot and action.
The ambiguity resulting from such an open-ended closure has
been reframed as a question of ideology--feminism--and the
ultimate purpose of women's awareness of their subordination
and suffering in a sexist society.

Nancy Walker, for

instance, finds Parker severely handicapped in deploying her
awareness of women's problems in a pragmatic manner.
Contrasting "Big Blonde" with the nineteenth century female
humorist Marietta Holley, who created the socially and
politically abrasive satirist persona of Samantha Allen,
Walker writes:
By presenting the results of women's cultural
conditioning and subordination, America's female
humorists implicitly address the sources of women's
self-doubt, dependence, and isolation from the
mainstream of American life. Whereas Holley's Samantha
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Allan overtly attacks discrimination against women in
both the political and personal realm, most of the
personae in women's humor are less aware than their
creators of the reasons for the inherent craziness of
their lives. Hazel Morse, in Dorothy Parker's story
"Big Blonde," is a poignant example of this
unawareness.

(A Very Serious Thing 30)

Walker grants Parker the awareness that she denies Hazel.
But on a closer reading, does Parker make Hazel so totally
unaware of what it happening to her?

The unconcluded ending

and the absence of an overt, politically positive act does
not make "Big Blonde" redundant as a feminist text.
Especially since Parker invests Hazel with a surprisingly
raw interiority whose revelation does not transform us into
voyeurs on the prowl for a sight to release our scornful
laughter, but as witnesses to the melancholic surfacing of
an emotionally drained but hesitantly self-aware ego.

This

interiority of Hazel is quite different from the aggressive
public put-downs that Parker's persona in her poems do.
Walker .dirui

that "the woman in Parker's sketch "A

Telephone Call," abjectly awaiting her lover's call, is more
typical in women's literature that in Parker's "Indian
Summer," which ends with the line "To hell, my love with
you!"

(A Very Serious Thing 28).

The ground of conflict

between men and women and the resultant pain that seems to
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find Parker's women, are carefully disguised and liberated
as aggressive laughter in her poems and reviews.

But in

"Big Blonde" we find this ground of pain exposed for our
scrutiny, and more so, to Hazel's own scrutiny, without the
protection of wit, cheer, or bravado.

This experience of

recognizing the conflict alone makes Hazel a more "aware"
character than her peers in Parker's poems.
Walker finds Hazel to be an emblem of the exploitative
stereotype of the "dumb blonde," a sister to Lorelei Lee in
Anita Loos's Gentlemen Prefer Blondes:
The ironic distance of the author's voice in "Big
Blonde" allows Parker to provide a double view of
Hazel: that of the objective narrator

who understands

how Hazel is viewed by those around her, and that of
Hazel herself, whose understanding is severely limited.
. . . Parker presents . . . Hazel’s perspective in
language that testifies to the limitations of her
perceptions.

. . . Parker consistently emphasizes the

extent to which Hazel is the product of others'- primarily men's--requirements. . . . Because Hazel is
expected to react rather than to think, she does
precisely that, and the only action she plans entirely
for herself is her abortive attempt at suicide.
very Serious Thing 94-95)

(A
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But is Hazel Morse that "severely limited"?

In no other

stories of hers does Parker attempt the kind of elegantly
controlled tone, and ruthless emotional vivisection that she
practices on Hazel, which alone should confer on "Big
Blonde" and Parker a prominent place in women's literature
for all time.

The disparity between what is expected of

Hazel--to be a sport--and her emotional state after her
abortive suicide attempt converges towards a poignant
commentary on what may be the cause for the absence of a
sense of humor in women.

We see Hazel the morning after the

suicide attempt in the act of reading a postcard from Art:
Mrs. Morse had to cover one eye with her hand, in
order to read the message; her eyes were not yet
focusing correctly.
It was from Art.
Detroit

Athletic

On the back of

Club he

had written

a view of the
"Greetings

and

salutations. Hope you have lost that gloom. Cheer up and
don't take any rubber nickels.

See you on Thursday."

(Portable 209)
This naive optimism of a "feel-good" groupee is juxtaposed
with Hazel's reaction that goes one step beyond mere ironic
detachment; here the detached point of view of the narrative
narrows and personalizes itself taking us into Hazel's
consciousness.

Unlike Kafka's hero who is amusing with his
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incongruous reactions on being turned into a vermin, Hazel's
post-suicide thoughts are appropriately miserable:
She dropped the card to the floor. Misery crushed her
as if she were between great smooth stones.

There

passed before her a slow, slow pageant of days spent
lying in her flat, of evenings at Jimmy's being a good
sport, making herself laugh and coo at Art and other
Arts; she saw a long parade of weary horses and
shivering beggars and all beaten, driven, stumbling
things. Her feet throbbed as if she had crammed them
into the stubby champagne-colored slippers. Her heart
seemed to swell and harden.

(Portable 209)

It is the prospect of humor that hardens Hazel's heart, a
glib wellness that disguises despair, like the image of
smooth stone

crushing her.

Other images of constriction

and imprisonment--feet crammed into slippers, weary horses,
shivering beggars, all beaten, driven, stumbling things-form a sequence that signifies the dominant mood of "Big
Blonde" which is that of despair, and a certain amount of
defiance indicated by the action of heart swelling and
hardening.
Is Hazel's defiance self-directed?

There is a certain

ironic posturing in Hazel's last words, but it is a pose
struck to deceive others and not herself.

Hazel prays:
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. . . without addressing a God, without knowing a God.
Oh, please, please, let her

be able to get drunk,

please keep her always drunk.
She lifted the glass.
"Thanks, Nettie," she said. "Here's mud in
your eye."
The maid giggled. "That's the way, Mis'
Morse," she said.

"You cheer up, now."

"Yeah," said Mrs. Morse. "Sure." (Portable
21 0 )

By the end of the story Hazel is once again the cypher that
she has been to the men in her life, her humorous
nonchalance a dissimulating pose.

If Hazel laughs at the

men's jokes and presents herself as a good sport, it is not
because she thinks those jokes are funny or because she
enjoys being a good sport.

Even her last word "Sure" is in

the category of that ambiguous laughter.

What Parker takes

on in "Big Blonde" is patriarchy's expectation that women be
passive, amusing, sporting creatures; Parker's counterpoint
is to show them as "beaten, driven, stumbling things."

The

humor in this story is certainly self-deprecating, but the
ironic detachment in the point of view makes it difficult to
validate Walker's claim that Hazel is a victim.
In its emphatic gloom and elevation of a seemingly
unexplained fondness for sentiment "Big Blonde" is almost a
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cautionary tale for patriarchy on why women are not laughing
with them all the time.

Parker's artfulness in this story

lies in the manner in which she reversed the use of what she
knew best--smug laughter--for non-humorous purposes.

It is

this conscious choice to write a story about women not
wanting to be funny or amusing for the sake of men that
distinguishes "Big Blonde" from being a lot more than merely
"a record of female shame" as Acocella described it so
dismissively in her New Yorker article on Parker.

Parker's

primarily ironic art, especially "The Big Blonde," is a
record of a quiet rebellion, a melancholic selfpreservation, despite its obvious tone of self-deprecation,
since Parker creatively avoids prescribing the neuroses of
self-deception to her women characters.

Humor in "The Big

Blonde" is the awareness we hear in Hazel, after her
comeback from suicide, of the violence done to her life; it
is a quiet, silent, melancholic antidote to the blind
striving for love that had taken her from one callous man to
another.

Of all her sentimental women who are in search of

laughter and love, Hazel comes closest to possessing an
understanding of laughter that has finally become a
meaningful sound in her life.

It is an ironic laughter

since it is the laughter of a slave whose best part of life
had been wasted within oppressive systems, but it is
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nevertheless a liberating laughter since it opens up a
right, inner understanding of the self's relation to that
system.
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form of the humorous challenge offered by the Firesign
Theatre may indeed be located in Pseudodoxia; like
Pseudodoxia. these radioplays are encyclopedic compendiums
of popular and erudite learning and folklore.

Like

Pseudodoxia positioned at the watershed between the prescientific and the post -scientific worlds, these plays feed
themselves on the benefits of two different but related
technologies--radio and television.

Like Browne's self-

confident championing of seventeenth century empirical
science, these plays exalt the value of their medium--the
radio--to us.

Like Browne who demonstrates the flaws in

medieval learning, these plays demonstrate the sureal power
of the technology of television to endlessly create and
recreate versions of truth and reality.

These radioplays,

moreover, capture the intention of televison in the sense in
which Walter Benjamin defined it in his theory of
translation.

Like the translation that exalts the original,

these plays raise the technology of television to visionary
heights, though the ultimate goal of this creative
projection is to subvert the monopoly of television to
represent reality.

The tendentiousness of their humor is

definitely value-based and it is ethically determined, but
the master-slave dialectic is made to self-destruct rather
than be destroyed from the outside.

The emphasis is on two

forms confronting each other--radio and television--and the
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unequivocal victory of the one--radio--over the other-television.
The Firesign Theatre was an improvisatory theatre based
in Los Angeles during the sixties.

Philip Proctor, Philip

Austin, Peter Bergman and David Ossman all brought their
backgrounds in theatre, literature, and radio together to
create plays that are terrifically funny, but also
appropriately and meaningfully so.

What is distinctive

about the humor of the Firesign Theatre is that they do not
give us any kind of safety valves that would absorb conflict
for us.

In this respect they are radically different from

the standard tradition of humor in America.

Humor in

America, both written and performative, is traditionally
grounded on a persona with identifiable characteristics.
Constance Rourke's Amgric.an,..Humgr; A Study...Q.f.t.hg Mat.
ip.nal
Character (1931), observes that humor has always been a
fundamental aspect of American character, indeed the
American world-view.

Rourke notes that "there is scarecly

an aspect of the American character to which humor is not
related, few in which in some sense it has not governed"
(American Humor 9).

Rourke's historical survey locates two

clearly defined characteristics in American humor, one that
of exaggeration, and the other, of understatement.

Rourke

finds in them the representation of two distinct strains in
the national character:
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The comic upset has often relaxed rigidities which
might have been significant if taut . . .the solvent of
humor has often become a jaded formula, the comic
rebound a u t o m a t i c l a f f that off"--so that only the
uneasy habit of laughter appears, with an acute
sensitivity and insecurity beneath it as though too
much had been laughed away.

Whole phases of comedy

have become empty . . . But a characteristic humor has
emerged, quiet, explosive, competitive, often grounded
in good humor, still theatrical at bottom and full of
large fantasy . . . with all the explosions its key has
often remained low; this tradition has shown an effect
of reserve, as if in immediate expression and in its
large elements something were withheld, to be drawn
upon again. It has produced two major patterns, the
rhapsodic and the understated, whose outlines may be
traced through the many sequences of popular comedy and
through American literature; regional at first, they
have passed far beyond the regional . . .(American
Humor 232-33)
Rourke's prediction that American humor will continue to be
grounded on a distinct persona and that it will transcend
the regional turns out to be astute.

Adam Gopnik in a 1994

retrospective piece on James Thurber reiterated the same
point: "The main accomplishment of Thurber and White in
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their early work was to turn down the volume, and end the
hysteria, of American humorous writing and satire.

They

managed--and the achievement really is comparable to that of
Addison and Steele--to find for American prose a mixed,
middle style and, in so doing, to deprovincialize it"
(Gopnik 173).

Gopnik's category of humor with its volume

turned down brings us to Rourke's category of understated
humor.

Turning down the volume in American humorous writing

was primarily a stylistic change rather than a new choice of
themes.

Gopnik observes that what is distinctive about

Thurber is the "perfect record of the faint, tuneless music
of the mind.

This music, more than the famous little man

attitude, is what is startling and still fresh in Thurber.
There are very few jokes or setups in the pieces, and almost
no movement.

What there is instead is an uncanny flow of

accurate psychological representation. . ." (Gopnik 172).
"The faint, tuneless music of the mind," "the deadpan
sentence" spoken with the volume turned way down by the
perplexed little man with the small dog and the big wife, or
the naive country-dweller in the city, such a persona has
continued to be a staple of most American humorous writing.
Rourke's rhapsodic humor--loud instead of muted--may be
located in the popular Hollywood comedies of the thirties.
Ted Sennett in his study of movie comedy Laughing in the
Dark (1992) observes that though the W. C. Fields comic
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persona was that of the little man badgered and intimidated
by life, one who might remind us of Thurber's meek Walter
Mitty, but Harold Bissonette (It's a Gift. 1934) or Ambrose
Wolfinger (The Man on the Flying Trapeze, 1935) inhabited a
world that was significantly different from the silent
comedies of Charlie Chaplin or Buster Keaton:
Fields's outlook is imbued with a deep-seated malice
and hostility, rather than the basic kindness and the
generosity of his comedy peers from the silent era.

In

the world of Its a Gift, the blind person is not a
sweet flower girl, as in City Lights, but an ornery
codger who destroys things with his cane.

A dog is not

a devoted pal as in any number of silent comedies, but
a nuisance who reduces his master's pillow to shreds.
(Laughing 28)
The jokes and visual gags in Fields's movies are pointedly
aggressive, evident in this example quoted by Sennett: in
The Man on the Flving Trapeze. Ambrose tells his boss that
his mother-in-law has died from drinking "bad liquor."

"It

must be hard to lose your mother-in-law," the sympathetic
boss tells him.

"Yes, it is," Ambrose replies, "very hard.

Almost impossible"

(Laughing 29).

While Fields' jokes are

funny, their tendentiousness sounds unmotivated, leading us
to question the limits of civilized humor, whether the
unnamed institutions mocked deserve the cruelty thrust upon
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them, a debate central to the philosophical discussion of
humor from Plato to Freud.

Fields's victims are the

ordinary, stereotypical victims of middle-class domestic
drama, in-laws, relatives, customers, insurance salesmen
etc, leaving us sometimes to wonder about the legitimacy of
the humorous put-down.

The emphasis in these films is on W.

C. Fields; the plot is merely a vehicle for Fields to
indulge his comic persona.

We don't find any real social

vision in these films, like we do in the plays of the
Firesign Theatre.
The significant leap in American humor brought about by
the Firesign Theatre might be made more visible if we
contrast their engagement with social issues with the always
popular, legitimately famous comedies of the Marx Brothers.
Their humor is equally loud, boisterous and more
rambunctious than the Field scenarios and the targets of
their humor are different.

Their humor, at once whacky and

audacious may be seen to be focused on the public arena
rather than the domestic one, bearing down upon such
institutions as bourgeois entrepreneurship in Cocoanuts
(1929), academe (Horsefeathers 1932), government (Duck Soup
1933) , cultural pretensions (A Night at the Opera 1935) .
The jokes in these movies are pitched at a loud level.
Groucho's puns and non-sequiturs, Chico's forced Italian
accent and even Harpo's harp solos provoke, what we might
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call loud laughter.

In these movies, moreover, we find a

genuine engagement, though short of a real social vision, on
the part of the comedians to topple pretentious social
institutions.

Their irreverence starts to sound rightfully

tendentious, as opposed to the lingering doubt we feel at
laughing at mother-in-law jokes.

Moreover, we see comedians

as champions of the common men, initiating such a point of
view from scratch.

Their subject matter is lowly, but they

are in loud form.
A significant example of their self-conscious, common
man's point of view mocking the elite is the climactic scene
in A Night at the Opera where Groucho Marx replaces the
bombastic manager of the New York Opera Company, Gottlieb,
and delivers an audacious opening-night speech to the
audience: "I am sure the familiar strains of Verdi's music
will come back to you tonight.

And Mrs. Claypool's checks

will come back to you in the morning."

The comic subversion

here comes into effect through two strategies.

First, word

play or punning with the verb "come back," with the hint
that Mrs. Claypool has taken everyone for a ride.

The butt

of the joke here is primarily Mrs. Claypool, who in order to
endear herself to the cultural circle has been talked into
donating a huge sum of money to the opera by Mr. Driftwood,
Groucho's persona.

This joke is ambiguously tendentious; we

laugh at Dumont because she is unable to retaliate to
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Groucho who has conned her.

We laugh at her pretensions

though we are not sure why they are to be ridiculed.

Like

the stock characters in the commedia dell'arte Margaret
Dumont plays a variety of characters along the lines of Mrs.
C'laypool [Mrs. Potter in Cocoanuts. Mrs. Firefly in
Ducksoup, Mrs. Upjohn in A Dav at the Races! who function as
a kind of foil or straightman for Groucho's witticisms to
bounce off, an underdog who is passive at best, and
ridiculous at worst.

The site of the opera is dissolved

into a farcical bedlam by the incongruous juxtaposition of
"Take Me Out to the Ballgame" into Verdi's overture.

When

the music starts we see the three brothers playing baseball
in the orchestra pit.
sells peanuts.

Chico pitches, Harpo bats and Groucho

This incongruous juxtaposition creates a

comic point of view whose purpose is to make the elite look
ridiculous, in other words, to create tendentious humor.
Harpo releases the wrong backdrops so that the gypsy in II
Trovatore sings before a railroad depot, a battleship, and a
fruit stand, instead of the period set.
The above example might be taken as exemplary of the
comedy of the Marx brothers both in its delight in comic
word play and surreal juxtaposition aimed at producing comic
effects.

They helped popularize a strain of intellectual

comedy that found its material in the public sphere, their
specific parody reserved to attack sales-talk and show
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business.

But as with W. C. Fields, where we start to feel

doubtful about the purpose of their humor is when we realize
that even at their most tendentious moment they refrain from
completely identifying the victim of their humorous attack.
The Fields joke about the mother-in-law gets more and more
pointedly aggressive; Groucho1s joke dissolve
welter of word-play.

itself in a

The purpose of the word-play, we

discover, is to project the personae of the players, and not
to challenge or transform the social problem which we
realize was merely an occasion for the actors to indulge
themselves. The dramatic range of their characters is about
as fixed as that of the fool in classical theater.
They begin with what we might identify as particular
characters, Mrs. Claypool or Hammer, for instance, who
represent particular institutions.

They are characters only

in an attenuated form, generalized as personae to play parts
in a stylized comedy.

Groucho is always the intellectual

prankster, Chico is always the delightful con man, and
Harpo, the least aggressive of them all, the silent source
of artful physical comedy.

Consequently characterization

does not much occupy the foreground, nor is it as developed
through a persona, as for example it is necessarily in
Dorothy Parker's stories.
With character development taking a subsidiary role,
what is most striking about these films is their attempt to
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develop a strain of comedy almost totally dependent on
conceptual shifts.

The Marx Brothers’ most conspicuous

contribution to comedy may be the scripting in of
literariness into their comic texts, expanding the
boundaries of comedy in self-conscious experiments with
linguistic and conceptual displacements.

An example is

Hammer's (Groucho's) auctioneer's speech to a group of naive
investors in Cocoanuts;
Florida, folks--Sunshine--perpetual sunshine--all year
around. Let's get the action started before we get a
tornado. Right this way. Step forward.

Step forward

everybody. Friends, you are now in Cocoanut Manor, one
of the finest cities in Florida. Of course, we still
need a few finishing touches. But who doesn't?

This is

the heart of the residential district. Every lot is a
stone's throw from the station. As soon as they throw
enough stones, we're going to build a station.

Eight

hundred beautiful residences will be built right here.
Why they are as good as up. You can have any kind of
home you want to. You can even get stucco--Oh, how you
can get stucco. Now is the time to buy while the new
boom is on. Remember that old saying, a new boom sweeps
clean? And don't forget the guarantee--my personal
guarantee.

If these lots don't double in value in a

year, I don't know what you can do about it. Now we'll

luO

take lot #20--twentah--right at the corner of De Sota
Avenue. Of course, you all know who De Sota was?

He

discovered a body of water. You've heard of the water
they named after him. De Sota water.

(Why a Duck 45)

We may identify six characteristic comic repartees in
Hammer's speech.
1.

They are all in couplet form:

Of course, we still need a few finishing touches.

But

who doesn't?
The comic shift resides in the ambiguous sense in which the
pronoun "we" is used.

In "we still need a few finishing

touches," "we" is used in the collective sense of the realestate brokers or the estate itself, as in the buildings
could do with some more last-minute paint jobs etc.
rejoinder "But who doesn't?"

The

takes us out of the first

context, selling real estate, and puts us into one which
could be read as a philosophical statement about the general
human condition.

It makes us laugh because we recognize it

as a cop-out.
2.

Every lot is a stone's throw from the station.

As soon

as they throw enough stones, we're going to build a station.
We experience a straining of our expectations here.

The

first statement leads us to believe that the station exists.
But the second statement contradicts that expectation--the
station is yet to be built.

What makes the relation between

the two statements comical is the double sense in which
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"stone’s throw" is used.

In the first instance, "stone's

throw" is used figuratively as an idiom for a short
distance.

in the second instance, "throw" is used in its

literal sense.

We laugh because we perceive a sudden

unconscious connection between the two meanings.
3.

You can even get stucco*-Oh, how you Cc.i. get stucco.

We shift our understanding of the word "stucco" from its
first contex where it signifies a material to the second
context where it is a pun.
comic in itself.

"You can even get stucco" is not

It could be spoken by anyone without

inciting the slightest comic laughter.

The rejoinder, "Oh,

how you can get stucco" with the pun on "stucco"

(as in

"this is a sticky deal" or "you are going to get stuck")
however, amuses us.

We are amused because we perceive an

connection between the two contexts throught the agency of
the one word.
4.

Now is the time to buy while the new boom is still on.

Remember that old saying, a new boom sweeps clean?
The two statements fit with each other cleanly to make a
comic couplet pivoted on the double entendre surrounding the
tern "boom."

in the s e o n d statement "boom" is superimposed

on "broom" with the latent broom still visible underneath.
The allusion creates a comic effect.
Statements (5) and (6) work together.
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5.

Of course, you all know who DeSota was?

He discovered a

body of water.
6.

You've heard of the water they named after him.

De Sota

water.
"DeSota" stands for both the name of the explorer as well as
for carbonated water--soda water. We are amused by the
relative ease with which the two words "DeSota" and "soda
water" combine to create two sets of relation that mean two
completely different things.
The jokes are clever intellectual exercises. In all of
the above six examples, we find that the jokes work only
when taken as couplets.

The crank that turns the jokes on

lies in the gap between the first statement and its
rejoinder and to access the joke we have to cross that gap
by making a small conceptual leap.

Individual couplets may

or may not be comical--we combined statements (5) and (6) to
discover the comic relation between the two.

In all cases

the comic spring is attached to a word that pops up like a
jack-in-a box in both appropriate and inappropriate
contexts.

The comedy of the Marx Brothers is the

elaboration of disparity.

The comic persona of the Marx

Brothers builds itself on such yoking of disparate terms, or
disparate actions (an embrace ending in a prolonged
untangling of a false beard), or disparate juxtapositions as
in the opera scene we discussed earlier from A Night at the
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Qliera^.

Groucho composes his speeches out of such strings of

comic couplets whose function is to lampoon his adversary,
or metaphorically speaking, bomb him or her with no chance
to retaliate and to survive.

The original social setting

recedes into the background as the characters move upfront.
The characteristic Groucho comic scenario, like that of
W, C.Fields, seldom lifts itself to a confrontation between
equals.

Though the characters Groucho, Chico and Harpo play

are impoverished, the representation of the inequality in
social status favors the powerful one in most Marx brothers
comedies, leading one to agree with George Santayana's
understatement, "Fun is a good thing, but only when it
spoils nothing better"

(The Sense of Beauty 249).

In the

Marx Brothers comedies, the powerful institutions and their
representatives who are the ostensible objects of parody and
satire remain uncorrected while the underdogs' satirical
point of view which created the initial comic tension in the
movie gives way to that of the establishment.

Groucho

parodies opera, real estate, academe, but the parody never
sharpens into satire.

Parody itself is a conceptual of

formal shift towards a reduction in seriousness, a
degradation directed against persons and objects that
command serious attention.

The result is that comic attacks

on the institutions end up as faint attacks that pose no
real threats to the institutions in question, as another

164
example from A Night at the Opera would make clear.

In A

Might at the Opera, the social institutions satirized are,
one, the cultural pretensions of the elite circle to which
Mrs. Claypool is an aspirant and, two, the trials and
tribulations experienced by immigrants.

The three

immigrants played by Chico, Harpo, and Allan Jones reach
America as stowaways hiding inside Groucho's trunk.

The

plot to release them inside the country results in dressing
them up as famed Russian aviators and attempting to procure
them a public welcome in the city of New York.

Indeed the

arenas that Groucho picks to stage his subversions are all
conspicuously public, auctions, operas, and here a citywelcome.

In A Niaht at the Opera, during the welcome, in a

mixed-up pandemonium, the three immigrants lose their
disguises as Russian aviators leading to their public
exposure as frauds.

The mayor and the policemen are exposed

as ridiculous figures as well when they fall prey to Chico's
and Harpo's comic antics, but their social roles as
authority figures remain unchallenged.

Groucho does not

make the authority figures retaliate against the three
stowaways in any forceful manner which would have made them
hateful, and liable to incite some kind of moral indignation
in us.

instead the weak ones in the tug of war gradually

expose themselves as phonies, seemingly without any force
put upon them by those in power. It is a clever strategy to
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protect the staus-quo of the master-slave dialectic by
making the masters unthreatening and kind, while the slaves
make themselves look ridiculous.

The rehabilitation of

immigrants is a worthy social problem but the Marx Brothers
retreats from making any manner of critical comment upon the
situation beyond demonstrating its existence.

But even this

demonstration is not without a certain ideological desire
for the position of the masters.

In other words, comedy

proffers no real threat to the social status-quo of power in
the social structure.

The immigrants give in to the mayor

and the city hall.
In Cocoanuts. however, in a variant of the comic
persona, Groucho's character Hammer contained the
paradoxical union of both participant and observer, outsider
and insider, or aggressor and victim by extension.

The

paradox acts as a safety valve to keep out any real
tendentious take on the institutions in question which are
salesmen and selling.

The result is non-tendentious comedy

that seems to be subversive but without the accompanying
threat to challenge or change in any significant manner the
target of its attack.

A Night at the Opera is similarly

non-tendentious since the status-quo of power is left
unchallenged.

The highly stylized and predictable comic

personae of the Marx Brothers furthermore act as barriers
between us and the staged social problem of these scripts.
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Let us turn to another example from Duck So u q .

In this

exchange between Firefly (Groucho Marx) and Mrs. Teasdale
(Margaret Dumont) we hear elements of aggression in the role
of absolute authority played by Groucho's character and that
of acquiesence in the seemingly vulnerable role played by
Margaret Dumont.

Dumont's inability to retaliate puts her

in a ridiculous position.
exchange.

But a lack of affect rules this

We respond to the puns and conceptual shifts

foregrounded in their conversation rather than react to it
as a text of conflict.
Mrs. T: As chairwoman of the reception committee, I
welcome you with open arms.
Firefly: Is that so?

How late do you stay open?

(Whv a Duck 143)
"Open" refers obviously to the above-board friendliness of
"welcoming with open arms" as well as the lewd suggestion of
"being (sexually) available."

Like the comic couplets of

his soliloquies, here too, the two statements independently
are innocent.

They are normal statements that we might say

to each other without inciting any kind of comic or
tendentious laughter.

But in its relation to Dumont's

statement, it is definitely tendentious. Groucho co-opts his
opponent's words and gives it a smutty twist leading to the
sexual innuendo.

Note how Mrs. Teasdale is unable to

retaliate to this comic put-d^wn, thus prolonging her

167
ridiculous position for us.

Instead she is made to trigger

another set of couplets for Groucho.

"Freedonia" is the

trigger here:
Mrs. T:

I've sponsored your appointment because I

feel you are the most able statesman in all Freedonia.
Firefly: Well, that covers a lot of ground.

Say,

you cover a lot of ground yourself. You better beat it.
I hear they're going to tear you down and put up an
office building where you're standing. You can leave in
a taxi. If you can't get a taxi you can leave in a
huff. If that's too soon, you can leave in a minute and
a huff. You know you haven't stopped talking since I
came here? You must have been vaccinated with a
phonograph needle.

(Whv a Duck 143)

Though Groucho intends it as a put-down to Dumont of Mrs.
Teasdale, the complicated figure of speech "vaccinated with
a phonograph needle" encompasses Groucho's act more than her
dumb-struck helplessness.

All the jokes in this exchange

revolve around punning based on similarity of sound--leave,
taxi, huff, minute and a huff etc.

Freud gives credit to

puns by grouping them with the category of joke techniques
such as condensation, multiple uses of the same word,
allusion, and double meaning , all of which revolve around
similarity in sounds and words.

Though puns might appear to

be innocent since they are usually created on the word-
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level, they can be as cruel and tendentious as any
complicated, conceptual joke.

Groucho's purpose here is

once again an unmotivated aggresr '

.1

against Dumont,

in

watching the films of the Marx brothers we are forced to
withdraw our affect from the social problems or even the
obvious framework of the master-slave relation as in any
exchange between Groucho and Dumont and discharge it as
laughter at a clever conceptual or linguistic invention.
The films of the Marx brothers stop short of a real social
vision.
Linguistic inventions might make their presence felt in
humor, but they are more predictable in comedy.

Certainly

Firefly's utterances are closer to comedy than they are to
humor, if we take Freud's distinction that humor presupposes
the existence of a potentially painful state of mind whose
pain the humorous displacement confronts and transforms into
a source of pleasure thus escaping the neuroses of
repression.

Unlike Aristotle, who stated that the comic

mask is essentially painless, Plato was aware of this
element of pain that might intrude into seemingly innocent
cases of laughter and his solution was not to laugh at all.
What ultimately reduces the films of the Marx brothers to
aggression with no real constructive purpose informing it is
their deliberate evasion of any ground of pain that might
spring up in the relations that make up their social system.
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In Firefly's speeches, as indeed in any other Marx Brothers'
script, this inner ground of pain or conflict is concealed,
an absence which allows us to identify them as excellent
examples of the laughter produced by comedy, not humor.

The

comedy of the Marx Brothers provides us with a comparative
norm to understand the working of humor in the radio plays
of the Firesign Theatre.

The plays of the Firesign Theatre

may properly be called examples of humor in the sense that
Freud intended it--"loftiest of these defense functions"
(Collected Papers 78).
What is distinctive about the humor of the Firesign
Theatre is that they do not give us any kind of safety valve
that would absorb conflict for us in their overtly political
plays.

The result

i~ i

t we are forced to confront

unfinished business at regular intervals.
are not composed of clean couplets.

Their dialogues

Unlike the Marx

Brothers scripts, which for all their wild, wayward,
carnival pretensions, follow a plot, the plays of the
Firesign Theatre

may be described in Pauline Kael1s phrase

as "one-damn-thing-after-another serial"

(For Keeps 105).

These plays show a healthy disregard of any demand we might
have about our audience expec

*tions.

Befitting the medium

of the radio on which these plays were aired, they create
all the accoutrements of drama like character, setting, and
time through voices and noises.

A plot exists only in the
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most attenuated form.

Humor is not an ingredient of

character, since character is not the focus of these plays;
nor is humor the trademark of a persona, since star-value is
not the prime focus either.
A typical Firesign humorous scenario incorporates a
medley of voices, some distinct, some blurred, some over
lapping with each other, some finishing each other's
sentences against a background of clicks, static, droning of
generators and often organ music.

Much of the action in

Waiting for the Electrician or Someone Like Him (1967) is
set in a prison, thus focusing our attention on an
ubiquitous atmosphere of suffering.

A character named P is

in a neutral country called "Enroute" where he is
deliberately harrassed, detained and thrown into prison.

In

their collective author's preface, the writers tell us that
they named the character P partly in homage to Philip
Proctor who played the part and partly after Kafka's
character Josef K. in The Trial.

But instead of following

in the footsteps of Kafka's K, P refuses to suffer in
prison.

If Dorothy Parker's heroines seek pleasure inside

their suffering, P repudiates suffering.

In other words,

imposition of force by the master cannot turn P into a
slave.

P seeks assistance from his fellow inmates:
P [Calling]: Guard! Guard! I want to see my

Ambassador!
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French Prisoner: Easily done! He's in the next
cell!
Scandinavian Prisoner: Use de telephone . . .
P : I don't have a dime!
Old Jim: Here, use one of the pages of me novel.
Sound: He dials the phone only to get a Fred
Astaire dance routine over the wire.
P: It's no good, they're tapping the lines! If I
could only speak to someone. If I could only tell my
story!

(The Firesian Theatre's Big Book of Plavs 31)

In the above exchange, we note two characteristic devices
employed to diffuse potential aggression. One, a sense of
ubiquitous aggression dispersed in rising gradations from
the relation between underdogs or slaves, to the relation
between slave and master, to the relation between masters.
This is a strategy very much similar to Browne's in
Pseudodoxia.

Turning oppression into an ubiquitous

phenomenon does not become an occasion to evade conflict;
instead, its ubiquity directs our attention to the
overarching oppressive framework subsuming the particular
examples collectively under its umbrella.

Within this

ubiquitous framework different relations give rise to
different degrees of humor.

For instance, the exchange

between P and Old Jim, both prisoners, is humorous in a nonaggressive manner:
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P : I don't have a dime!
Old Jim: Here, use one of the pages of me novel.
(Firesiqn Theatre's Big Book 30)
In order to access this joke, and the one following
immediately after, we have to enter a surreal world where we
must willingly suspend our ordinary systems of belief.

The

surreal technique of dialing the phone with a page from a
dime novel introduces a note of levity in a context whose
potential implications are oppressive.
inside the cell is communally fearless.

But the atmosphere
P's "dime" produces

Old Jim's pun on the word "dime" as in "dime novel" or pulp
fiction.

When P accepts the "dime" to dial the phone, like

Alice in wonderland drinking the glass that said "Drink me"
and growing small or tall, we enter without warning into
another world.

P accepts the page of Old Jim's pulp fiction

and uses it to dial the phone.
Fred Astaire dance routine.
exclaims,

He gets through to hear a

P listens to the phone and

"It's no good, they're tapping the lines!" and we

hear the sound of tapping, presumably Astaire tap-dancing.
Though it is subtle, the effect of this exchange and the
purpose of the pun on "dime" are to underscore for us the
threatening situation that P and his fellow prisoners are
in.

P's reaction to the threat conveys his sense of

disbelief and despair ("If I could only speak to someone.
If I could only tell my story!"), but to get to P's despair,
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we have to fumble across the surreal fact that he dialed the
phone using a page from a dime novel.

We experience a

tension inside us between laughter and concern.

But these

moments of concern in us are fenced around by acts and
phrases of a complete absence of sentimentality, rebellion,
and sense of play in the face of suffering.

We hear this

deliberate underplaying of the fact of suffering in the
French prisoner's reply to P's enquiry about his Ambassador:
"Easily done! He's in the next cell!"
Another device to reduce the effect of suffering is to
exaggerate it.

We hear hyperbole's power to reduce

seriousness in Old Jim's description of his Great Prison
Novel:
I was imprisoned by a faceless people for a crime of
which I had no knowledge and certainly did not commit
But what of that? In me spare time, I have been
pursuing me ’obby, which is writin' a Great Prison
Novel. In the beginning, I wrote with an ink composed
of parts of me own blood. However, this would not make
an acceptable carbon, so I acquired an electric
typewriter.
(Firesign Theatre’s Big_,Bggk 30)
The effect of the hyperbolic phrases "Great Prison Novel,"
and "ink composed cf parts of me own blood" is humorous,
precisely because they are exaggerations, the Great Prison
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Novel suggesting the ready-made genre to us rather than the
condition of the prisoner who wrote it.

The purpose of

hyperbole here is two -fold--one, to expose the painful
circumstances of prison-life, and, two, indirectly to reduce
its power to tyrannize the prisoners.

Like the earlier

example of using a dime to dial the phone, we are faced with
a similar bizarre hyperbole here, writing with one's own
blood, but lest this should introduce an element of
sentimentality that would force us to pity Old Jim, an
element of contrast is introduced in the form of an
alternate instrument of composition, the typewriter, to
reduce its effect on us.

The ego's unflinching stance is

further elaborated in Jim's rationale for procuring the
typewriter--since writing in blood would not make an
acceptable carbon.

Statements like Old Jim's function like

the bars of the prison through which we can look in and out,
but the fact of the bar, the suffering, remains. Unlike
Parker who might react to the same situation in a selfdeprecating manner, thereby minimising the worth of her ego,
or the Marx Brothers who might dissolve the implications of
the threatening situation either by transforming it into
farce or by identifying with the masters, the Firesign
Theatre holds us face to face with the situation without
making us distort our reactions to it.

Their jesting

reaction to suffering (which is transferred to us), neither
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reduces their sense ot

self-worth; in other words, their

humor is not self-deprecating, nor does it exaggerate their
self-importance by being aggressive towards others; in other
words, it is not hostile. The relation of the prisoners to
authority is one of rebellious unconcern, but it does not
distort the status of the prisoners as prisoners.

They

resist suffering as much as they can from wherever they are.
If tendentious jokes swing between an amplitude of
self-deprecating humor on one end to hostile jokes on the
other, we would find that the humor of the Firesign Theatre
does not fit this gamut.

Old Jim's speech, for instance,

parodies the purple style of pulp fiction, in the same
manner in which Groucho's speech parodies the style of
auctioneers.

Groucho's parody demonstrates that it is a

parody and eventually disappoints us by collapsing into a
self-serving appropriation of the form.

The appropriation

is often for the purpose of self-aggrandisement, usually at
the expense of a weaker character.

Old Jim's speech,

however, reinforces the fact of parody to us through
repetition, until the form ridicules itself.

For instance,

a few lines after Old Jim first introduces us to "the first
edition of me saga of eternal torment [profusely
illustrated]

titled 'Leather Thighs'I" we are reintroduced

to the same novel, in a new advertisement: "Perhaps you
would like to 'ear an excerpt from me Great Prison Novel of
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Eternal T o r m e n t I n Cold Leather' " (Firesian Theatre's Big
BOOk 31) .

That the play is parodying the form is evident in

the subtle variation given to the title, from "Leather
Thighs" to "In Cold Leather" both carrying suggestions of
popular sexual fantasies, not necessarily about prison life.
Even when the relation between prisoners leads to
tendentious humor, there is no attempt to turn the jest into
an occasion for the characters to claim our sympathy or
hostility, as we do with Dumont and Groucho in the Marx
brothers's films.

For example:

P: I'm not afraid of Justice! I know these bars
are here for a good reason.

Prisons are for the

guilty.
Prisoner: String him up!
Another Prisoner: Anybody got a string?
(Firesign Thea fcxals_Big_b .q q K 31)
Here, P tries to separate himself from the rest of the
prisoners.

"Prisons are for the guilty" is his way of

saying that he is not guilty, but that everybody else is.
This is a potential source of conflict and it is revealed as
such.

But the tendentiousness in the prisoner's remark

"String him up" is drained with the rejoinder "Anybody got
any string?"

The jest technique is similar to other

instances of word-play ( a paradigm change from the
figurative use of "string up" to its literal use) we have
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identified in the Marx Brothers scripts but its effect here
is very different.

Its purpose is to make fun of oppression

by making it so ubiquitous that even prisoners are planning
to oppress each other.
any means.

This is not a humorous situation by

In fact it could turn into the very opposite of

a humorous situation.

But it becomes humorous when the

prisoners make it sound rebellious ("String him up!" the
powerful imperative used in a weak way by a powerless
figure) in an incongrous manner rather than make it sound
like a rationalised plot to murder P.

The form repeats

itself when P shouts to the prisoners:
P: No, no, no! don't you guys see?
here for your protection!

I'm not afraid!

is a chance to clear my name!

All I want

Look, we live and

operate under the Due Process of Law.
have nothing to fear.

The system is

The innocent

Only the guilty will suffer!

Prisoner: Lynch him!
Another Prisoner: Anybody got a lynch?

(Firesian

Theatre's Big Book 31)
"Lynch" is used in the same manner as "string him up" and
works as a jest in a similar manner.

But by repeating it a

second time it is drained of content and we concentrate on
the form.

It reduces the effect of the conflict between the

prisoners, after having revealed it.

The Firesign Theatre
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parodies a form to demonstrate the form that it parodies and
waits for the form to consume itself.
There is no attempt made in these plays to conceal the
oppressive grounds of a public problem.

Concentrating on

the subjectivity of characters while they undergo suffering
produces sympathy or ridicule in us; absence of such a
subjective point of view, however, does not reduce the
seriousness of the suffering in these plays.

Their

rebellion demonstrates it as a method to contain the
suffering. We never forget for a moment that the characters
are in prison,

what is new about the treatment of

oppression by the Firesign Theatre is that we encounter
characters who contend authority by allowing ubiquitous
authority to destruct itself from the inside, draining it
off its power to affect us in a painful or sympathetic
manner by parodying its form.
Don't Crush That Dwarf Hand Me the Pliers (1970) is a
similar appeal to watch out for the continuous presence of
the master-slave dialectic in contemporary life, done in a
form that parodies most forms of master-discourses,
primarily religion, politics, and the military.

The form

that they choose to expose through parody is the meta-form
of all forms of oppressive discourses television.

in the

preface to the play, David Ossman described their effort
thus:

179
The latest album is about Multiple-Identity--going
through changes here and now.

we are dealing with

television: What the TV set gives you is the ability to
plug in at any time.

You can get any old movie,

something from every bit of time . . . it's a life in
the day of a man who looks at himself on television,
metaphorically speaking . . . you can see yourself on
TV, any one of those people can be you . . .
records of our time.

we make

We made this one at the time of

the Kent State murders, so naturally we wrote about
schools . . .

(Firesian Theatre's Big Book 59)

The interactive element which formats the play--talking to
the television, television talking back to us--is not an
impossibility nowadays with TV call-in talk shows, and
computer chat lines that provide us anything from a simple
bibliographic references to matrimonial possibilities.
Though there is nothing inherently humorous about such
advanced technology, the Dwarf has touched upon a trickster
aspect of television--its formal ability to transform itself
endlessly in as many guises as possible--and turned this
discovery into an occasion for a tendentious critique of the
media.
Non-duration and discontinuity, two characteristic
states of our relation to television, combine to create the
form of the play.

The skimpy plot follows the life of
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George Tirebiter revealed to him all in the span of one day
on television.

Tirebiter grasping his own history through

the medium of television takes place on the level of
demonstration; we follow George Tirebiter as he tries to
retrieve his past from a jumble of soundbites; but as in a
dream we are made to witness events organized with their own
inner logic with no explanation or preparation.
In their collective preface to Dwarf

the authors

disclose that Dwarf evolved out of a radio show called "A
Life in the Day," doubtless a tendentious reversal of The
Beatles' song title "A Day in the Life" from Sat Pepper's
Lonely Hearts Club Band (1967):
In January, 1968, we wrote the last script in a series
of half-hour plays which we were performing on AM
radio. It departed from the more absurd character comedies we had been doing, being based on a day's
television programming. Beginning with the morning's
first show, "Today's Day Today," it continued (with
commercial interruptions) with the day's broadcasts of
"Sailor Bill," "The End of the World," "Ozzie Knows
Father," The Evening News (including an item about a
man-made baby1
), "The Golden Hind," and a Western called
"Garbanza!"

Late in the evening, the TV channels were

changed, switching through several bits of programs,
including an Italian movie and the Ralph Spoilsport-

181
sponsored Late Late show, "Babes in Khaki."

At last,

after a prayer and the National anthem, the station and
the set were turned off for the day.
(Firesign Theatre’s Big Book 59)
The above list of programs --dangerously crass, exaggerated,
sensational, a parody of real TV--is a catalogue for channel
switching which has brought with it its own way of creating
all kinds of bizarre plots and perceptual leaps within the
minds of the viewers.

Dwarf exploits these leaps that we

make in our minds for the purpose of challenging and
disproving television's authority to disperse truth.
The play starts with a miracle. An unidentified voice
says, "Well! My iron lung is working again.

. . ," an

opening appropriate for the atmosphere of disbelief and its
gradual demystification that are the real issues of the
play.

The turning on of the power switch with which the

play opens is a tendentious moment since it charts out the
distribution of power relations in the play.

A janitor

switches on power while talking to an unspecified mass
audience who are apparently anxiously waiting for the power
to come on:
Janitor: You people got trouble here? Well, I don't
know why you people seem to think this is magic.

It's

just this little chromium switch here . . . [click] My,
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you people are so superstitious . . . (Firesicm
Theatre's Big Book 61)
A radio comes on and we internalize the division created
between the audience and the programs, or audience versus
authority by extension, since they seem to be mesmerised by
the whole act.

An element of menace to the audience, or the

young, is also introduced immediately following the turning
on of power, which brings us back to Ossman's comment about
the Kent State murders.

We hear a policeman say, "Bob, this

is Mobile Security Patrol One.

There seems to be a young-

type person in the audience with a Negro radio.
check that out please?"

(61) .

Would you

The ridiculous circumloction

of "young-type person" parodies the language of lawenforcement with great accuracy.
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to dinner!

'Cause Godamighty, I'm hungry! Yes! I'm

hungry! Safe and sound and hungry!

(Firesian Theatre's

Big Book 63)
Pastor Flash and George Tirebiter who we hear watching the
show meet on the topic of hunger.

That the motif of hunger

is intended to carry the motif of menace becomes evident
when we hear Pastor Flash's exhortations to eat ("We must
^at of our friends the birds, of our friends the cows, of
our friends the pigs.

Yes, its good to eat a friend, my

friend") merge into an advertisement for an unidentified
edible product described as ". . .urreunded by a thin, thin
16 millimeter shell.

And inside it's delicious!"

(65).

The

play here parodies the rhythm of advertisements for the
purpose of condemning the television for something that
sounds vaguely like homicide: an artillery weapon is hinted
in the description "thin, thin 16 millimeter shell"

which

follows on the foot of cannibalism first hinted in Flash's
statement, "Yes, it's good to eat a friend, my friend."
Both statements confirm for us that what the television
proposes to feed you is morally suspect from this point
onwards.

The motif of hunger and its variant cannibalism

(killing), moreover, anticipates Tirebiter's role in his
war-film and Peorgie's court-martial in yet another movie
Hiahschool
openly

Madness where the elements of aggression are more

displayed.
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The advertisements, newscasts, and interviews spawned
by television create a similar menacing lisc that denies us
any glimpse of coherence.

For instance, the list of

headlines before a news show parody the form of headlines.
Their function is to sound almost violently cryptic:
This is the Hour of the Wolf News.
Appear in East.
Sector B.

Big Light Slated to

Sonic Booms Scare Minority Groups in

And there's Hamburger All Over The Highway

in Mystic, Connecticut.

(Firesian Theatre's Big Book

66)

Like the earlier image of the 16 millimeter shell
surrounding something delicious to eet, we have another
vaguely threatening list here, non-explicit as to its
references, but menacing just the same.

Even when the list

sounds detailed and explicit, it is coded as in "Sonic Booms
Scare Minority Groups in Sector B."

The image of shelling

and blowxng-up of body-parts from the 16 mm image is
continued in "And There's Hamburger All Over The Highway in
Mystic Connecticut."
The list form with its non-interpretive syntax

is thus

used by the Firesign Theatre to keep their humor on the
level of demonstration and let the parody destroy its target
by itself.

Lists like the Headline list above or the

following are good examples of this form of peculiarly
unpredictable tendentiousness.

In other words, we are
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unable tc extrapolate a rule regarding the ridiculous, or
the object of laughter, since it might be any word, any
sound, anything at all.

The result of this unpredictability

is that once again we are sensitized to the possibility that
oppression, not suffering, is ubiquitous.

The question we

are left with then is, how are we to react to ubiquitous
oppression?

Television commercials are used pointedly by

the group to draw our attention to the pervasiveness of a
particularly rampant form of public exploitation.

Their

strategy of contention is to let the absurdity of the form
destroy itself through repetition:
1.

Ocelots.

Paupers.

Armenian Gardens.

Pipe-nipples, Polombras, Pizzas!
. .Hank's Juggernaut.

Leviathan. . .Nick's Swell.

. .New

(Firesian Theatre's Big

Book 66)
George mutters this list as he thumbs through the telephone
directory looking for a pizza delivery.

This list with its

meaningful words (ocelot, paupers, pizza) and combination
meaningless words (pipe-nipples, polombras, Armenian
gardens, Hank's juggernaut, new Leviathan, Nick’s swell) are
absurd since most of them sound out-of-place in the Yellow
Pages section.

Their purpose is to add to the surreal

environment that surrounds George.
2.

. . .I've got an envelope that'll clean your car while
you’re driving it home to work.

Well, George, believe

186

me this time, because this one isn't like the Austrian
self -sharpening razors.
like the tropical fishes.
with the dike.
Bob Baseline,
these products.

No, friends, no overheating
No zizzing and dripping like

. . (68)

a television host for commercials, sells
The marvellous phrase "this one isn't like

the. . ." reverses the effect of the elaborate list with
great economy so that we regard the strange, dangerous
products like Austrian self -sharpening razors, overheated
tropical fishes, and the dike that zizzes and drips with a
skeptical eye.

The purpose of the list is to underscore the

incomprehensibility and latent menace of television
programming.
3.

You promise to covet property, propriety, plurality,
surety, security, and not hurt the State?

Say "what"?

(89)
The Bailiff who swears in Mudhead for his trial says these
words, evidently to confuse him and us as we are led to
imagine a society where that is the oath.

If we superimpose

this list on top of the original oath where we are to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the whole truth,
we will hear the tendentious shift in values and priorities
that rule this list.
4.

Right Jack! So far, a complete broken set of color bars
for Mrs. P's new home, some levelled mountain skis and
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water -rollers for that funfilled open season, an
unattached Grid-Five Stand-Up Reheater with a smoke
window, and now. . . .Three hundred full pounds of Chef
Antoines's Southern Fried Glimps, toasted to golden
perfection, cubed, reheated, and returned to water
before you're ready, Mrs. P.
look at that!

And the inside?

Well,

Close the door and the light stays on!

(85)
This list of ostensibly highly desirable household products,
broken set of color bars, fried glimps, etc belong to Danny
Dollars and Bob, the hosts for television's Hawaiaian SellOut game-show.

The purpose of the list is to underscore

tendentiously the total incomprehensibility and scam of
advertisements.
What makes these lists humorous is once again an aspect
of hyperbole or exaggeration, what we might call a
dangerously unaware loudness, often tipping over into the
realm of the nonsense or the absurd, that makes it
vulnerable to ridicule. Oppressive authority represented as
a loud form constitutes the device of parody in Dwarf.

It

is as if the latent aggression is extracted out of all
tyrannical situations and fed through a megaphone where it
is loud enough for anyone to hear it for what it is.

We

hear this loudness in everything Pastor Flash says; we hear
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it in George Tirebiter’s speech to the nation where he asks
for their votes:
• . . not in any way want to put myself in a
confrontatory position either with the United Snakes,
or with Them. And you can believe me, because I never
lie and I'm always right. So wake up!

[slap and baby

crying] And take a look at your only logical choice.
Me. George Tirebiter.

(Firesian Theatre's Big Book 69)

Instead of an outside authority confirming his worth as a
political candidate,

the tautology "I never lie and I'm

always right" makes his argument unexpectedly selfreferential, making us see his authority in no uncertain but
unverified terms.

The authority is thrust upon us

aggressively; hence the slap to the baby.
The same loudness characterizes the speech of Sailor
Bill, another television host, this time for a children's
program:
Ok, kids! And we have another letter here from our
Happy Birthday Gu-gu-gu- gumdropper in Sector R.

It's

little Sally I. Chink--er--uh--Ching! And she's 12
years old today. Well, that's wonderful, Sally! You're
going to start menstruating soon, huh?
you ought to be . . .

Don't you think

(76)

The seeming innocence of radio announcers, used to disguise
actual aggression, is parodied here.

Sailor Bill is both

189
racist ("Sally I. Chink--er--uh--Ching") as well as inclined
to sexually titillating conversation, hinted in his apparent
interest in the girl's menstruation.
In both of the examples above, we find that the
tendentiousness of the parody is legitimate and within the
bounds of civilized humor.

Both targets are summoned only

for the shortest possible time, they are not allowed to
develop any kind of relation between themselves and other
characters which would fix them into a role.

The exact

nature of their aggression is identified and exaggerated in
a dynamic that does not require them to have a victim, or a
ridiculed target.

We are in doubt for a moment that the

parody has a target, but in the tendentious dynamic that we
encounter here the oppressive form is drained of its
specific content and made visible to us in pure form.

But,

like in the hearing of a smutty joke, we understand who the
targets are and what the purpose of the joke is. Both
Tirebiter and Sailor Bill represent a form of aggressive
authority and it is that form that the play satirises so
effectively.
When both the master and the slave are present at
the scene of conflict, there is no attempt made to conceal
the conflict and its exact nature in the manner of the Marx
Brothers reducing the seriousness of the problem of
immigration in A Niaht at the Opera.

For example, in the
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scene where Tirebiter/Mudhead, like P, is prosecuted for an
unspecified crime, the military is held responsible:
Lt. Tirebiter: Surrogate General Klein, sir.

When

I signed my contract with you, I fully intended to
fulfill its terms with honor, sir.

But you never told

me I had to go out there and kill anybody.
Klein:

I. . .

[banging gavel]: Lieutenant, we will not

tolerate the use of prohibited language in this courtmartials. The accursed will be advised of the absence
of his rights under the Secret Code of Military
Toughness and will accordingly.

(87)

Authority is mocked (though the form of submission is
observed) from the very moment of apostrophe onwards:
"Surrogate General Klein, sir," an imposter obviously,
unless it is a legitimate title in the society that is
portrayed. The title thus becomes a pointed comment on the
society itself.

Tirebiter's statement "But you never told

me I had to go out there and kill anybody" intensifies the
paranoid prohibition on the word "kill" that we hear
enforced in an earlier exchange between Tirebiter and Pico
and Alvarado:
Lt. Tirebiter: Make a clean sweep.
enemy and ki-ki-ki-um . . .
Sgt. M: What's that, sir?

Flush out the
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Alvarado: Sir? Lieutenant, excuse me, sir, what
are we gonna do, man?
Pico: Yeah, after we flush 'em out?
Lt. Tirebiter: We're gonna lock and load, Private,
and we're gonna go out there and ki . . .

(79)

Tirebiter's inability to say the word "kill" purposefully
highlights the menace it embodies.

This is a breakthrough

moment in Dwarf where a word, representation of reality in
language, acquires a mysteriously poetic authenticity that
we are, for once, absolutely certain as to what it means.
The play achieves this authenticity through the simple
process of repetition, which brings out its melancholy
menace, rather than turn it comical, putting Frye's
observation about the comic form of repetition once again in
reverse.
Pico: What'll we do when we lock and load?
Lt. Tirebiter: We're gonna ki-ki-ki . . .
Sgt. M: Take it easy.
Peorgie!

It's not your fault,

Come on, Peorgie!

Lt. Tirebiter: ki-ki-ki . . .

(79)

Klein's reply also follows the form of official reprimand,
but it is full of nonsense that makes him sound ridiculous,
but rightfully so, since even here, his nonsense is
aggressive nonsense: telling the truth is termed "the use of
prohibited language," the accused becomes "the accursed,"

192
who will be informed of "the absence of his rights," under
due process of Law which becomes "the Secret Code of
Military Toughness."

Authority undoes its credibility

itself.
The repetition of prohibited words, double entendres
and allusions surrounding every word, and absurd titles like
the above Surrogate Klein create a visible gap between the
absurd society represented by the play and our society.

But

ultimately the absurd world of television in Dwarf is a
tendentious critique of our society since we are the
producers and consumers of this nonsense; we play absurd
roles to amuse ourselves.

But even when trapped inside the

mindless amusement park of television/society, Dwarf allows
authentic existential moments to break through, as in
Tirebiter's inability to pronounce the word "kill" or
Tirebiter's panicked comment "Oh, no, that woman's trying to
kill me!" on seeing his old co-star from Peorgie and Mudhead
movies, "the original 'Bottles,' Mudhead's crazy, hopped-up
girlfriend" who "drops right through the Celebrity Trap
Door"

(68).

These unpredictable and incongruous moments

contain the play's attempt to invest or derive meaning from
the seemingly mindless surface of life portrayed by the
television.

Dwarf's approach to the television is one of

absolute control; they reveal the absurdity of television,
not through any external agents, but by imitating its form
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almost word for word in certain cases, and allowing the form
to gradually destroy its credibility.

But inspite of this

tendentious expose of its absurdity, Dwarf exalts the
technology when George is made to piece together certain
authentic moments from his life from amongst the random
soundbites of advertisements, movies, news shows and
commercials.

This mixture of censure and approbation is

what excludes Dwarf from the extreme categories of McLuhanlike enthusiasm as well as the overwrought paranoia and
pessimism of technology to be found in critics like Jean
Baudrillard of the modern media.

Dwarf shows us television

for what it is--entertainment without beginning or end or
pause--but it is a purposeful revelation; they show us that
this permanent presence is directed towards homogenizing all
kinds of disasters ubiquitous and of the same degree and
kind. This homogenization of different aspects of our
phenomenal world into products for our amusement is
television's singular and particular form of oppression.
Dwarf's contribution to our intellectual discourse about
technology is its perceptive articulation of television's
ideology to homogenize oppression so that unless we learn to
see television as a product it will render our reactions to
it incapable of dissent.

They emphasize the product-form of

television by breaking its linear, seamless continuity and
replacing it with rapid channel-switching that scrambles the
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superficial control of television rendering it
discontinuous, non-linear, and nonsensical.
In We Are All Bozos on This Bus (1972) we find an even
clearer demonstration of systems demolishing themselves from
within.

Here, the central object of satire is modern

technology.

A Tirebiter-like figure, who is now called

Clem, a computer operator rather than a film director, finds
himself at the Wall of Science with his seat-mate Barney
(the group tells us that the ur-form for Bozo was a
children's play realized only in bits and pieces) while on a
tour of the archetypal techno-theme park, the Future Fair
Tour Bus.

Clem, for reasons of his own, enters the

electronic system and tries to reprogram it so it would
answer his question, "Why does the porridge bird lay his egg
in the air?"

Clem finds himself in the hologram mode and

decides to clone himself.

Once again, we hear the exact

appropriation of the form of modern technological discourse
in Clem's conversations with the machine:
Clem: Prepare, shift, simulfax for hue and form.
Prepare for mirror clone . . .
Barney: What are you doing?
Clem: Clone me!
Mac: Password.

Illegal entry.

Clem: Clone me, Dr. Memory?
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Mac:

Thank you.

(Firesian Theatre's Big Book

125)
We note that the machine is clearly the one in control here.
Clem has to modify his imperative command "Clone me!" to a
more submissive form, "Clone me, Dr. Memory?"
Clem/Clone duality attempts to conduct a conversation with
the machine:
Clem/Clone: I have a question for Dr. Ah . . .
Dr. M: UHHHHHHHHH . . .
Clem/Clone: For Dr. Ah . . .
Mac 1: Ah-vocado . . .
Mac 2:

...

aguacatl, nahuatl, chocolotl, ocelotl

Mac 3: Aligator Pear, crocagator pair,

dat's why

dey's so mean . . .
Clem/Clone: No, no, no!
Mac 1: Nos.

Many nos.

Or . . .

Mac 2: . . .knows as in HE SHE IT knows . . .
Mac 3: SHE . . .

IT

(Firesian Theatre's Big Book

125)
The electronic system in on its way to a total breakdown as
we hear it latch on to any sound that Clem/Clone makes and
tries to give information about it.

Like the nonsense

substituted in Surrogate General Klein's speech, the
breakdown of the machine produces an absurd list of sounds,
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the sound "A" leading to Avocado, aguacatl (spawning its own
series of what sounds like Mayan names but are English words
made to sound Indian--chocolotl, ocelotl), and Clem's
frustrated interjection "No, no, no," giving rise to the
"Many nos" leading to "knows" which brings us to
scatological stop in "SHE. . .IT."

The disintegration

increases in tempo when Clem asks the machine his question:
Clem/Clone: All right, Doc--this is it! Gird your
grid for a big one!

Why does the

porridge bird lay his

egg in the air?
Dr M: N000000000000000 . . .
Mac 2: White dust 'n' perished birds leaves its hex
in the air?
Dr M: N000000000000000 . . .
Mac 3: Wise doves 'n' parish bards lazy leg in the
Eire?

Dr. M: NOOOOOOOOOOOOOO . . .
Mac 2: Wise ass the poor rich Bar
[Honk]
Mac 3: DELAY . . .
Mac 2:

. . .lazer's edge in the Fair?

(129)

The system's inability to answer Clem's question and its
disintegration from within is demonstrated in the form of an
electrical short circuit that finally shuts the machine
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down.

This atmosphere of disintegration is carnival -like,

especially with the honking sounds in the background.
The rebellion displayed by the powerless in these plays
confronts oppressive authority by downplaying its effect on
the voices or the charaoces.

The society that these

characters inhabit are chaotic, menacing as well as absurd.
The defense strategy to counter this ubiquitous oppression
is to allow it to destroy itself.

The political

implications of this plan of attack is inwardly directed as
well.

The characters demonstrate for us the way in which

humor can be used as a subversive, distancing tool from the
framework of aggression, which, however, does not signify
inaction on the part of the characters.

They display a

tenacity to defend their sense of equality in the face of
conflict through an unequivocal rebellion towards that which
oppresses them.

Freud observed that the best instance of

humor serves an illusion, but he added that humor is
precisely a demonstration of an attitude of mind towards
suffering that repudiates the fact of suffering without
quitting the grounds of mental sanity that other forms of
repression might bring.

It has a peculiarly fine and

liberating effect to it since it does not belittle the ego.
It is this self-conscious triumph of the ego in the face of
conflict that is the most important contribution of the
Firesign Theatre to the philosophy of humor.

CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion: Towards Non-tendentious Humor and Non-violent
Rebellion

Thomas Leary's translation of the ancient Chinese document
on military strategy, The Art of War, compiled over two
thousand years ago by Sun Tzu, opens with a parable:
According to an old story, a lord of ancient China
once asked his physician, a member of a family of
healers, which of them was the most skilled in the art.
The physician, whose reputation was such that his
name became synonymous with medical science in China,
replied, "My eldest brother sees the spirit of sickness
and removes it before it takes shape, so his name does
not get out of the house.
"My elder brother cures sickness when it is still
extremely minute, so his name does not get out of the
neighborhood.
"As for me, I puncture veins, prescribe potions,
and massage skin, so from time to time my name gets out
and is heard among the lords."
x)
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As this story illustrates medical science and military
strategy have one factor in common: both serve pain.

Both

are necessary to relieve suffering but the less we need them
the better would be the quality of our lives.

This is the

reason why the physician exalts his eldest brother as the
perfect healer--the one who has the power to stop the
disease while it is still in its spirit.

But in the

imperfect world we live in it is altogether impossible to
access the underlying causes of afflictions before they take
shape and preventative arts start their work by dealing with
symptoms.
Humor operates quietly like the physician's eldest
brother who did not win any fame because he could kill the
sickness while it was still in its spirit form.

All the

texts that we have looked at--those of Browne, Kipling,
Parker, The Firesign Theatre-- exemplify this quest for a
quiet manner to defeat aggression.

The quest took many

forms; we found that it is virtually impossible to faze
Browne and Kipling from the outside because of their exalted
sense of themselves.

We found that Parker developed a

melancholy awareness that protected her from self-deception.
Her prolonged suffering and ruthlessness to herself have a
monastic quality to it because it brings with it selfawareness.

The plays of the Firesign Theatre demonstrated

how loud laughter and aggression eventually have to die down
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spontaneously if the rest of us vaccinate ourselves against
it by a good dose of rebellion.

The strategies to confront

aggression in a quiet manner are different, but they all
have a common denominator: they self-consciously avoid
attacking their adversaries directly and instead defeat the
enemy in an indirect, non-violent manner.

The non-violence

is not the sign of passivity or weakness; it is the sign of
a shrewd mind.

The humorous point of view exemplifies what

Sun Tzu termed "remembering danger":
So the rule of military operations is not to count
on opponents not coming, but to rely on having ways of
dealing with them; not to count on opponents not
attacking, but to rely on having what cannot be
attacked.

(The Art of War 65)

The humorous perspective demonstrated by these texts is one
that sets out to create "what cannot be attacked."
internal quality grounded in introspection.

It is an

Aggression is

an ubiquitous dialectic, a continual strife; then what has
the power to offer a paradoxical relief from this strife is
to be alert to the existence of conflict. Our goal is to
posit the existence of a liberating laughter borne of a
sense of humor that accepts its political and social
responsibility.
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